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SYMPOSIUM
TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF
LAW
Sponsored by
The Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law
in cooperation with
The International Legal Studies Program
of the
Washington College of Law,
The American University
INTRODUCTION
PROFESSOR ROBERT KOGOD GOLDMAN
On March 8 and 9, 1990, the Washington College of Law hosted a
conference on "Transitions to Democracy and the Rule of Law" as the
inaugural activity of its Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law. The newly established Center, which I co-direct with my faculty
colleagues, Claudio Grossman and Herman Schwartz, is a tangible ex-
pression of the Law School's commitment to the cause of human rights
at home and abroad and will build on our record of scholarship and
activism in these two complementary branches of international law. In
addition to organizing and hosting conferences with international orga-
nizations and non-governmental groups, the Center will undertake do-
mestic and international litigation, develop multilingual human rights
and humanitarian law materials, and enable foreign and United States
lawyers to acquire skills training and pursue advanced studies in both
fields of law.
The March conference brought together an impressive group of
1. Professor of Law and Louis C. James Scholar, Washington College of Law, The
American University, Washington, D.C.
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prominent human rights leaders, practitioners, and scholars from Eu-
rope, Latin America, and the United States who, over two days on a
series of panels, grappled with many of the formidable legal questions
confronting the emergent democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin
America. This volume of The American University Journal of Interna-
tional Law and Policy provides a comprehensive transcription of the
remarks of the speakers on various panels at the conference. These pro-
ceedings are engaging reading with thoughtful insights into, and di-
verse perspectives on, the process of building genuine democratic insti-
tutions in these countries. The conference was a fitting beginning to our
Center's important work.
OPENING REMARKS
DEAN ELLIOTT MILSTEIN1
Today we announce the birth of our Center for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law; a Center within the Washington College of Law
which will permit us to consolidate and expand the work of our faculty
in this very important area.
Our faculty has long been active in promoting the rule of law
throughout the world as part of the struggle to protect human rights.
They have observed elections and visited political prisoners. They have
conducted litigation and influenced, or at least tried to influence, for-
eign policy. They have reported human rights abuses and published
scholarly articles. They have organized symposia and spoken to the
press. They have educated countless students. They have done these
things because they share in a belief that the law provides powerful
weapons for the just to fight against the wicked; a belief that for a
lawyer to fight against the abuse of human rights is to engage in the
most important fight of all.
Last fall, three of our faculty approached me with the idea of start-
ing a Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law at the Law
School. Claudio Grossman, Robert Goldman, and Herman Schwartz
told me about the terrific ideas they have for this Center and the
projects that we will be able to do as a law school in this field. The first
project that they mentioned, this conference, is an important event in
its own right and a fitting way to inaugurate our new Center.
1. Dean, Washington College of Law, The American University, Washington, D.C.
In February 1990, Dean Milstein travelled to Nicaragua to act as an observer in the
first free elections to take place in that country.
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I suppose you all are familiar with the work of Claudio Grossman in
the field of international human rights. Claudio has taught me many
things. I have traveled with him to Chile, Nicaragua, Argentina, and
Israel. Claudio, among other distinctions, litigated the first ease to be
tried before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights last year. The
case was against Honduras. Through Claudio's work and the work of
other lawyers working with him, Honduras has been ordered to pay
money damages to the victims of its repressive political regime.
Bob Goldman has been involved in thS human rights struggle for his
entire career, more than twenty years. He has been involved in human
rights missions in almost every country in Central and South America.
Most recently he has been active in fighting against the amnesty that
Uruguay has declared for crimes committed by the military.
Herman Schwartz has been active in fighting for the rights of prison-
ers in the United States; fighting for the disenfranchised. He was one
of the founders of the National Prison Project.
Herman has also done many important things for the Washington
College of Law. He started our Israeli civil rights program. Each year
two lawyers come to the Law School from Israel to study international
human rights and/or American public interest law. They then go back
to Israel to be public interest lawyers. When I was in Israel last sum-
mer, two of these lawyers won a case to require the military to give
notice and hold a hearing before they tear a person's house down.
Though these rights seem basic, in Israel this was a new civil right.
Herman can take some of the credit for making that kind of change in
Israel. In addition, he brought the first South African lawyer to our
program to study American public interest law and has been working
in the human rights area in Eastern Europe, particularly in Czechoslo-
vakia. These three people are the co-directors of our new Center.
We have other faculty who are also very well known in the human
rights area. Tom Farer has a joint appointment with the Law School
and the School of International Service and will be working in the
Center. Rick Wilson, the newest member of our clinical faculty, is
starting a clinical program at the Law School in international human
rights next year. Rick and about eight students expect to be handling
cases before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights next
year. This will be the first in-house clinical program handling human
rights cases. Bob Dinerstein, the director of our clinic, has been on
human rights missions to Chile. Fred Anderson, the former dean of our
Law School, has been on human rights missions to Chile and
Argentina.
It is also fitting that this Center will be at The American University.
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The American University has students from more foreign countries
than any other university in the world. We also have an International
Legal Studies Program, a Master of Laws degree program that has
attracted more than 100 students each semester from more than forty
foreign countries. About a third of those students are here to study
human rights. In addition, The American University has other notables
such as Lou Goodman, the Dean of the School of International Service,
Sandy Unger, the Dean of our School of Communications, and other
faculty involved in human rights. We are very, very optimistic and
proud of what we are going to be able to accomplish.
Our new Center is going to engage in scholarship, litigation, and ad-
vocacy. We will teach and prepare teaching materials. We are going to
have symposia and conferences. We are going to provide education to
hundreds and hundreds of lawyers from around the world. I am confi-
dent that this Center will be successful and invite each of you to par-
ticipate in its future. &
I would like to add one other personal comment as this conference on
the "Transition to Democracy" begins. Two weeks ago I was with
Claudio Grossman, the International Human Rights Law Group, Amy
Young and Karen Penn, and others in Nicaragua. One day, we were in
one of the poorest neighborhoods in Managua. It is hard to describe the
poverty that we saw in Nicaragua, but this was the worst. The polling
place was in a shack with a dirt floor and no windows. There were bags
piled against the wall. The light came in through big spaces between
the slats of the boards that made up the shack. A bare bulb hung from
the ceiling.
A woman came in with her husband. The head of the polling place
turned to the international observers and said, "We have a lot of illiter-
acy in the neighborhood and we have to be very flexible; so what we do
is let the husband go in with an illiterate wife or vice versa to help
them vote. Unless you have objections, that will occur." It did. The
ballots were very large to protect against fraud. They were folded.
There was a black ink stripe to make certain that the vote was secret.
The wind blew the woman's ballot open as she came to put her ballot in
the box. She had voted for "UNO."
I learned from this experience that there was an energy, a desire, to
engage in the right of political participation even among the poorest
and most illiterate people in the society. They felt free to vote for
whomever they wanted. This made me feel that there is hope for the
spread of democracy throughout the world.
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PROFESSOR CLAUDIO GROSSMAN 1
Are there common bonds that link a Bush Negro tribe in Surinam,
Czechoslovakians, East Germans, Nicaraguans, Chileans, and
Paraguayans? On December 31, 1987, eight members of the Saramaka
tribe in Surinam were killed by the armed forces. They were made to
dig their own graves before the soldiers executed them. The Saramakas
are a Bush Negro tribe; a very proud African people with a tremendous
sense of dignity. They had escaped long ago from the slavery of the
Dutch plantations in Surinam in the 17th century. They had refused to
be slaves, and since then they have struggled to "keep their own ways"
and their right to be independent. Currently, a number of students at
our Law School are assisting me in presenting a claim against the gov-
ernment of Surinam before the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights on behalf of the relatives of these slain Saramaka tribesmen.
Elections were recently held in Nicaragua, Chile, and Paraguay. The
international monitors who observed these elections were all impressed
by the quiet dignity, almost the religious dignity, with which people in
those countries lined up to express their will and to freely determine
their future. They exercised something that they perceived to be very
important: the right to influence the political character of their na-
tion-for the first time in years the people were truly actors in shaping
their collective destiny.
In Czechoslovakia and East Germany, walls-both spiritual and ma-
terial-have been destroyed. The people there are seized by the power-
ful idea of freedom and the notion that arbitrary controls placed by
government on the development of human beings are morally and polit-
ically unacceptable.
In spite of huge differences in geography, culture, and experience,
the Bush Negro tribe, the East Germans, the Czechoslovakians, the
Chileans, and others share a common past of human suffering. That
suffering, however, does not tell the whole story. They also are linked
by their dignity in the face of repression and by their belief that it is
possible to create a freer society and that they can be key actors in that
endeavor. All of us who have had the opportunity to witness the politi-
cal transitions taking place in these countries cannot help but be deeply
moved by the intensity of the feelings and the powerful motivations of
their people. We have returned to our own countries, after having
viewed those events, with a renewed commitment to human dignby and
with the hope that things can be better.
1. Professor of Law and Geraldson Scholar, Director, International Legal Studies
Program, Washington College of Law, The American University, Washington, D.C.
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The shared legacy of repression existing in these countries also poses
some common legal questions for their transitional governments. One
of the most difficult questions concerns accountability for human rights
violations during the previous regimes. What should be done with
members of the armed forces and the secret police who committed
these crimes? How this issue is resolved can contribute either to
strengthening or weakening the new democratic, but still fragile, insti-
tutions and to uniting or dividing society. Other questions address the
creation and organization of new legal arrangements. What, for exam-
ple, should be the role of the judiciary in protecting individual rights?
How does a society beset by ethnic tensions reach consensus on a com-
mon core of values that recognizes and protects both majority and mi-
nority rights? What can the international community, and particularly
the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), do to aid this process?
We are here to discuss these and related issues. We are also here
because we believe that lawyers can solve these problems. Although we
will probably not be able to answer all these questions over the next
two days, it is important that they be addressed and debated.
The new Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law of The
American University is particularly pleased to provide a forum for the
discussion of these matters. I look forward to listening to and exchang-
ing ideas with you and, hopefully, together we can shed some light on,
and pave the way for, an ongoing debate on these important issues.
PANEL I
TRANSITIONS IN THE MIDST OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF
THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION
REMARKS OF ARYEH NEIER'
The international community should not decrease its advocacy for
human rights when a country makes the transition to democracy. An
experience I had when I was with the American Civil Liberties Union
illustrated this point to me.
I had traveled to India where I met a distinguished advocate of
human rights who had once been associated with an Indian civil liber-
ties organization. I asked him what had happened to the Indian Civil
Liberties Union. He told me that Roger Baldwin, founder of the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union, had traveled to India and enlisted, among
I. Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, New York, New York.
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others, Jawaharlah Nehru to organize the Indian Civil Liberties Union.
Nehru became the group's chairman. But when Nehru became prime
minister, he wrote a letter to the Board of Directors of the Indian Civil
Liberties Union. He suggested that, since he had become prime minis-
ter there was no longer a need for an Indian Civil Liberties Union, the
group should disband. The group complied.
My friend, the distinguished advocate, was arrested when Nehru's
daughter, Prime Minister Indira Ghandi, imposed her state of emer-
gency. Because of that state of emergency, the same group of people
met to reconstitute a civil liberties organization in India.
Clearly, civil liberties should not disband during transitions to de-
mocracy. Indeed, evidence shows that some of the greatest dangers to
human rights and some of the most severe violations take place in the
years following soon after transitions to democracy.
The Human Rights Watch, for example, documents the persecution
of human rights monitors worldwide. A report published this past De-
cember enumerated some sixty-eight killings of human rights monitors
around the world that we found out about during the course of the
year. All but five of those killings took place in countries that are ordi-
narily considered democratic. Only five took place in dictatorships of
the right or the left. The majority of those which took place in the so-
called democracies took place in countries that had fairly recently en-
gaged in what would usually be described as free and fair elections.
Another organization, the Committee to Protect Journalists, is-about
to issue its annual report on attacks on journalists worldwide. It will
show a similar pattern with respect to journalists. More than fifty jour-
nalists were killed around the world during the past year. Virtually all
were killed in countries ordinarily labeled democratic.
The question is, why is it so dangerous for human rights monitors,
journalists, and others in these circumstances? Though I am not sure of
the answer, I offer a suggestion. There is a moment in the history of a
country when the political process opens up and many people become
active in human rights matters. Others engage in investigative report-
ing. Many other citizens are active in ways that were not possible dur-
ing the period of dictatorship of the right or the left. People are en-
couraged at that moment to take advantage of the relative openness
within a country, yet, in so many countries around the world the estab-
lishment of the rule of law does not accompany this openness. Accord-
ingly, those who were active become subject to reprisals by people who
do not care for human rights monitoring or who dislike investigative
journalism that is underway. Further, the institutions of the society are
too weak at that stage to hold accountable those who attack human
1990]
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rights monitors, journalists, and others.
These are difficult times in many countries. Once the political pro-
cess has opened, there is an opportunity to establish the rule of law.
There is an opportunity to establish the institutions of a civil society
through which it is possible for persons to associate freely with each
other and to advocate the causes and press the interests that unite them
in those organizations.
We have not reached the point of nirvana when political opening has
taken place, and the so-called transition to democracy has begun. In
many Latin American and East Asian countries, where this kind of
transition is taking place, there is an increase in violence during this
transition. In Guatemala, for example, there has been an increase in
danger to human rights since the establishment of a democratic govern-
ment. It is more dangerous in Guatemala today than it was during the
last three years of military rule that preceded the establishment of the
government of Vinicio Cerezo.
In Brazil, a country which is not ordinarily high on the human rights
agenda in any significant way, there are enormous numbers of death
squad killings, large numbers of disappearances, the routine practice of
torture, and frequent and often violent violations of the rights of Indi-
ans. Summary executions of peasants over land disputes by killers
working for rural landowners are common, and there is virtually no
possibility for prosecution or court enforced punishment. Yet Brazil has
largely disappeared from the international human rights agenda be-
cause it has made the transition to democracy. Democracy can provide
a government with the opportunity to shield itself from the kind of
scrutiny and criticism that is more easily directed against dictatorships
of the right and the left. I am not saying that these situations of great
danger will take place in every country. Two countries which are un-
dergoing transitions at this moment are among those about which I am
optimistic. In Eastern Europe, I am most optimistic about Czechoslova-
kia because it had a civil society "from below" and a democratic tradi-
tion which is reasserting itself. I believe that human rights will be very
well protected in Czechoslovakia. In Latin America, the prospect for
the protection of human rights in Chile is much better than in many
other Latin American countries.
All over the world there are governments where abuses will persist.
People concerned with human rights in the immediate aftermath of a
transition may be in the most danger. The international community
must combat the belief that problems are at an end once a transition to
democracy has taken place.
[VOL. 5:965
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REMARKS OF PROFESSOR RICHARD LILUCH1
I obviously view the events in Eastern Europe and elsewhere with
great satisfaction. However, I do not think we want to view them, at
least from the perspective of the NGO community, with too great an
amount of self-satisfaction. I think most NGOs should be rather mod-
est about the role that they have played in many of the recent develop-
ments. As indicated earlier, the people who really should get the credit
for the remarkable developments we have witnessed are the people who
were in the trenches over the past few years and decades. Moreover,
the people who are going to play important roles in the future, of
course, are these same people who are in the trenches now. Therefore,
rather than rush into a variety of rather trendy activities, I would sug-
gest that NGOs approach the future by considering how best they can
assist in the development of human rights law and practice around the
world in a very modest and low profile fashion. It may well be that in
many instances the role of NGOs is going to be relatively marginal, or
at least radically different from what it has been in the past.
I have grouped my remarks today under three points: First, a new
emphasis for new problems; second, a renewed commitment to tradi-
tional concerns; and third, the impact of recent developments upon the
approach to international human rights law in the United States, a
matter I find to be almost entirely neglected in many of the editorial
pieces and other commentaries now being published. There is great
self-satisfaction about events in Eastern Europe on the part of the Bush
Administration. There is great self-satisfaction among a variety of
other groups who view recent developments as a victory not only for
democracy, but also for their version of the free enterprise system. I
think it unfortunate that few people are concerned with what we in the
United States can learn from Eastern Europe. The East German Social
Charter, that was adopted in March 1990, tells us things that we ought
to be concerned about in the neglected area of economic, social, and
cultural rights. The Eastern Europeans, I suggest, certainly want our
form of democratic government, but by no means do they want the
type of unregulated capitalism, coupled with the reduction of social
programs, that became the hallmark of the Reagan Administration.
First, new emphasis on new problems. By and large, what NGOs are
doing is fine, and they ought to continue to do what they have done in
the past, not only in Eastern Europe, but also in many other areas of
the world. I believe, however, that NGOs have to go beyond what they
1. Professor, University of Virginia School of Law, Charlottesville, Virginia.
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have been accustomed to doing in the past. One has to move from just
criticizing and pointing out human rights abuses in other coun-
tries-which has been the major activity of human rights groups in the
past-to getting into the service area, if you will, by providing support
to human rights developments in other countries. The old cliche about
the carrot and the stick has some relevance insofar as the future role of
NGOs are concerned.
Let me suggest that such things as institution building, constitution
drafting, legal training, and legal aid and assistance may be much
more important factors in the development of human rights in other
countries than just the critical reports that have been the mainstay of
NGO activities in the past. Obviously, there are going to continue to be
many, many countries in which grave and serious human rights depri-
vations continue to occur. That is why I suggested that NGOs should
continue with what they have been doing in the past. But it seems to
me that there are a whole range of new ideas that have to be brought
into play.
One important factor, of course, is that governments may no longer
be the primary problem. The approach of the NGOs generally has been
to criticize governments, but it may be that governments now need as-
sistance in attempting to impose a human rights regime upon their
countries to develop civil rights and liberties. Therefore, assistance,
rather than criticism, may be the order of the day.
Another point I think we have to keep in mind is that international
human rights lawyers per se may not be the most important actors in
providing this kind of assistance. I, as I am sure is true of most of the
members of the panel and a good many people in the audience, have
been asked to go on a variety of constitution drafting missions. I have
said no to all of these offers. I have recommended instead one of my
colleagues, who is in Budapest right now and will be in the Soviet
Union next week, because it seems to me that constitutional lawyers
and administrative lawyers are the kind of people needed by many
countries these days, more so than human rights lawyers. Moreover,
one cannot forget, particularly in countries like Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary, and Poland, that there is a wealth of talent right there, waiting to
be tapped. One must avoid the paternalistic approach to constitution
drafting that surfaces from time to time. I am sure most of you saw the
article on constitution drafting in The New York Times2 which in-
cluded the hourly rate of one prominent international human rights
lawyer. I would suggest that is not the approach to take.
2. Wiehl, Constitution, Anyone? A New Cottage Industry, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2,
1990, at B6.
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Additionally, we are going to have a lot of old problems in new con-
texts, as has been pointed out in one or two editorial pieces appearing
this spring. Opening up the states of Eastern Europe has opened up old,
racial antagonisms, so there are racial problems. We may have
problems with the treatment of minorities where there had not been
problems in those countries while the iron hand of the Communist re-
gimes prevented them. We must take new approaches to new problems.
I hope that all NGOs are considering these matters as they assess what
their human rights agenda should be for the coming years.
Second, I would like to talk about a renewed commitment to tradi-
tional concerns, because, as I have indicated before, I think one has to
continue what one has done before but do it in an even better fashion.
Let us consider, then, the traditional human rights agenda of NGOs.
Obviously a lot of new things have come on the agenda. Some of
these things should have been on it years ago. Frankly, a lot of things
that in the past should have been on the agenda never were on the
agenda of most NGOs. I wonder how many people paid much attention
to Roberta Cohen's report on China two years ago. All of a sudden,
human rights in China has become a very, very hot topic indeed. It
should have been such a topic all along. Incidentally, I was very glad to
read the report on Albania by the Minnesota Lawyers International
Committee. Albania has been overlooked and has not been on the
agenda of the NGO community in the past.
In addition to these overlooked areas, one could talk about certain
countries in Africa. Some countries in Africa, such as Ethiopia, seem to
get all the attention. Other countries, like Zimbabwe, get almost no
attention at all. Recent efforts to get a prominent NGO to undertake a
mission to Zimbabwe have fallen on deaf ears in the United States.
That is unfortunate because, while there may be human rights
problems in Zimbabwe, there have been remarkable successes too,
which if publicized might serve to make that country a "role model"
for other African states.
And dare one say it: There is a country called Israel; I wonder some-
times whether we should not have a group called Israel Watch. It
would certainly have a very busy human rights agenda. And I can
speak with some experience as well as disappointment here, because I
have been remarkably unsuccessful in getting a prominent Washington
NGO to investigate the situation on the West Bank.
Of course, there are other countries that need monitoring of the
traditional type as well. We have to reassess, at least in my estimation,
usual targets such as Turkey, which all of a sudden, because their im-
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portance to the national security concerns of the United States may
have lessened, have become more susceptible to governmental pressure
than they were in the past. Perhaps NGOs should increase the atten-
tion they pay to such states.
My next point, insofar as the agenda is concerned, is to stress the
need for a little bit more cooperation and coordination between NGOs
in the United States and NGOs overseas, as well as between NGOs in
the United States. I am on the board of one prominent English-based
NGO. I find its attempts to reach out and coordinate activities and
even to assist the activities of NGOs in the United States have not met
with the enthusiasm on the part of their American counterparts that I
would like to see. It seems to me unfortunate to turn aside efforts by
NGOs in other countries to assist in the development of human rights
law in the United States-for instance, by not taking up the offer of
assistance in making European Convention precedents available for in-
clusion in amicus curiae briefs to the Supreme Court and other United
States courts being filed by American NGOs. I just cannot understand
why there is not more cooperation in that and other areas.
Moreover, there is a lack of cooperation, to say the least, between
many NGOs within the United States. It may be fueled to some extent
by the competition for the almighty dollar from foundations; in any
event, one finds turf battles occurring all the time. I do not want to go
into any of the turf battles that I have participated in-some I have
won, some I have lost-6ut it does distress me when I hear that the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in New York is thinking about
establishing a branch office in Washington. One of the exciting things
about the development of human rights NGOs in the United
States-like the Minnesota group and Human Rights Advocates in San
Francisco-is to have local groups around the country. The idea that
we need to have some kind of centralized organization with branch of-
fices-the Baker & McKenzie of international human rights law
firms-is somewhat appalling.
My third point focuses on the impact of recent developments in East-
ern Europe upon the activities of NGOs in the United States. One of
the great overlooked issues today is the lack of the United States' par-
ticipation in the monitoring bodies of the major human rights treaties.
That follows from the fact that, with the exception of the Genocide
Convention,3 the United States has ratified none of the six major inter-
national human rights treaties pending before the Senate. During the
3. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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Reagan Administration the rhetoric was that these treaties were under
study, but our guest speaker at lunch, Ambassador Schifter, eventually
came out of the closet in Quebec in 1985 to say that he opposed these
treaties. He used as an example against ratification one that I would
hope that he would reassess now because, of course, it was the example
of Poland's ratification of the Civil and Political Covenant.4
Why should we ratify the Covenant, he argued, when Poland, who
has ratified it, takes advantage of its provision to derogate in states of
emergency. Moreover, he argued, they have not subscribed to the Op-
tional Protocol5 and hence no effective enforcement mechanism exists.
That argument comes like an ill wind out of the mouth of a United
States spokesman, because even President Carter, as we all know, did
not send up the Optional Protocol for Senate advice and consent. To
criticize Poland on that score is somewhat unbecoming, to say no more.
In any event, Poland is aboard now. The Soviet Uni6n is going to
ratify the Optional Protocol. Moreover, almost all the Eastern Euro-
pean countries now have applied for membership in the Council of Eu-
rope. The writ of the European Court soon will run over most of Cen-
tral Europe. In place of the "Evil Empire" we shall have a host of
independent states committed to the standards found in the major in-
ternational human rights instruments.
Where does that leave the United States? I think we have a tremen-
dous opportunity to push for U.S. ratification of at least the Civil and
Political Covenant. I leave this afternoon for a two-day conference in
Georgia where a variety of people, including Professor Sohn, and peo-
ple from the United States government and the United Nations, will be
talking about the ratification of this treaty. It would be a very good
thing if the NGOs that have been relatively spoke on the need for the
United States to ratify this and other treaties speak up more and made
treaty ratification one of the major objectives on their agendas.
The PAIL Institute sponsored a conference here in Washington ear-
lier this year that was very poorly attended by the very NGOs that are
represented in this room. There does not seem to be much interest in
mounting the long-term effort needed to obtain ratification of the
human rights treaties. I think that NGOs should make it a major goal,
because 1991 is the bicentennial of the ratification of the Bill of Rights,
that the United States at least ratify the portion of the International
4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
5. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 302.
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Bill of Rights called the Civil and Political Covenant.
We hear so much rhetoric today, particularly from the U.S. govern-
ment, but also from other sources, reflecting great self-satisfaction
about the triumph of democracy and the free market system in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union. I do not know if democracy necessarily
embraces the free market system, but I would suggest that we have a
lot to learn from the Eastern Europeans and from some of the ideas
that they are going to bring to the West as part of their assimilation
into the Council of Europe. The East German Social Charter is an ex-
ample. I think that one of the areas that NGOs in the United States
have not treated adequately-and I am certainly guilty of this derelic-
tion in my own writing and my own work-is the area of economic,
social, and cultural rights. I think this is one of the major areas that
must receive far greater attention from the NGO community in the
future. If, in effect, we are going to learn something from this process
that is going on, as well as contribute to it in the future, I think we
ought to be very concerned about the ways in which we can borrow
from some of these other countries and develop our own system in a
more effective and just and humane fashion.
REMARKS OF HUGO FRUHLING'
When I was asked to speak on Latin America and looked at the
subject of this panel discussion, I began to ask myself a series of
questions.
Whose crisis should I speak about? Should it be this crisis of the
human rights situation in Latin America, for instance? I assessed the
situation there. The human rights picture in some countries is as bleak
as ever. In others, like Colombia and Peru, it is deteriorating. But in
countries in the Southern Cone, the human rights situation is better
than it has been in the last fifteen or twenty years.
Should I speak about the role of NGOs in Latin America, which is
facing a very grave and terrible economic and social crisis, rising social
demands, and a deterioration in the states' abilities to respond to this
demand? This is too large an issue to discuss in ten or fifteen minutes,
and there are certainly national differences which should be taken into
account.
I decided to discuss the crisis of NGOs in situations in which transi-
tions to democracy are taking place and human rights violations have
1. Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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decreased dramatically since a new civilian government took charge.
As Aryeh Neier was saying, this is not happening in Brazil, Guate-
mala, or El Salvador. At this moment this is happening in Uruguay
and Argentina, and I predict it will happen in Chile.
This issue is a less dramatic one. We are not talking about the dete-
rioration of the human rights scene in general; we are discussing the
problems that human rights NGOs face in such a situation. NGOs
were created to fight against gross and systematic human rights viola-
tions that took place under military regimes. In a new political environ-
ment, they have to expand their agendas, which is difficult. In many
cases, as in Argentina and Uruguay for example, the struggle to make
governments or past armed forces officers accountable for past viola-
tions exhausts NGOs' efforts and demoralizes their activists. In other
cases, NGOs' close connections with the opposition mean that some of
their members will enter public roles. The question is, therefore, how
do we see the human rights movement?
What are the kinds of institutional arrangements that would promote
a stronger human rights movement in situations in which transitions to
democracy and serious attempts to impose a rule of law are occurring?
This is a less dramatic question because, to some extent, NGOs face
this crisis as a result of their partial success. They played a major role
in weakening authoritarian rule. They played a measurable role in the
transition to democracy. They are, to some extent, responsible for the
new political situation. This crisis opens up opportunities to reflect on
the human rights movement and the new priorities that should be as-
signed in countries of this sort. As in any crisis, there is the possibility
for failures and for new successes.
I would like to address this issue by looking first at the new institu-
tional structure. I would posit a few points dealing with what the new
international human rights movement should be like in these countries
in the future. I will explain what the goal of a human rights movement
should be in these countries and what kind of steps national and inter-
national organizations should take toward that end.
The main goal of the human rights movement in such situations is to
make the human rights issue a national issue. This means to stimulate
debate about human rights and encourage cross-fertilization of dia-
logue among people of different political opinions about human rights
issues. We must overcome divisions coming from the past without for-
getting the issue of accountability and trials for human rights offend-
ers. We must also try to build trust, as well as organizations that are
capable of attracting people from different ideological persuasions.
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To do that, we have to create an institutional structure that is com-
prised of more actors in the human rights field. I am a big defender of
human rights organizations. I have participated in some of them and I
have directed my work as an attorney towards them. I do, however,
think that a strong human rights concern requires a more diversified
group of actors working in the human rights field.
I begin with government. The government, by definition, is usually
our opponent in the human rights struggle. But there is no possibility of
building up an efficient, functional human rights system without the
participation of the government, Congressmen, and judges. There is no
possibility whatsoever of passing laws to reform current problems in the
criminal justice system, in the administration of justice, in the lack of
access to justice by the poor population, without at least influencing
and having a fertile dialogue with public authorities. We should bring
in the government to participate in the human rights field. We should
recruit judges to participate in the human rights struggle.
We should push the universities to teach human rights as one of their
main concerns. Universities play a major role in Latin American socie-
ties. Most judges and human rights advocates are going to get their
degrees there. Human rights is taught in some courses at a very general
level in a few universities in Latin America. We have to push these
universities to give these courses more relevance in the curriculum.
NGOs should participate in that effort. They should prepare teach-
ing materials based on their own experience and cases of human rights
violations to provide the universities with teaching materials for these
courses. They should create internships within NGOs for interested
students. They should create career possibilities so people who are in-
terested in human rights coming out of law schools may pursue profes-
sional careers in human rights litigation.
In addition, new NGOs should probably be created. These new
NGOs should invite participation from people whose views span the
ideological spectrum. They should address civil liberties issues that ac-
tually arise from the permanent structural deficiencies of their institu-
tional system and economic inequalities that are present in so many
Latin American countries.
I firmly believe that tolerance for a certain type of human rights
violations, like tolerance for a terrible jail system or unacceptable be-
havior of the police, paves the way for a culture that permits gross and
systematic human rights violations in the future. If we do not scrutinize
violations that seem minor in comparison to what happened in the near
past, we will not be able to build a strong democratic and human rights
abiding culture. Institutional actors should be much more diversified.
We should encourage the emergence of these new actors.
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We should encourage research. I mention this not only because I am
an academic but because research plays a major role in institutional-
izing a certain practice or subject within a society. There is a lot of
research coming out of Latin American NGOs which is excellent in
some respects. The problem with research in human rights in Latin
America is that the main consumer of research is the NGO commu-
nity. This would not be a problem, however, if the human rights com-
munity was not small as compared to the many people who could cre-
ate and who could appreciate this research. We should make an effort
to reach out to the largest sectors of the community with our research
pieces. Human rights research does not appeal to many people in Latin
America. It does not attract the same type of respect as traditional
constitutional research or social sciences research.
We should promote research and develop an audience for that re-
search. First, we should press the teaching of human rights at the uni-
versity level. Second, we should press and monitor the behavior of Con-
gress and present to Congress new, just proposals concerning changes
in many aspects of the judicial and institutional system and the legal
systems that are present in Latin America today. By pushing proposals
from a human rights perspective, we would impress on these groups the
need to improve their expertise in human rights issues.
Human rights organizations and human rights researchers should
look for collaborative projects that include people from organizations
that are outside the human rights community. There is a clear division
between those who are in and those who are out of the human rights
community. The larger part of the intellectual community has no real
knowledge of what research is done by human rights researchers.
International outreach is another major goal. Uruguay, Argentina,
and Chile have developed a tremendous expertise in founding, manag-
ing, and establishing human rights organizations, in establishing large
legal services for human rights victims, and in filing complaints before
the international human rights fora. These kinds of expertise and ex-
perts should be called upon to play a role in building up and strength-
ening human rights organizations everywhere else, in Latin America
and in other Third World countries. The South American experience is
unique in some respects. Advantage should be taken of it. Human
rights organizations in Chile should promote that effort.
Human rights organizations should also play a role in pushing the
international, and specifically the inter-American, system to pay more
attention to human rights violations that take place under democratic
regimes.
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There is litigation going on before the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights. We have the first three cases decided by an inter-
American court. Yet these are the first steps in the development of a
very strong inter-American human rights system. The experience of
these NGOs in South America should extend beyond the boundaries of
these countries.
Finally, training is important. Both new NGOs that specialize in
civil liberties and old NGOs that were created under authoritarian re-
gimes should play a role in training judges and public officers. They
should also play a role in educating the government to devise the
human rights policy. Latin American countries which have democratic
credentials should play a more important role in the international fora
that deal with human rights.
Events in Latin America and in Eastern Europe will cause the inter-
national human rights regime, all the rules and institutions that deal
with human rights within the international arena, to be strengthened.
They will have more importance hnd more impact in public decisions in
each country. NGOs can push these governments to play a more im-
portant role in that process.
The real issue is to address the violations of the past and to build up
the preventive capability for redressing human rights violations in the
future. I am only speaking about countries which will not experience
dramatic increases in human rights violations. That does not mean that
we do not need a strong non-governmental movement. What we do
need, however, is a more diversified structure of institutions that col-
laborate in that effort.
I will end with two basic points. First, we should encourage collabo-
rative and trans-national research projects and conferences. We should
bring in some human rights activists to learn about the American civil
liberties experience. We should push for collaboration. This need not
include technical assistance. Our effort should strive to give a wider
audience the impression that the human rights movement is energetic
and is very dynamic.
Second, NGOs should remain independent of their governments. If
human rights organizations are not independent from the government
and are incapable of criticizing their governments, then they are not
non-governmental organizations. In order to institutionalize a human
rights system, laws must be passed and policies must be implemented.
This requires a policy of rejection-of denunciation-of abuses, and
reaction to actions that violate or infringe upon human rights. Further-
more, it requires a policy that goes towards proposing alternatives and
getting things done. That also requires a dialogue with the government.
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REMARKS OF MICHAEL POSNER1
I am pleased to be here. There are several points made by previous
speakers that I would like to comment on and I will add a couple of
extra points to the debate, as well.
First, it is important that the title of this meeting is "Transitions to
Democracy and the Rule of Law." Discussion about a transition to de-
mocracy, whatever that exactly means, and a transition to institutional-
ized protection of human rights rule of law can be very different things.
The conversation we would have about Guatemala is a very different
conversation than the one we would have about Chile.
Second, the topic of this panel is Non-governmental Organizations
(NGOs). It is important that we distinguish and talk about the role of
nationally based NGOs and the role of international NGOs. They are
quite different. The role of international NGOs ought to be principally
to support the work of national groups. Hugo Frubling said a moment
ago that part of the role of NGOs is to make human rights a national
issue. He meant that within a country there needs to be a more diversi-
fied number of groups and individuals addressing these issues on a reg-
ular basis. I mean that another way. There needs to be enough of a
domestic constituency that the international groups can go on to busi-
ness in other places.
Our role-that is to say, international groups like Amnesty Interna-
tional, the watch committees, the Lawyers Committee and so forth- is
eventually to put ourselves out of business. I do not see that happening
in the next three or five years. But the ideal state would be one in
which 170 countries each had a strong, aggressive, national human
rights community which addressed these issues on a regular basis, inde-
pendent of government, confronted governments regularly, worked for
the reforms that Mr. Fruhling talked about, and had no fear of retalia-
tion or persecution. Though we have a long way to go before we get
there, this goal should guide all of our energies and our focus in these
times of change.
I want to comment also on a couple of things that Richard Lillich
said. One is the question of advice and support as opposed to reporting
on gross abuses. Non-governmental groups right now are not playing
an aggressive enough or active enough role in monitoring the efforts to
provide advice and support. First, we in the non-governmental commu-
1. Executive Director, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, New York, New
York.
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nity have been terribly remiss in allowing international organizations
like the United Nations to divert a great deal of their attention away
from their central mandate. The United Nations, in its Commission on
Human Rights, has a central protection role which it is not following.
It has moved instead, in the midst of the supposed transitions in places
like Haiti and Guatemala, to a focus on what they call advisory
services.
The advisory services program has been a total failure and those in-
volved from the non-governmental community have not held the United
Nations' feet to the fire to make sure that those programs get back on
track. The United Nations has a central obligation to make sure that,
in states like Guatemala and Haiti where gross violations occur, reports
are prepared on an annual basis, that there are debates under its Item
12, which addresses gross violations of human rights, and that those
governments feel held accountable for their actions.
This is not happening. It is not happening in part because non-gov-
ernmental organizations are not doing enough to make that an issue of
first order in the debate. The United Nations Human Rights Commis-
sion just met-is meeting right now, in fact-but just met to address
these issues. The Mexican delegation led the fight to prevent Guate-
mala from going back to the Item 12 agenda to allow a report to be
done on human rights violations in Guatemala. There was very little
international or national NGO activity to prevent that from happening.
We have failed to monitor and to advocate within international organi-
zations to keep protection on the agenda in states like Guatemala.
The situation is the same in Haiti. Venezuela took the lead in Haiti's
defense, making sure that Haiti remained for this year on the Item 22,
or advisory services agenda, despite the fact that the United Nations
advisor had recommended reporting because the situation was so miser-
able. All of us, internationally based groups and national NGOs, need
to be more attentive to what governments are doing in the context of
international organizations. We must monitor those practices.
Second, there are a variety of United States efforts to provide advice
which are equally suspect or at least in need of monitoring, scrutiny,
and advocacy by human rights NGOs. I refer to programs like the
State Department and the Agency for International Development's
(AID) Administration of Justice program, which has had a checkered
record at best in places like El Salvador, Colombia, and Guatemala.
This program continues with too little monitoring. There are not
enough of those concerned about human rights who argue that the pro-
gram must have a stricter sense of its purpose and a clear human rights
perspective.
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I refer also to various efforts to expand police training, which I think
needs to be discussed in the context of a broader objective of demilita-
rizing countries and moving more toward democratic civilian control
over armed forces. And I refer to the National Endowment for Democ-
racy, which is now a widely praised program in the United States but
which I, from a human rights point of view, consider a highly question-
able enterprise that needs to be monitored on a regular basis and chal-
lenged every day.
Finally, Dick Lillich referred to the ratification campaign of the trea-
ties. The United States-based human rights community should look at
the two covenants. I would suggest not only the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights2 but also the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights.-
The campaign for ratification of that international bill of rights is
only going to take off and only going to be effective if we mobilize and
activate national NGOs in the United States, like the ACLU, the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, or the Coalition for the Homeless. We
must mobilize a domestic constituency concerned about these issues in
the United States and make it an American issue.
I think to view it in international terms, that is to say-we are doing
this so that we can have enhanced standing in the rest of the world-is
a hopelessly out-of-date way to address those issues. There is the poten-
tial now, which has not existed in the past, for that constituency in the
United States to be mobilized. But we must use a very different ap-
proach, a radically different approach, than those who have cam-
paigned for the Genocide Convention4 and the Torture Convention.'
Members of the Senate, and the United States in general, perceive
these conventions as treaties that apply to "those people over there." It
is time to look at the United States to figure out how can we use inter-
national treaties to improve our own country and get our house in
order.
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S
171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 383 (1967)(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
4. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948). This convention calls for the formation of an interna-
tional court to hear and rule on alleged cases of genocide. Comment, Implied Waiver
Under the FSIA: Proposed Exception to Immunity for iolations of Peremptory
Norms of International Law, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 365 (1989).
5. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
of Punishment, 40 U.N. ESCOR Annex (Agenda Item 10(a)), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4
(1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984). Since its reprint, the Torture Convention
has undergone several minor revisions. These revisions are discussed in 24 I.L.M. 535
(1985).
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REMARKS OF MICHAEL SHIFTER1
As a member of the NGO community, I find the suggestions of the
previous speakers extremely useful and relevant. Those of us in the
foundation sector, along with others, would do well to rethink and reas-
sess human rights programs throughout the world.
Today I am going to focus my comments on Peru. This probably
strikes most of you as quite odd because the framework of this meeting
is the transition to democracy. I hope you will not view this focus as
reflecting an interpretation of the elections that will take place a month
from now, or the new government that will begin in July 1990, in Peru.
I think, however, the Peruvian case is quite instructive and unique in
the Andean region and in Latin America generally. It might be useful
to think about and draw some general lessons from it as other countries
go through their transitions.
The transition in Peru took place a decade ago. The shift from mili-
tary to civilian government was accompanied by a number of signifi-
cant developments. For example, the emergence of the armed insur-
gency of Sendero Luminoso coincided with the Peruvian transition.
Also, the country's legal left, and the United Left coalition of political
parties and movements, was able to consolidate itself during this time.
A myriad of popular organizations and social movements of various
sorts that had their origins in the 1970s, also crystallized at the begin-
ning of the decade. Finally, a set of human rights organizations
emerged with very close ties to a dynamic sector of those popular orga-
nizations and social movements. So unlike the cases of Chile and Ar-
gentina in the Southern Cone, quite curiously the Peruvian transition
essentially brought human rights organizations into existence.
These organizations emerged when they did because of serious
human rights problems that several people in this audience have re-
ported on for the last six or seven years. Both at the national and inter-
national level advocates and monitors have pointed to patterns of disap-
pearances, extra-judicial executions, and torture. Such a grave situation
continues to exist today.
The response to the human rights situation in Peru has been, until
recently, quite traditional. The response has emphasized the documen-
tation of violations and the denunciation of the Peruvian government
1. Program Officer, Andean Region and Southern Cone of South America, Ford
Foundation, New York, New York.
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because of the actions of its security forces against innocent civilians. It
is worth stressing, then, that from the outset human rights organiza-
tions and the NGO community in Peru have been dealing with the is-
sue of human rights violations committed under civilian, constitutional
rule.
I would argue, however, that in the last couple of years there have
been some new developments that are beginning to alter the strategies
and the focus of human rights organizations in Peru. First, the insur-
gency in Peru, and principally the Sendero Luminoso insurgency, has
been growing. This insurgency has expanded geographically, and the
numbers of victims that it has included in its assassination campaigns
have increased. In the last year and a half or two years, victims have
included development workers, priests, teachers, and opposition politi-
cians who have been associated (at least indirectly) from the very be-
ginning with human rights organizations in Peru. This process has
caused human rights organizations, and the NGO community in gen-
eral in Peru, to reflect on their role.
Second, the weakening of the state in Peru in the last several years
has been particularly pronounced. The state has failed to coordinate its
policies, and has been unable to deal with the insurgency. It has failed
to provide fundamental protections to Peruvian citizens.
Third, there has been a shift in public opinion more generally in
Peru toward the view that human rights violations may in fact be an
inevitable price to pay in some respects for fighting a guerrilla
movement.
The traditional human rights framework has been unable to deal ef-
fectively with many of these new developments. As a result, the NGO
community is beginning to experiment with a new emerging strategy
and a new approach in Peru.
What does this new approach consist of? I think it consists of several
elements. First is the documentation of atrocities committed by insur-
gent groups in Peru. Second, there is a greater emphasis on balance, on
looking at both sides, in the Peruvian situation. Third, the NGO com-
munity is trying to find some common ground, and some consensus in
Peruvian society regarding human rights issues. Efforts are underway
that attempt to strengthen a non-violent democratic center in Peru.
There has been much more emphasis in the last couple of years than in
the early to mid-1980s on education and training activities that try to
reach out and bolster key sectors in Peruvian society.
For the first time, I would argue, a key question is on the human
rights agenda: how can Peru deal effectively with an armed insurgency
within a democratic framework respectful of human rights?
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This is a new question that has been asked increasingly by human
rights advocates in Peru. People have perceived the limitations of the
old framework that is no longer able to deal effectively with a fresh set
of political conditions. Peruvian rights advocates are also increasingly
turning to humanitarian law as a possible way to address some of these
developments in a situation of internal conflict and political violence.
The emerging consensus that the traditional framework is no longer
adequate has resulted in a number of very concrete and interesting and
exciting alternative responses in Peru. One example would be the ef-
forts of several human rights organizations to conduct training sessions
and work closely with judges, prosecutors, and lawyers. Such programs
reflect serious NGO attempts to deal with groups that are neglected by
the state and that can play an important role in strengthening the rule
of law in Peru.
Education work in Peru is among the most sophisticated in Latin
America. There is a vigorous network that consists of six human rights
organizations. They have an expanded program in the jungle region, in
the coastal area, and in the highlands in Peru and work effectively at a
variety of levels with church groups, neighborhood associations, unions,
and so forth. This is a very exciting, innovative, and relatively recent
development.
In addition, several human rights groups have made an effort to en-
gage public officials and politicians of diverse political tendencies in a
dialogue about human rights issues. The aim is generally to establish
some common ground. This is something that has only taken place in
the last few years and that I think responds to new developments in
Peru.
I would argue that the Peruvian situation, both the human rights
situation and the response of the NGO community, is in fact unique in
Latin America. The Peruvian situation shares some elements with cases
such as Colombia and El Salvador, where the principles of humanita-
rian law are plainly most relevant. I think it clear, however, that
Sendero Luminoso and its peculiar characteristics sets the Peruvian
case apart from the others.
The fact that victims in Peru are increasingly becoming members of
popular organizations and social movements that have had historically
close ties with human rights organizations is without parallel in Latin
America. Furthermore, although one can point to many weak states
and governments throughout the region, the crisis in Peru is particu-
larly acute. Here, too, the human rights groups have perhaps attempted
more than NGO human rights organizations in other countries to fill
the space and assume the offensive in the Peruvian context.
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Of course I do not mean to be too optimistic. There are enormous
problems. The forces at work, the tendencies that reflect a deteriorating
situation, are very powerful. It is unclear whether these human rights
efforts can reverse those tendencies. There are opportunities for human
rights organizations to be more aggressive in reaching out to the mass
media in Peru, and to engage in a more effective campaign to work
with groups in civil society.
A problem began to emerge in the last few weeks, which I presume
all of us view with considerable alarm and concern. There have been
some attacks on Lima-based human rights organizations that are
clearly designed to impede and to stop their work. Obviously, such dis-
turbing developments do not help create a favorable atmosphere for a
new, experimental human rights strategy in Peru.
The Peruvian case illustrates that the NGO community has a strong
political role to play. We should not deceive ourselves and say that
these organizations are not political. They are perhaps not partisan, but
they are political in several fundamental respects: they look for political
space in society, adapt to new circumstances, try to be effective, and
seek a significant measure of public credibility. In Peru, NGOs have
been enormously resourceful, and courageous, in dealing with the coun-
try's complex and very difficult human rights problems.
PANEL II
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY,
SECURITY ESTABLISHMENTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN
EASTERN EUROPE
TRANSLATED REMARKS OF ROBERTO CUELLAR1
I am going to talk mainly about organizations that have not been
recognized as having a judicial status and that have had to face, inter-
pret, and work within a crisis, especially in Central America.
It is important to analyze the role that these organizations are play-
ing in the transition to democracy because they have had to face this
process at a difficult time. Many human rights violations are still tak-
ing place. Despite all the problems these NGOs have faced, they have
carried the banner of human rights, especially from the ethical point of
view, against very severe problems. These include problems of interna-
tional supervision, economic survival, and international acceptance, as
well as many situations where the lives of people and members of the
1. Director of the NGO Project, Interamerican Institute of Human Rights, San
Jose, Costa Rica.
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NGOs not only have been in danger, but lost.
There is solidarity among the people working in the NGO movement
in these countries in which life was in danger every day and silence
meant the possibility of staying alive. They were silent among them-
selves. Their solidarity is one of the main assets of the NGOs' work in
these countries.
These organizations went a lot further than providing legal protec-
tion. NGOs are working with indigenous populations, with refugees,
with displaced people. There is a very wide range of actors in the work
they are doing in Central America. The NGOs have themselves been
taking a leading role as actors within the Central American system.
This is the case of campesinos in Honduras, indigenous populations in
Guatemala, and also the different people who work with the churches
in Central America. These organizations made it possible for different
international organizations and bodies, such as the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and the OAS General Assembly, to
learn about the situation in countries like Chile, Argentina, Brazil,
Uruguay, and El Salvador.
It is important for NGOs to consolidate their credibility and to im-
prove their images. Very often, NGOs have been too politicized and
attacked both the right and the left. It is also very important for them
to avoid the temptation to openly participate in political parties and
take political positions.
There must be more objectivity and equilibrium among the organiza-
tions. Also, as other members of this panel have mentioned, NGOs
must start dialogues with governments. There is room for NGOs to
work with governments, and there are many areas in which we can
work together. NGOs and governments should not oppose each other.
NGOs will have to be a lot more creative in order to face the new
challenges; and I wonder what role NGOs in the United States will
take in supporting Latin American organizations. Not only should they
make claims on behalf of the people who have been killed, they should
support and contribute new creative ideas that NGOs will need during
the transition to democracy. These last ten years and this next decade
will be a fight for survival. Survival is different for our societies than it
is for the more developed countries. The environment will be, of course,
a key issue in the next decade, but in the case of the NGOs in Latin
America, survival also means being able to find a way to ameliorate
economic disaster brought about by the external debt and the very high
human price that we have had to pay for it.
We must address our work in the future mainly to children between
ten and fourteen years. In the very near future, they will be the work-
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ers, the soldiers, and the university students. Technology should serve
human rights education and improve it in a substantial way. Our socie-
ties need it.
A Jesuit friend wrote to me a few days after the recent killing of the
Jesuits in El Salvador. "Roberto, -we cannot despair. We have to have
faith and we have to believe that historical reasoning is going to prevail
in human rights."
REMARKS OF JERI LABER2
I have been traveling for more than ten years now in some of the
most repressive countries in Eastern Europe, usually one step ahead of
the police, occasionally one step behind. I had the most direct contact
with what is known as the security forces, however, last October in
Prague and then in Sofia.
In Prague I witnessed leather-jacketed thugs arresting members of
the Charter 77 movement with whom I was planning to meet. I took
out my camera and tried to photograph what they were doing. The
next moment I was engaged in a physical tussle with a security police-
man who wanted to take the camera from me. When I refused to relin-
quish it, I was rather roughly but very expertly lifted into a car and
taken off, with my colleagues, to the police station.
A couple of days later, I was in Sofia where I watched carbon copies
of those thugs, this time speaking Bulgarian, roughing up a group of
activists for environmental protection who were attempting to collect
signatures on a petition in a park in central Sofia. The police did this
not only in my presence but in the presence of Western journalists and
diplomats, including representatives of several state departments of
Western countries who were in Sofia at the time for a Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) meeting.
I felt truly disgusted at the end of that trip. As I thought about it
afterwards, however, I realized that what I had seen was not the sign of
strength it initially appeared to be. I saw the bared fangs of a cornered
animal.
When totalitarianism is working, you do not see the police. They are
there, of course. They know where you are but you do not know where
they are unless they choose to make themselves known. Back in 1982 or
1983, the police in Eastern Europe would never have tussled with dissi-
dents in front of Western reporters, who take pictures and write
1. Executive Director, Helsinki Watch, New York, New York.
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articles.
The two incidents I described also revealed the confusion of the po-
lice. I was released from the jail in Prague within a half hour because
someone said, "You made a mistake. Don't do that." In Sofia, the au-
thorities actually apologized the next day for what the police had done
to the group of ecological activists.
I am describing the human rights situation in two countries of East-
ern Europe just before the revolution. The events took place in mid-
October. By November 10th, Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov had re-
signed. A week later there was a demonstration in Prague which
marked the beginning of what became the "Velvet Revolution."
During that same visit, I discussed with Vaclav Havel the numbers
that were necessary to make a revolution. As I remember it, he said
that it would take 100,000 people in Czechoslovakia. He doubted that
so many Czechs and Slovaks would ever take to the streets. This was
also in October.
Peaceful demonstrations did begin, as we all know, first in East Ger-
many, then in Czechoslovakia, and then in Bulgaria. The first demon-
strations were usually met with some form of police violence-beatings,
water cannons, and other attempts to stop them. But when the demon-
strators came out again, the police held back. The power of the people
was felt. And the revolutions of 1989 occurred virtually without vio-
lence except, of course, in Romania where everything was different.
What caused these demonstrators to go out on the streets, despite the
predictions of people like Havel who have been fighting the battle for
human rights for many years? There are many factors, of course.
Many of them will emerge in the course of the discussions that will
follow.
At the root of this activism is the fact that people in Eastern Europe
have been left with a bankrupt ideology and increasing economic hard-
ships. They became more and more aware of the repression and depri-
vation under which they were living. Glasnost in the Soviet Union
brought about certain small but truly revolutionary changes. Perhaps
the most important change, one that is seldom really acknowledged,
was the end of jamming of foreign radio stations. With that move in
the Soviet Union, which immediately affected Eastern Europe as well,
people in the Eastern bloc countries suddenly began to learn about
events in the outside world. The transformation was dramatic. It af-
fected everyone-not just intellectuals. It affected the man in the
street, the students, the people who ultimately engineered the
revolutions.
The removal of jamming was tied to the technological revolution that
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has been going on for some time now. Information became accessible
despite all the efforts of the authorities in Eastern Europe and the So-
viet Union to stop it. It was hard to outlaw computers and videotapes.
The authorities themselves began to realize that they could not prevent
their people from having access to technology and still remain part of
this and the next century.
When the peoples of Eastern Europe took to the streets, they were
talking about democracy. They were talking about freedom. They were
talking about a market economy. It meant very different things in dif-
ferent countries, but these were the rallying cries.
The role of the local human rights organizations in these countries,
of course, has varied. In Czechoslovakia, although those who led the
revolution were mainly students, long-standing human rights activists
took charge by popular mandate. They are now running the country.
In Hungary, where the revolution has been slow and steady, human
rights activists who were once known as the democratic opposition, are
running surprisingly strong in the forthcoming election. In Poland,
where there is a unique combination of forces, Solidarity, which is both
a trade union and a human rights movement, is in charge. In East Ger-
many, Bulgaria, and Romania, there were no human rights groups to
speak of before the revolutions. Groups formed during the revolutions
themselves, and, to the extent that they exist today, are embryonic, and
very much in need of advice and help.
The countries that have had long-standing, although persecuted,
human rights movements have the best chance of success in the transi-
tion to democracy. Thus, in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, good
progress has already been made. The fact that these groups had con-
tact with each other and with groups in the West was very important.
In Bulgaria and Romania, the prospects are much more dubious. East
Germany, because of the situation with West Germany, is in a special
class by itself.
I am not sure how this theory relates to the Soviet Union. The
human rights monitoring effort in the Soviet Union started even before
the signing of the Helsinki Accords,2 and probably before any such
movement in Eastern Europe, but the transition to democracy in the
Soviet Union has been slow, to say the least. This may be because the
Soviet groups were more isolated from groups in other parts of the
world, including Eastern Europe, or because they were more
persecuted.
Groups like ours have played an important role in what has hap-
2. Helsinki Accords, Aug. 1, 1975, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292.
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pened, but it has been hard going. Back in the early 1980s, when I first
traveled through Eastern Europe, I was bringing messages from Adam
Michnik in Poland to Miklos Haraszti in Hungary. The two had heard
of each other, but had never met. Both were engaged in the beginnings
of Samizdat ("self" or underground) publishing. They wanted to get
each other's articles so that they could translate them, and so that they
could establish some kind of contact. While the level of communication
between them has changed, this was its level at that time.
As a human rights organization dealing mainly with the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe, the early 1980s was a pretty barren time.
We kept talking, over and over and over again, about the same cases,
trying to find a new angle to interest the press and the public. People
kept saying, "Go away, already. We know about this. We know about
Yuri Orlov. How many times can we publish an article about him?"
There was no response from the Soviet government. There was no
movement.
In 1982, when the cold war was at its height, we decided to launch
an international Helsinki movement in Western Europe with the idea
that groups in neutral countries like Austria and Sweden might have
better access to the Eastern bloc countries than Americans did. We
launched the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights in
1982. It is now a very well established and effectively functioning or-
ganization with nineteen national groups, both East and West.
There are now Helsinki committees in all of the East European
countries, except East Germany. The Federation has adopted the tactic
of trying to push the limits of official tolerance. Thus, in addition to
meeting with officials themselves, we as a Federation have held alterna-
tive meetings in Eastern Europe at the time of the CSCE meetings. We
did it first in Budapest; we did it recently in Sofia. We also hold our
annual meetings in Eastern bloc countries where no such meetings have
been held before. We did so in Belgrade and Warsaw. This year we are
going to try to do it in Moscow.
We are also organizing regional meetings. One took place at the be-
ginning of February in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, where representa-
tives of non-governmental Helsinki committees in eighteen countries
met to discuss future work in Eastern Europe.
The prospects for the future differ from country to country. Each
country is now taking on a national character that it did not have
before. In the past, when a panel like this assembled, each participant
would give a slightly different variation of the same report: the press is
controlled; there is no free speech; there is no freedom of assembly; and
the writers' union does not represent the writers-you cannot publish
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unless you belong to the union. All of Eastern Europe was operating
under the same Soviet-style system. This, of course, has ended. Each
country is now beginning to reclaim its own national characteristics.
It is a fascinating process. It is also one that is going to make our
work much more difficult because we cannot just assume that what is
happening in Czechoslovakia is going on in the same way in Hungary.
It is not, anymore. There were fifty-nine political parties in Hungary,
and something like twenty-seven in Slovakia when I was there. There is
a lot to follow, and I suspect a lot of problems will remain.
I am going to list just a few, without going into them: the role of the
secret police; the investigation, including fact-finding and documenta-
tion of past abuses; assistance with constitutional and legal reform; en-
suring that due process is observed at trials of past abusers; sending
trial observers; monitoring the conditions leading up to elections; rein-
forcing the right to strike; investigating states of emergencies and
whether they were imposed because there was a legitimate need or
whether the use of force was excessive; investigating conditions in pris-
ons that we can now get into; rehabilitating political prisoners, which
has not been done properly in a number of the countries involved; re-
storing citizenship to emigres who were deprived of their citizenship;
learning the problems of minorities who are seeking cultural and reli-
gious rights-the Hungarians in Romania, the Turks in Bulgaria, the
Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, the Czechs and the Slovaks. What do
we do about nationalist movements, especially in the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia, that are tearing their countries apart? Their right to
peaceful expression of their secessionist goals should be protected, but
where does one draw the line? Finally, all of these countries face two
ugly problems: the repression of Gypsies and the growth of anti-
Semitism.
There are certain obvious tasks. We need to strengthen and expand
networks and contacts between the countries that are now seeking dem-
ocratic systems. We need to encourage the development of civil society
in these countries. We need to find new human rights monitors to work
with, now that so many of the people we worked with before are the
presidents or the foreign ministers of their governments.
I would find it hard to generalize about the prospects for the future.
As I said, each country is different. Czechoslovakia appears to have the
best chance; Romania, the worst. But this has been a year of surprises.
Nothing is necessarily what it seems. Certainly, the socialist bloc is no
longer socialist and no longer a bloc. Each country is now reclaiming
its national identity and will develop in its own distinctive way.
I have heard the same sentence in recent months, in a variety of
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different languages, from new leaders in new countries: "It's easier to
tear down a building than it is to build a new one." Nineteen eighty-
nine was the year of tearing down. In 1990, the rebuilding will begin. It
is going to be a hard time and a fascinating time. There will be many
new problems, and many of them will involve human rights. The
human rights struggle is not over. In some ways, it is just beginning.
REMARKS OF ZDENEK URBANEK'
The other day I was told to look at the front pages of several Ameri-
can dailies. The papers had published a picture showing about fifteen
members of Romania's Securitate, indicted in front of a so-called
court. Their heads were shaved. They had on the striped uniforms of
prisoners.
My first question was: Why hold this theater of a court and trial if
they have already been sentenced? I do not like the Securitate people,
but I like much less the actions of those behind the scenes who decided
to humiliate them in this way.
The picture reminded me of two things. During the so-called Prague
Uprising, which started on May 5, 1945, a strange mixture of real free-
dom fighters and youngish, trigger-happy people entered the streets and
some of the apartments of the city. The freedom fighters wished at long
last to prove their desire for freedom. The others, a larger group,
seemed more inclined to seek revenge for the humiliating experiences of
the last five or six years and, at the same time, to have a kind of maca-
bre fun. They had not fought back in any really effective way during
the Nazi occupation years. Now they found it possible to use their en-
ergies and to show what kind of patriots they were. They shaved the
heads of the wives of the Nazi military who were not clever enough to
leave their Prague apartments in time. They painted crosses on their
backs. In many cases, they wounded them and their children with
knives and guns or rifles.
These were useless activities; they were irrational and expressed the
lowest instincts of mankind. In a way they were continuations of the
irrational movements of Fascism and Nazism during the previous dec-
ade or two. Millions of decent people died in the fight to overwhelm the
old and successful Nazi war machine but at the moment when the bat-
tle for a less inhuman world was won, these young people in Prague,
along with others in Europe, seemed to wish to continue the Nazis'
1. Translator, essayist, human rights activist, and a Signatory of Charter 77.
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irrational, humiliating, and murdering ways.
The picture from today's Romania shows, as well, that the formerly
oppressed have a tendency to repeat the prolonged, irrational, undemo-
cratic, dictatorial, and murdering activities to which they were sub-
jected. Human rights are indivisible. If former violators are treated the
same way they treated their victims, then the fight for a less violent
world has been in vain. The human rights movements in the West have
been helpful during the two decades of the Czech, and other human
and civil rights movements', struggle for more freedom. People, how-
ever, are no better than they are. A role for human rights movements is
far from disappearing. The most important and most difficult work is
only beginning.
Three steps are necessary to promote human rights in Central and
Eastern Europe. First, we must support as strongly as possible the peo-
ple or groups in Czechoslovakia, and anywhere else, who support the
philosophy that revenge does not justify the continuation of human
rights violations. Second, we must give as much advice as possible con-
cerning the laws, law enforcement, and questions of political develop-
ment-issues which come first in the defense of democracy. Third, we
must defend even the former violators of human and civil rights against
any attacks or humiliation which are not substantiated by the law of
their country. Law and truth will prevail. The task is difficult but feasi-
ble, I hope.
REMARKS OF CATHY FITZPATRICK"
I received a list of questions to address today that asked me to de-
scribe the human rights situation in my country of expertise before the
regime was overthrown, and what role human rights groups played in
overthrowing that regime. I called the organizers and said, "Wait a
minute, wait a minute. My regime wasn't overthrown yet. And further-
more, the human rights groups are still rather small and haven't played
a role." The fact that I could appear on a list of people who were ex-
perts on the role of human rights groups in the first revolutions in East-
ern Europe indicates the way in which the Soviet Union is perceived
and the way Gorbachev is perceived as the initiator of changes within
his own country and of the democratic revolution in Eastern Europe.
People say to me, "You human rights activists are never happy.
Gorbachev came to power; Sakharov, who is the leading symbol of the
1. Research Director, Helsinki Watch, New York, New York.
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human rights movement in the Soviet Union, entered the Parliament
and took on Gorbachev. What's your problem? It seems like the regime
was overthrown. You are still critical, even when the revolution has
already taken place." I want to show that the revolution has not taken
place, although it may be imminent.
The Soviet political situation is like the weather. If you do not like it,
you wait five minutes. The battle for the revolution centers around Ar-
ticle 6,2 which enshrines the Communist monopoly over all aspects of
political and social life. Before Sakharov died, he mounted a huge cam-
paign with the Inter-Regional Group, the parliamentary opposition of
which he was one of the leaders, to try to put Article 6 on the agenda
of the Parliament so that it could be abolished through the proper leg-
islative body.
Sakharov lost that battle before he died. Gorbachev blocked place-
ment of the issue on the agenda. Even a vote to discuss it failed. It was
not until several months after Sakharov died that the party convened a
plenum and decided for political reasons that they would step back
from this monopoly. They issued a statement that Article 6 would be
abolished at some time in the future, but this decision was really at the
level of a promise. Article 6 has still not been abolished. In order for
politics to become pluralistic and for civil rights legislation to be passed
in the Soviet Union, the Parliament must remove Article 6 from its
constitution.3
Furthermore, even after this article is removed, laws on freedom of
assembly and freedom of association still have to be passed. A draft
law now being discussed still involves the state giving permission for
association; it is likely to be passed before the end of 1990.
It is important to note that this political decision to step down from
monopoly happened after the election nominations process started. The
elections that were so striking last week, that brought many democrats
to power, were still one-party elections. No parties are legalized yet.
And it is going to be quite some time before they are. A few associa-
tions have managed to get themselves registered. But it will be a while
before parties as such, with platforms and with offices, buildings, news-
papers, and so on, will appear.
We are now in an era where the next elections, local and national,
are not scheduled to take place for another four or five years.
Gorbachev has created a kind of a four-year period of sectarian polit-
2. Konst. SSSR (Constitution), art. 6 (USSR).
3. The Parliament amended Article 6 in a subsequent session but, as of the date of
publication, has not ratified a law permitting opposition parties.
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ics, possibly without a full legalization of the parties, or with numerous
small parties too weak to make an impact.
The way to understand this whole struggle is to contrast it with what
happened in Eastern Europe and with what I have identified as the
process in the East European countries, a process that I have broken
down into six stages. During the first stage, a social movement ap-
peared, like Solidarity, or like the Green movement in East Germany,
or a small, highly organized, but repressed, human rights group like
Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia.
During the second stage, these movements would consolidate. They
would begin to put pressure on the regime, begin to mount various ac-
tions, demonstrations, symbolic gestures, commemoration of various
holidays, and so on. Sometimes this process took a year, sometimes ten
weeks, or ten days. We have seen different schedules.
The third stage would be the large demonstration in the public
square. Wenceslas Square in Prague is the place that many people re-
member, where citizens jangled their keys as a sign of unlocking the
political process. They remember the people who crowded the squares
of East Berlin and Sofia. They remember that the demand of all these
mass rallies which, except for Romania, went peacefully, was for a
round table with the government, for some kind of social dialogue.
Many of the movements were named for this effort: there was "civic
forum," "social dialogue," "new forum," and others. Specifically, the
demand for a round table was to discuss the call for elections.
The fourth stage was the elections and the fifth stage, the parlia-
ment, would come from these elections. Once a parliament convened, it
would begin the sixth stage: writing the constitution and the laws that
hang from the constitution, and thus institutionalize civil rights.
In the U.S.S.R. this entire process happened largely in reverse. First,
Gorbachev began with some economic reforms. But he rapidly realized
by 1987 or 1988, that he would have to make some political reforms to
energize the population. He conceived of the structure of an All-Union
Parliament, the Congress of People's Deputies. Through changes in
electoral law and the constitution, this parliament was, essentially, con-
vened from above.
The Parliament that convened in June 1989 was in part a concession
to freedom of expression. It was also partly a method of absorbing it,
because it had the effect of diverting the large street demonstrations
beginning to build in a number of cities in the Soviet Union. It was a
way of siphoning off social energy to have change occur in a peaceful,
orderly way. Many people thought this was a brilliant gesture of
Gorbachev's.
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This Parliament, however, did not behave. Although it was not
elected democratically, it still was able to radicalize, so that the pres-
sure on the regimes, (step two) began to happen on television, in a very
accelerated way. There was pressure for step three, to pass laws that
would guarantee civil rights, freedom of expression, press, and so on.
By step four, the Soviets were beginning to say, "What we really
need to do is fix the constitution. We started out trying to legislate
freedom of expression, but without a change in the constitution and
without a change in one-party dominance."
This led to step five, large rallies in the squares. That would seem to
be the end of this round in the process, whereas in Eastern Europe it
was the beginning.
What are these large rallies in the U.S.S.R. calling for? They are
calling for round tables with the government. This is step six that East
Europeans know so well as the call for the round table, stage three for
them.
In the Soviet Union, people got frustrated with parliamentary polit-
ics and moved to the streets. The large rallies that occurred in recent
weeks were, at first, highly manipulated. Gorbachev used them to put
pressure on the party to step down from power. He hoped that after the
elections the rallies would begin to dissipate. Instead, they have grown
even stronger and are no longer under control.
Right before the rallies began in the last week of February 1990,
rumors abounded predicting violence and the possible declaration of
martial law-no one was sure who was going to declare it. The left
wing? The parliamentary opposition? The right wing, the conserva-
tives, who would overthrow Gorbachev? Russia is very much a land of
rumors, and without an opposition press, events are perceived through
hearsay. The panic and the fear that the government may be forced
into declaring martial law was, and remains, very real.
What happened? Instead, the KGB and the police got on television
and warned everyone not to come to the demonstration. Authorities
told schoolchildren not to come out to the rally. Professional unions
pleaded with their members to stay home, but people, mainly the
groups outside of parliament who were led by some of the parliament
opposition, had the rally anyway. There were no incidents.
Pamyat, the ultra-nationalist anti-Semitic movement, was not visible
at the rally. The fear, however, is still a very real one. The fear of
"pogroms," originally a Russian word that means to destroy, to
threaten, to kill, the fear of pogroms in all the major cities has led to a
massive exodus of Soviet Jews in recent weeks.
I want to say something about anti-Semitism and pogroms, because
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most of the rumors and the hysteria around this issue is based on dates
of pogroms that are supposed to occur. One was supposed to be Febru-
ary 19, another on February 25. There is fear that one is coming up in
May; different dates are given. So far, nothing has happened, thank
God, but the fear is very real.
There are not any real incidents that one can point to, but in the
climate of lack of news and manipulation by various forces, a few
apartment robberies in Kharkhov of some Jewish families is enough to
spread terror. There is a history of this and, of course, the climate ex-
ists where these things can take place.
All this hysteria on the issue of anti-Semitism has distracted atten-
tion from the actual pogroms that have taken place, which were di-
rected at Armenians, Azerbaidzhanis, Meskhi, and Tadzhiks. There
are many ethnic groups, some of which are unknown to most Ameri-
cans. Hundreds of these people have died in various ethnic conflicts and
in martial law situations where Soviet troops were involved in trying to
maintain control.
Another side effect of the Pamyat fear has been that the prosecutor's
office has decided to open up a case against Pamyat. This has thrown
human rights groups into a bit of a quandary because we may find
ourselves in the unenviable position of having to defend the very repug-
nant on free speech grounds. Now, fortunately for us, we have been
able to stay out of this so far because there is no First Amendment in
the Soviet Union and there is no First Amendment in international law.
Articles in international law restrict free speech so as to discourage
incitement of ethnic hatred or the advocacy of discrimination. That is
the type of case that the prosecutor's office has opened against Pamyat.
The problem is that whenever the prosecutor's office opens up a case,
hundreds of people fall into the net of the interrogation, people who
have no relationship to the original case. It is a form of social control.
The actual evidence used may pose problems. I devote this amount of
attention to it because I see that this is the beginning of dozens,
thousands, millions of similar cases throughout the Soviet Union.
The current prosecution involves a group called the Union for the
Proportional Representation of the Peoples. The group is a Pamyat
Front that says that Jews should be kept out of jobs, public positions,
and so on, because they make up only X percentage of the population.
This is still at the level of advocacy, and it is still not clear whether the
prosecutor will be able to prosecute the Pamyat under international or
Soviet law." Members of these groups, however, are people in power, in
4. The Pamyat case came to trial in July 1990 and there has not been a verdict as
1990] 1001
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
institutes, and in local Soviets. If they make the decision to pass dis-
criminatory laws, they will be discriminating on the basis of this insane
philosophy and we will be able to respond on that level.
To picture the ethnic situation in the Soviet Union, it is important to
know that about sixty million Soviet citizens do not live in a republic
matched to their nationality. In other words, the Armenians are in
Russia, the Russians are in Estonia-there is a lot of mix-up. Twenty-
five million out of sixty million are Russian. This has caused a lot of
displacement. Furthermore, approximately half a million refugees are
now fleeing various disasters. These groups of roiling, angry mobs do
not have homes, are impoverished, and are the seed beds for the
pogroms against everybody. Rumors could fly about pogroms in Lenin-
grad one week because Russians who were kicked out of Baku arrived
in Leningrad. Who did they want to blame? The Jews. It is a chain
reaction and a very dangerous, volatile situation.
Gorbachev now has a new set of presidential powers, with some ref-
erence to the American model. He may declare emergencies, ban
strikes, veto laws, and possibly close down the Congress and Parliament
themselves, although they are not so weak that they did not mitigate
his powers somewhat.
Already the All-Union Parliament is not really functioning. Even if
it were not closed down, it has reached the point now where it is very
unwieldy. It is not passing laws. Nine months have gone by and it has
not gotten the civil rights legislation through. It is a terrible muddle;
there are often no voting records. One does not know who one's con-
gressman is or what he or she is voting for. There are no procedures.
The mark-up is very sloppy. People get different copies of the laws and
vote on things without realizing sometimes what they are voting on. It
will be very easy for some people to say, as Lenin said back in 1917,
"It's a talk shop. Let's just close it down." I might add that Gorbachev
already began declaring emergencies without Congress, and even
before he received any special powers. A small group of men in the
Presidium, the executive organ of the Supreme Soviet, has declared
seven states of emergency in seven different republics with Gorbachev's
signature. Gorbachev's hand was behind banning the strikes in the
summer of 1989. He has been blocking the passage of laws. He may
not even have had to grant himself these powers to stay in charge, but
the fact that he did shows his enormous power.
I just want to finish by attempting to answer a question that Jeri
Laber raised, which is: Where are the human rights activists in all this,
of publication.
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and is it too late for them to play a role, or have they already? In part,
they were persecuted, jailed, forced abroad, killed-they were deci-
mated; there is no question that their lives were ruined. Unlike in East-
ern Europe, the people who went to the jails did not get elected to the
U.S.S.R. Parliament, with the exception of Sakharov.
With the local elections, we have seen a smattering of other ex-politi-
cal prisoners like Sergei Kovalyov who have come to power. Civil rights
groups, the monitoring groups, have turned into political groups over-
night. In most cases, they took on the nationalist programs if they were
in Georgia, the Ukraine, or Estonia. All those groups which used to call
themselves Helsinki groups became nationalist liberation movements as
soon as they had freedom of speech. The few groups, like the Moscow
Helsinki group that kept to monitoring, were under a lot of pressure to
do something about the fact that parliament and the local Soviets were
not working. They were asked to run, to do something for their coun-
try. These people formed little lobbying groups, the seed beds of future
deputies. Those are all the democratic and human rights groups that
you see so far, particularly in Russia.
Unfortunately, these groups are like people on a scaffold who, when
they reach the top, kick the scaffold away. They do not remember to
keep it because they may need it to climb down again. The organiza-
tions that people built, like Moscow Tribune and some other types of
what we would call NGOs, all collapsed as soon as their people got into
power; they were left without anything to do. They did not understand
the point of being a lobbying organization because the object was to get
into power.
The notion of a public interest group-all those things that we think
of that make up civil society-does not exist in the Soviet context.
There is no patience to build these things because the Soviets feel that
they are in an emergency situation. To look at it from their point of
view, I can understand why Sergei Kovalyov would not want to stay in
a monitoring group. He does not have any law to monitor in his coun-
try. It has not been passed yet. There is no democratic constitution that
is functioning yet. Freedoms are not in the current constitution. The
press law has not been passed.' The law that would legalize the very
group that he ran from-the association law-as well as other civil
rights legislation still have to be implemented. That is why you saw the
human rights activists, the lawyers and all of those people that we have
associated with and protected over the years rushing into the parlia-
5. The press law was passed in July 1990, but the government maintains a mono-
poly over paper and printing presses.
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ment. It is their last chance to create something that they may have the
luxury of monitoring several weeks or years down the road.
REMARKS OF LAWRENCE WESCHLER'
We were originally going to give these talks "in the order in which
things happened." The notion was that only after Gorbachev came to
power did things begin happening everywhere, so that the Soviet Union
should be discussed first. However, I think you can make a much
stronger argument that Gorbachev is only in power today because of
what happened elsewhere, specifically in Poland-that the sixteen
months of Solidarity in 1980, for example, scared the hell out of the
leaders in the Soviet Union. The notion of a worker's movement rising
up against a worker's state was the most terrifying to the people who
were able to know the most about it. People who were reading the So-
viet press didn't have a sense of what was going on. But people in the
KGB had a very strong sense of what was going on, and when
Brezhnev died and the head of the KGB, Andropov, took over, I think
an argument can be made that the specter of what had happened in
Poland, the near-miss that had occurred in Poland, was very much on
his mind as he began to maneuver his protege Gorbachev into a posi-
tion to succeed him. Of course, this will all get played out years from
now in terms of what came first, and naturally it is all part of the same
process, but I would make a strong argument that the Polish example
was very important. Having said that I will try to just go through some
of the things that were distinctive about the Polish movement and that
are valuable for other places to think about.
There had been a series of uprisings in Poland-after 1944, 1956,
1968, 1970, 1976-that had all failed, for one reason or another. Two
factors stand out. One was the fact that up until 1976 the Polish lead-
ers, the people in the Communist party, were able to play the intellec-
tuals off against the workers. For example, you had intellectuals rising
up over censorship issues during one year, 1968, and the workers were
actually called out to beat them up (the worker/intellectual divide in
Poland in 1968 was not unlike what was happening in the United
States with the Vietnam demonstrations and the hard-hat labor people
being angry at the students, and so forth). Two years later, in 1970,
when the workers went out, the students sat it out. The intellectuals
were not going to pay attention on worker kinds of issues-minimum
1. Staff writer, The New Yorker, author The Passion of Poland and A Miracle, A
Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers (both Pantheon).
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pay, not being able to feed the children, terrible working conditions,
and so forth. So a first thing that had to be surmounted was that some
kind of unity had to be found between workers and intellectuals if there
was eventually going to be an effective assault on power.
The other factor was this very notion of a direct assault on power. It
had been tried several times, workers boiling out of factories, going to
burn down the Communist party headquarters, and so forth, and such
uprisings proved fairly easy to put down. Some other tactic had to be
found, which is why the events after 1976, another failed worker upris-
ing, proved so terribly important.
In Ursus and Radon in 1976 there had been a series of strikes, which
were brutally suppressed. Terrible trials began directly afterwards. At
that point a group of intellectuals set up a committee to monitor those
trials, specifically on human rights grounds. This was the origin of
KOR, the Committee for the Defense of the Workers.
During the next four years, links between workers and intellectuals
began to be established that would prove very important when Solidar-
ity came into being. Understanding the philosophy of the KOR and the
kinds of resonances it created all through Polish society is vital if you
are to understand what happened thereafter. There is a terrific book
that I recommend to people interested in this topic, by Jan Jozef Lip-
ski, called KOR.2 He was one of the founders of KOR and wrote a
history, which is published by University of California Press.
Let me point out two aspects of the KOR strategy. One of them
might be called the strategy of "as if." The key here was that people
were simply to start acting as if they were free. Do not fight battles
about whether there are laws that will allow you to found trade unions;
just found a trade union. The great phrase of Kuron was "Don't burn
committee buildings; found other committees." Yes, of course you will
be assaulted, but if first a few people and then still more people and
then more people begin acting as if they were free, they will create a
zone where freedom exists. Specifically, the zone they will create is the
zone of civil society: a zone where there are underground publishers,
underground universities, all these sorts of things.
That was one aspect. The other aspect I will quote from Lipski. The
KOR made a distinction between political work and social work, and
"[a]bove all, KOR meant social and not political activity .... KOR's
dominant role was in the area of social work. What did this mean?
Above all, it meant that KOR's primary interest was in real people who
2. J. LIPSKI, KOR: A HISTORY OF THE WORKERS' DEFENSE COMMTrrEE IN PO-
LAND 1976-1981 (1984).
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needed help."8 So rather than having long discussions about abstract
issues, about what the post-Communist world should look like, or hav-
ing arguments with Communists at symposiums or something, they be-
gan helping specific individuals who were on trial and their families;
getting them financial and medical and legal assistance, and so forth.
Very quickly they were in the terrain of human rights, of finding
basic grounds upon which to try and defend these people, at which
point the Helsinki agreements, which we have not talked about much
up to this point, became very important. Poland, all these countries,
were signatories to the Helsinki agreements, and it was possible to ap-
ply pressure on that basis.
As members of KOR began to help individuals, what they called so-
cial work, they began to see common links between the problems that
different individuals were having, and that brought them a wider per-
spective. Those two areas, the notions of living as if you were free and
helping specific individuals, moved things forward, as it turned out, ex-
tremely quickly during the 1976 to 1980 period.
Specifically, just to give some examples, in 1977 the KOR set up an
intervention bureau which was headed by Zbigniew Romaszewski: If
you were a worker and had a problem (how you were being treated or
if your family was in trouble because the husband or the father had
been thrown in jail), this group of people, who had no authority, just
set up shop and began making interventions. By January 1980, KOR
had established a Helsinki Committee that was specifically keeping
records of human rights violations. They were planning to make a re-
port to the Madrid conference, the follow-up conference on Helsinki.
As it happened, in August 1980, the whole eruption of Solidarity took
place. Eventually they published their first of many reports, called Pro-
logue to Gdansk," a very interesting and valuable report.
Without going into the whole history of Solidarity during those six-
teen months, I will point out that the Helsinki Committee in Poland in
November 1981 was making plans-the international Helsinki move-
ment was planning to have a meeting in Spring 1982 in Warsaw to
monitor human rights all over the world, and, of course, that meeting
3. Id. at 62. If you do not read anything else in Lipski, he has a chapter called
"The Ethos of KOR," the ethos of the worker's defense committees. It's Chapter Four
in the book and it's really quite fascinating. (It's just been translated into Chinese and
is being smuggled into China.)
4. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Helsinki Final Act,
Aug. 1, 1975, Helsinki, Finland.
5. PROLOGUE TO GDANSK: A REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE POLISH HEL-
SINKI WATCH COMMITTEE, New York (1981).
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collapsed, it never took place, because of the coup in December 1981.
Let me talk just quickly about what the coup was about and the
response in Poland, and how things went from 1981 to the present. The
coup essentially was, in the words of the people who fomented it, about
"normalizing" the situation of the country. To the extent that Poles
talk about Solidarity as an expression of their subjectivity, by which
they mean their capacity to act as subjects instead of objects, to be the
originators of sentences instead of the ones who have sentences imposed
on them, normalization is an attempt by the authorities to take these
pesky little subjects and turn them back into good little objects once
again. So in a way the whole fight is over who gets to say "I" or who
gets to say "we,'-"We the people," or "We the state."
Ironically, the word "normal" itself was up for grabs all during this
period. And when you ask Poles today, and certainly when you asked
them back then, "What are you fighting for? What is up for grabs?
What is the battle about?" they would tell you over and over, "We just
want to live like normal people. We don't want all these crazy regula-
tions. We don't want all this intervention, this overhang of bureaucra-
cies, these apparatchiks. We just want to live like normal people." I
want to read a passage from a letter that Adam Michnik composed
during this period from prison. This, by the way, is from Adam
Michnik's Letters from Prison and Other Essays.7 They are very enter-
taining to read nowadays, with everything that has happened since.
(Michnik is now the co-editor of Solidarity's aboveground daily.) He
has one letter from prison called "Why You Are Not Signing?"' This
is the classic KOR spirit. He is addressing anybody thinking about
signing a loyalty oath. And he says:
You know that you are no hero and that you never wanted to be one. You have
never wanted to die for your nation, or for freedom, or for anything else.... You
have always wanted to be alive, to live like a normal person, to have respect for
yourself and for your friends....
Nevertheless, they did declare this war on you and over thirty million other
people, and so you are forced to recognize that amid the street roundups, the
ignoble court sentences, the despicable radio programs, and the distribution of
leaflets by underground Solidarity [by signing] you will not regain the normalcy
that was based on respect for yourself. Now you must choose between moral and
material stability, because you know that today's "normalcy" will have the bitter
taste of self-defeat .... 9
He warns against giving in to the tempting offers of freedom made by
7. A. MICHNIK, LETTERS FROM PRISON AND OTHER ESSAYS (1985).
8. Id. at 3.
9. Id. at 11.
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the policeman "who seeks to delude you with promises of happiness but
really brings suffering and inner hell instead. No, this is not heroism. It
is mere common sense."10
It is striking that in the same letter, Michnik insists that "You har-
bor no hatred toward the policeman, only pity .... You know that the
sentence of national oblivion will be passed on them. ."I, This too, is
absolutely typical of the "KOR ethos," as Lipski called it-an ethos
which was at once absolutely consistent and absolutely paradoxical.1 2 It
was characterized by an insistence on the crucial importance of "living
in truth," as Vaclav Havel put the matter, in neighboring Czechoslova-
kia-the fundamental necessity, the deep spiritual value, of saying a
true thing, of refusing to say false ones, of calling things by their true
names. And yet the ethos was simultaneously suffused with a profound
understanding of human fallibility and weakness, of the tragic dilem-
mas that actual people faced in their actual lives, of the inevitability of
their failing to be able to live in truth at all times. No sooner has
Michnik urged people not to sign a loyalty oath in this one letter-or
not to emigrate, as he does in another-than he is lavishing under-
standing on those who felt that they had to. He is even refusing to hate
the police. In both cases, in part because of what feelings of superiority
or hatred do to the one who harbors them. But also because of the
strategic requirements of the movement: how it desperately had to be-
come more and more inclusive, rather than exclusive, if it was going to
succeed. In his recent New Year's address as president, Havel refused
to shift all the blame for his country's debacle onto "them," the coun-
try's prior totalitarian leaders. He insisted that everyone who had lived
in the system had to search his own heart, to gauge his own complicity,
to establish his own truth as a first step before the country could move
on.13
I see my time is running out, but I would just suggest that this dual-
ity-the insistence on naming things by their true names and the si-
multaneous lavishing of understanding and forgiveness-characterized
Solidarity both as an underground movement and in the remarkable
transition to state power which it has recently been undergoing. And as
such it provides one model for the sorts of issues we will be considering
in this conference.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 7.
12. J. LUPSKI, supra note 2, at 62.
13. The Great Moral Stake of the Moment, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 15, 1990, at 42 (pro-
viding excerpts from the inaugural address by Vaclav Havel on New Year's Day in
Czechoslovakia).
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REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE ALEX KOZINSKI 1
My main claim to fame for participating in this gathering is that I
was just in Romania. I came back about ten days ago. I have no previ-
ous intimate knowledge of, or dealings with, human rights organiza-
tions. I am a federal judge in the United States. I deal with human
rights in this country when they are challenged in court. I share the
view expressed by Jeri Laber and by some of the other speakers that
Romania probably will be the most difficult case of all of those we now
see. Change there is taking place, but it is going on in peculiar and, I
think, even perverse ways. It is too early to tell, but I think there is
some cause for optimism. There is also a good deal of cause for
pessimism.
I spent a week in Romania and spoke with many people, some on the
street, some that I picked up hitchhiking-and some government offi-
cials as well. The thing that perhaps struck me the most was that I
never heard anybody say even the slightest positive thing about Nikolai
Ceaucescu. Moreover, I do not have anything good to say about him
myself. He was, nevertheless, the leader of the country for twenty-four
years, and one imagines that he must have done something of which
somebody, somewhere approved. He might have been a tyrant. He
might have put people in jail, but perhaps he built a nice subway sys-
tem, for example. Of course he may not even have done this.
I then asked myself, where are all the kooks? In other words, where
are those people in a free society that take odd and unusual positions,
unpopular positions, positions that maybe have no foundation in fact at
all? I saw none of those people, or their ideas expressed. Although the
last time I was there, everybody was a Communist and loved the First
Son of the Republic, when I returned, no one was a Communist, not a
single person.
Of course, I did not talk to twenty-seven million Romanians. Of the
people that I did talk to--which was a fair sampling-not one admitted
to being or ever having been a Communist, or even to having had Com-
munist leanings, or to having ever said anything in support of
Ceaucescu. One has to ask why. Perhaps it is too early to tell or per-
haps the reason you do not see more diversity is that the people have
been taught to move in a kind of goose step in the same direction for so
long that if you turn them around, they will all turn around and march
1. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, Pasadena, California.
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in the opposite direction. I think there is more to it than that, and here
I want to emphasize a very important area to which some of the other
speakers have alluded, but which, I believe, needs more emphasis.
The problem in Romania is that nothing has changed economically.
The state still owns everything: your job, your housing, your schooling,
your entitlement to medical care, your entitlement to whatever it is
that you can get legally. Now there is a lot one can get on the black
market, but it is still dependent on the structure created by govern-
ment. It is still dependent on the same people who were there six
months ago or ten years ago. One still cannot see a doctor unless one
has a pack of Kents, nor fill a car with gasoline unless one is willing to
pay the right baksheesh. The degree of control that exists, even in a
society where one is now free to speak and one is free to say any-
thing-the stifling presence of this huge governmental apparatus that
pervades every area of existence-continues to be the main impediment
to the exercise of true human rights in Romania.
I do not know whether the Securitate is still operating. Most people I
talked to were fairly candid and were willing to tell me how bad things
were and how much hope they had for the future. When, however, we
started approaching the subject of what is now taking place in
Romania, they whispered. For example, I was sitting in a restaurant
next to a curtain and the fellow with whom I was talking-someone
quite sophisticated and intelligent-before answering a question, moved
the curtain aside to make sure that no one was behind it listening. Ad-
ditionally, when I was sitting in the United States Consulate, I started
saying something to a United States citizen who works in a station in
Romania. The statement was vaguely disparaging of something or
somebody-I do not want to go into details. She quickly deflected my
comment and said, "Oh, but he's a great man" pointing to the ceiling,
and gave me a chance to say, "Of course he's a great man. He's a
wonderful man."
I do not know whether these perceptions are all in the nature of the
pains you feel in an amputated leg or whether these are realities. What
I do know is that the situation will not change easily as long as there
are no economic reforms; as long as a fair measure of the population is
unable to control their economic existence without relying on govern-
ment bureaucrats. This is a fundamental issue. We have talked about
speech. We have talked about voting. We have talked about political
participation. We have talked about fair trials. All of those things are
very important. I advance the view that there are other important
rights as well. Those rights include choices about what one does with
one's life, what profession one practices, where one works, and in what
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city one lives. Those choices in Romania are entirely dependent on
where one gets assigned (repartizat). Therefore, if one becomes a doc-
tor, one draws the name of one city, and then lives in that city. The
government made all those decisions, and until there is change, until
Romania-I cannot speak for other Eastern Bloc countries although I
guess it may be the same-gets a heavy dose of capitalism, to use a
term which is not always a favorite in this country, we are not going to
see real change in what are considered traditional human freedoms. It
simply cannot, and will not, happen.
Next I would like to discuss why, aside from the fear, changes in
Romania will be difficult. Romania has one television station. It is
owned and controlled by the government. If one wants to be a political
party, one must get time on that single television station. There were
forty-three parties declared at last count. Every day I was there, two or
three young men stood up and declared a new political party. The abil-
ity to disseminate one's point of view through television, on the other
hand, is vital to realistic success in politics today.
There are several newspapers now. There are long lines for every-
thing in Romania, but none longer than those for getting a paper,
which shows there is a healthy interest in the democratic process. The
papers, however, lack newsprint. They lack basic equipment such as
computers, cameras, and lenses. They gave me a long list of things they
needed in order to be able to keep putting out their alternative publica-
tions. Problems result because the editors' housing is controlled by the
government. The government controls their heat and their telephones.
While I have not verified this, I was told that they printed some articles
that criticized the government, and all of a sudden they lost their heat
and telephones. Whether there is a connection between their criticism
of the government and their loss of heat and power, or whether it was
just the way the Romanian economy works, is not clear. Nevertheless,
they perceived this as governmental control over their activities.
Writers are dependent upon the printers' union to get articles
printed. The printers' union fiercely favors the National Liberation
Front, the current government. There is one printing plant, Casa
Scinteia. It could be seen in photographs from the square where
Lenin's statue was removed. This huge building called the House of
ScInteia, used to house the Communist paper that is now defunct.
However, it is full of printing presses, effectively the only printing
presses in the country. If one wants to run a paper that is critical of the
government, critical of the current regime, one must have access to re-
sources such as newsprint, printing presses, and distribution. That does
not currently exist.
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While I was in Romania, I spoke with Strelian Tanase, a man who
runs one of the more radical papers, named "22" after the events of
December 22nd. I use the term radical in the most positive sense, since
the publication contains the most ideas and alternatives currently avail-
able for reading. Tanase commented that Romania has a real problem
that other Eastern Bloc countries do not face. Romania no longer has
any Communists. At least in the other East Bloc countries, there is a
Communist party. There is a Communist presence. Everybody knows
who they are, and can differentiate among the groups. The Commu-
nists, as well as other parties, present their respective views, and distin-
guish themselves from each other by what they offer. In sum, there is
an exchange of ideas.
We have a hidden enemy in Romania. There are still people who are
Communists. I think there should be people who believe in Commu-
nism. I think it is a healthy thing in a democratic system to have peo-
ple espousing those views, if only to have them, I hope, rejected. They
should, nevertheless, be offered. The idea that people might espouse
Communism as a means of testing the ideas of others is dead in
Romania, and it handicaps Romanians. It handicaps them in identify-
ing who is an enemy, and it handicaps them in really sharpening any of
the ideas that they do have.
One can go into Victory Square or into the Palace Square-the big
squares where there was a lot of shooting and blood during the revolu-
tion-and people are now there speaking vigorously about the current
situation. A lot of heat and passion are generated, something one would
never have seen while I was growing up there. One never would have
seen such discussions last year. However, if one listens, they are not
saying anything. There is a vacuum of ideas. Discussions are on the
following level: "Things were bad. Democracy is good. We want more
democracy." Well, democracy is a vessel. Democracy is a vessel which
you have to fill with ideas. Ideally, democracy reflects and represents
what the people think. Right now there is no thought whatsoever.
I share the view that it would have been better for Romania if the
change had not occurred quite so suddenly and that Communism had
not become such an unspeakable word. My views on this are well
known, but I hope that it will not be too long before Communism re-
turns to Romania. I hope Communism does not return as ruling doc-
trine, but at least as acceptable political doctrine-something that can
be talked about, debated, and considered along with the other ideas
that I also hope will be generated. When it does, then we can be much
more optimistic.
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ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE RICHARD SCHIFTER1
This morning I met with a group of parliamentarians from Iraq who
were telling me about human rights progress in Iraq, and I listened. I
tried to engage in a dialogue with them in the hope that they will, upon
their return to their country, work on this subject.
I had initially written a few thoughts for today, but rather than de-
livering a written statement, I want to follow up on the previous discus-
sion. I would like to comment on the developments in Eastern Europe.
This is one situation in which we can do more than just make state-
ments on the subject. Now we can actually go to these countries and
see whether, in cooperation with the people involved, something can be
done to effect change for the better.
For example, Professor Herman Schwartz is now very actively in-
volved in Czechoslovakia. Judge Alex Kozinski has just been to
Romania. The question is, what can we do that will advance the human
rights cause in Eastern European countries? Let me offer a few com-
ments. I would be very interested in getting reactions to them.
As far as the United States government is concerned, let me empha-
size very strongly that there is a deep interest in, first, trying to figure
out what it is that we can do most effectively to advance the cause of
democracy and human rights in Eastern Europe. The next question is,
once you have figured out precisely what it is that can be done, how
can one get the job done? Above all, once you have agreed to put a
certain amount of money into the cause, in a good many of these situa-
tions we must ask where can we get the right people to provide the
required help? These are the thoughts I would like to express by way of
background. Let us look at each country on a case-by-case basis. I will
give you my impressions of what we are dealing with in each country
because, while there are a great many similarities, there are also a good
many differences.
First, I would leave out East Germany because, by and large, the
West Germans are dealing with the changes in East Germany, and at
this particular point, no one in Leipzig, Dresden, or any other part of
East Germany is waiting for us to arrive there. Rather, they are wait-
ing for people to come from Bonn, Frankfurt, and other West German
cities-and that is fine. It makes it possible for us then to see what we
can do elsewhere.
I want to say that as far as Poland is concerned, as I see things
1. Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, De-
partment of State, Washington, D.C.
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operate there, I was struck by what can happen in a country which,
although having a reputation for a great deal of internal disagreement
and divisions of various kinds, it was, nevertheless, possible under those
circumstances for a group to come together. The Solidarity movement
by and large set up a shadow government. In Poland, people in the
opposition really trained themselves for the day when they could take
over. When the day came, they moved in and they are now doing an
amazing job in terms of trying to run the country in a highly effective
and responsible way. It is something that had not been expected in the
past. Given the fact that Poland owes forty billion dollars accumulated
in the Gierek era of the 1970s, and in spite of all its difficulties, Poland
is really moving in the right direction.
Even in Poland problems do arise, and these difficulties are of con-
cern to people throughout the region. The concept of local government
responsive to the people is something that is largely unknown in that
part of the world. Interior ministries ran local governments in most of
these countries. A good many people have told me that they really need
to train municipal officials. They need to understand how to run an
autonomous local government that really looks to the population for its
mandate and has powers of its own. It is necessary to provide a legal
framework for that type of government and then train people to run it.
Again, this is something that is of interest throughout the region. It is a
very important element of grass roots democracy. That is one point I
wanted to make with regard to Poland.
In Czechoslovakia, there is also a group of people who are skilled
and able. Those who participated in the "Charter 77" movement and
are now in the Civic Forum will know how to run the country. When I
recently met with the new Czech Ambassador, Rita Klimova, who was
a spokeswoman for Charter 77 and then the Civic Forum, one of the
points she made to me was that Czechoslovakia will have to run a good
election. She pointed out, however, that Czechoslovakia lacks the capa-
bility to organize the electoral process. Czechoslovakia needs outside
assistance to put the process together. She stated she was not worried
about the process becoming repressive or anything of that nature.
Rather, she was primarily worried about creating a mess due to disor-
ganization. So again, it is necessary for outsiders to help Czechoslova-
kia put the process together, purely in terms of technical advice.
The situation in Hungary involves a group of people who really took
responsibility-not just the reformers in the Communist party-for re-
forming the country and opening the road to democracy. They hoped
that they could stay in power, but it looks like they are going to lose
the vote. We will have to see how we can be of help to whoever is
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elected and provide assistance to those who are interested in engaging
in necessary reforms. In the meantime, the incumbent minister of jus-
tice, Kulcsar, has actually taken a very effective role in getting the le-
gal structure of the country reorganized. I think he has received some
help, but undoubtedly additional assistance can be rendered.
Next I will address the more difficult situation. Judge Kozinski made
a point about the situation in Romania. Let me continue with some of
the thoughts he expressed. It is my impression from observing the vari-
ous postwar East European Communist countries, that the one common
thread that runs throughout the entire system was that the Communist
parties, most of which were illegal--certainly all of them were illegal
during World War II and were illegal in many countries prior to World
War II-were groups bound together by ideology and also by some sort
of fraternal spirit.
The communists had all been in the underground together and after
the war took office together with a collegial feeling toward each other.
That kept the entire system operating for quite some time. Ideology fell
by the wayside as the years passed, but the collegial spirit was still with
them in most countries with the exception of Romania. What
Ceaucescu did, as Alex Kozinski pointed out, was to destroy the Com-
munist party and substitute for it what resembled to me when I first
went there, a Byzantine court.
There was an emperor and a group of courtiers whose only tie was
the tie to the emperor. That is the way the system operated. The kind
of relationship that tied officials to each other in other countries simply
did not exist there. So when one killed the emperor, the entire system
shattered and overnight there was nothing left, absolutely nothing.
What remained available was the debris that had been cast off over a
period of time. The people on the outside, who had for one reason or
another antagonized Ceaucescu, came together and formed the Na-
tional Salvation Front that now is functioning as the government of
Romania.
The question that arises now is: under these circumstances, where
one deals with people who have very little identification with democ-
racy in anything other than perhaps book knowledge, how can one be
of assistance to them? Let me simply say that it ought to be possible to
design a program that meets the needs even under these difficult
circumstances.
For example, I believe the minister of justice in Romania is someone
who is willing to listen. He also understands what is necessary for
Romania to become a recognized and respected member of the concert
of democratic nations.
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It would be productive to engage the Romanian government through
him and provide the building blocks for the establishment of democracy
as Romania tries to establish a democratic system. That requires peo-
ple spending time in a country which is not particularly pleasant to go
to at this point-unless one wants to go to Transylvania and enjoy the
mountains. We must find a consistent means for working with the peo-
ple over there, and at the same time make sure that various democratic
countries send a clear message about what the minimum standards are
for acceptance as a member of the democratic family. There is no
guarantee that this is going to work but at least it is worth an effort.
Bulgaria presents a slightly different problem, but there are similari-
ties. In Bulgaria, by and large, the Communist party as it has existed
in the past has slightly reformed itself. The leader, Zhivkov, was tossed
out by a Politburo vote of five to four. This vote in the Politburo came
about, I believe, after very severe pressure from the Soviet Union. This
is how they were able to get Zhivkov removed. There is, nevertheless,
new leadership there. There are some people who are better than
others. The old system has, by no means, been dismantled. There is
reason to believe that during the election, which is due next June, the
Communist party will be defeated and a new group will take over.
In Bulgaria, as in Romania, there was not an effective outside group
that was organized enough to move in and take office. They also will
need a great deal of outside help. Here again, the question that arises
is, how can one put it together? Who is willing to spend some time
going over there and working with them?
In all of these situations, while outside assistance is provided only if
it is invited, I think that a good many of the East Europeans would be
eager and anxious to receive guests from the West-particularly from
the United States-who are prepared to render advice and counsel on
how to set up a scheme that is democratic and that is protective of
human rights.
We normally do not think of Yugoslavia in this context, but while
Yugoslavia may have been out in front in the past, it is certainly not
out in front at this particular point, particularly in Serbia. There are,
indeed, serious problems as to where that republic within Yugoslavia is
going and what this means about centrifugal forces at work in Yugosla-
via. Slovenia, on the other hand, is moving toward an open democratic
society with Croatia somewhere in between and Serbia not moving at
all. In addition to all the other problems, there is a very serious prob-
lem in the Kosovo province between the Serbs and the Albanians. Here
again the question is to what extent are the Yugoslavs interested in
engaging in consultation? I plan to be there next month and that is
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very definitely one of the issues that is going to be on the agenda. As to
Albania, there has been no clear word about their being interested in
receiving advice and counsel on how to move toward democracy and
human rights.
Finally, I would like to make a few comments about the Soviet
Union because some of the most recent developments in the Soviet
Union have not been fully discussed in the American media or in any
analyses that I have read. In many respects, the Communist party of
the Soviet Union as a controlling force has started on a decline, not
only because of forces at work internally from the bottom, but also
because of specific actions of Gorbachev. What we need to keep in
mind is this: there has been a great deal of discussion during the last
few weeks about the new powers assumed by Gorbachev as president.
The question raised by Sakharov before he died is to what extent is this
an augmentation of authority that is inappropriate for a democracy?
I think that what one will find on close examination is that the pow-
ers that the president of the Soviet Union has now assumed are similar
to the powers the president of France assumed under the De Gaulle
constitution. The powers of the French president under the Fifth Re-
public Constitution have some similarity to the powers of the Soviet
president. Of course, the difference is that Mitterrand, for example,
was elected by the people. The same cannot be said for Gorbachev.
What should also be noted is: from whom did the president take this
power? The power that has been assumed by Gorbachev was taken
from the Politburo. The power vested in the past in the top leadership
of the Communist party was power vested in a committee in the post-
Stalin period, a committee in which Gorbachev actually shared power
with his colleagues. By and large, what he has done now is outflank his
colleagues in the Politburo. Even if they decide to dump him, and he is
no longer general secretary of the party, unless there is a coup that
ousts him as president, he remains president. That is where the power
now rests.
I have not seen this discussed in any of the analyses of changes in the
Soviet Union. Similarly, looking at the elections that have taken place
in the last few weeks, first in the Baltics and, on March 4th, in the
Slavic Republics of the Soviet Union, the party is being made irrele-
vant at the local level. Formerly the party apparatus operated at the
local community level and ran the city of Moscow. In Moscow, in very
short order, there will be a city council with power as a state organ
derived from the general population. The voters have elected new lead-
ers in an effort to sideline the Communist party establishment. This is
a very interesting development. Many of the reformers in the Soviet
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Union are now interested in getting advice on how to improve the local
structure of government, the structure of government generally, and
above all, their legal system.
Gorbachev has started talking about the creation of a state built on
the rule of law-an issue that has been on the agenda for a number of
years. This is now a term frequently used in the Soviet Union when one
talks to people, for example, at the Ministry of Justice, the Institute of
State and Law, those in the court system, and even people in the Min-
istry of the Interior. In one funny incident, the last time I was there, I
got an interview with the Deputy Chairman of the KGB. In the course
of the conversation, believe it or not, he told me that the problem with
his country is that people do not know their rights. Worse than that,
lawyers do not defend people adequately. I am not saying this is the
last word from the KGB on that subject, but the mere fact that he
made such statements was interesting. One ought to pick up on this.
Moreover, Minister of Justice Venamin Yakolev, who I really believe
is a reformer, has said that more lawyers are needed. There are only
27,000 lawyers, whereas I understand there are more than 52,000 in
the District of Columbia alone, which can make quite a difference.
Many lawyers in Moscow, where there are more lawyers perhaps than
elsewhere, tell me that everybody practices on the run. They do not
have enough time to pay useful attention to individual cases.
We must try to build up a relationship with people in the legal pro-
fession and in the various parts of the government of the Soviet Union
who are concerned with reform as it relates to the law. It is in that
context that some of us are presently engaged. The United States gov-
ernment should support an effort to engage in dialogue and expose the
appropriate Soviet officials to concepts of legal structure and protection
of human rights in a democratic society. Particularly, we should try to
reach those people who, because they held positions of influence, can
have the effect of a multiplier in an effort to change human rights con-
ditions for the better in the Soviet Union.
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PANEL III
CIVIL/MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE WESTERN
HEMISPHERE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
REMARKS OF ALEXANDER WILDE1
The issue of military accountability in Latin America has gone
through two generations. They are now overlapping generations, but
they are separable somewhat in time, and certainly analytically. The
first generation of issues was that concerned with violations committed
by military dictatorships, with penalties and sanctions for past abuses.
That led to debates within the human rights community about amnes-
ties; debates about the relative balance and equity to be sought between
truth, justice, and reconciliation in different societies. That first genera-
tion of issues is still relevant. It is certainly relevant for Chile. It is
relevant for Nicaragua, and it may someday be relevant for El Salva-
dor-but with those nations I might be getting a bit ahead of the story.
I would like to come back in particular to Nicaragua and El Salvador
at the end of my remarks.
The second generation of issues has had to do with the ongoing
abuses committed by the armed forces-violations of human rights
under putative, and sometimes genuine, political democracies. Unfortu-
nately, we know a good many cases of this abuse. El Salvador and
Guatemala are just outstanding ones, but Peru, Colombia, Brazil, and
Honduras are additional examples. These issues are in many ways at
the core of this panel highlighting the broader questions of transitions
to democracy and to the rule of law because they relate to the place of
the armed forces in the larger democratic order or, as Louis Goodman
described it, within the political system.
It is well known that Latin America has been characterized by cycli-
cal patterns of variation between military dictatorships and rather
weak, and many times unsatisfactory, democracies. It is important to
recall that cyclical history in this triumphant moment today when the
map of Latin America looks in a superficial way "democratic." There
have been times when the map looked a good deal more democratic
than dictatorial in Latin America, such as during the fifties and early
sixties, but dictatorships came back. Today when we explain why that
happened we emphasize the cold war-the ideological and military
global competition that blighted the possibilities of institutionalizing
1. Executive Director, The Washington Office on Latin America, Washington,
D.C.
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democracy. However, we should not forget that dictatorships also re-
placed democracies in that earlier period because of deep, underlying
injustices and inequalities, to which democratic institutions failed ade-
quately to respond.
We stand now at a moment when many people hope that we can
break the old cycle, and that Latin America can undergo a genuine
democratization. Against that hope stands the history of the region,
and many of the same factors that explained the end of the earlier
wave of democratization. For example, the same underlying injustices
continue, and now involve a deeper economic crisis across the region
than in that earlier period. In addition, the military doctrines of low-
intensity and counter-insurgency warfare which developed in that time
are still very much alive in the armed forces of Latin America. Those
doctrines led the military to consider dissidence in society illegitimate
because it could lead to the overthrow of the democracy by revolution.
Against that background remains the hope that Latin America is not
condemned to cycles of dictatorship because the world order has
changed fundamentally with the end of the cold war. Another factor
that is less noticed in the United States, but that is very real for anyone
who knows Latin America, is the flowering of "civil society." It demon-
strates today perhaps the greatest vitality ever in Latin America at the
popular level-a response to the long dictatorships-and is organized in
ways beyond anything Latin America has known in the past. That is a
source of hope and potentially genuine democratization.
Now there is a new possibility between the alternative of a return to
dictatorship and that of genuine democratization. It is that many coun-
tries in Latin America could continue in some kind of semi-democratic
state for a long time. In this "democradura" situation, the military mo-
bilizes violence in the name of the state to combat internal enemies. Its
arm may reach into many different aspects of policy and of national
life-without feeling the effect of democratic accountability. I used to
think such a system was impossible, because it was inherently unstable.
If there were any freedom of information-disclosures that the army
was engaged in gross abuses, for example-this would be intolerable to
a military which would not want such things revealed, and intolerable
to a civil society unable to punish such deeds. Yet, for a decade in El
Salvador and for more than several decades in Colombia, an uneasy
kind of state, with a civilian political leadership and military presence
throughout society, has existed. One has to wonder whether, in fact,
that kind of situation might not become the norm in many other coun-
tries in Latin America.
I have been generalizing broadly. Latin America has many different
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situations. There are many possible factors we could examine that
shape the impact of the military on human rights. I would like to look
at two. They have more to do with the political context that permits the
military to intervene in politics than with the armed forces themselves.
One of these is the continuing political character of the armed forces,
the fact that it "represents" certain interests in society. Professor
Wiarda, Professor Charles W. Anderson, and other scholars have
pointed to this as a normal feature of politics in many countries. This
has undeniably been the case.
The other factor limiting genuine democratization and. the rule of
law is the military's "exclusionary" role. In many different countries,
the political spectrum is truncated in the sense that the interests of
significant parts of the population-even the majority, as in the case of
Guatemala-are simply not represented at all in politics. The military,
however, also acts directly to exclude certain existing political
forces-to push organized interests out of the political system, both
majority and significant minority interests. These are old patterns. In
Argentina, this is what happened to the Peronistas. The Colombian left
is another example. Of course, we have two very important and con-
temporary cases with which I will conclude: El Salvador and
Nicaragua.
Let me just compare them briefly. First, in the case of Nicaragua
during the present transition, human rights groups have a number of
clear principles upon which we can operate. One is certainly that past
abuses of human rights by the army should be punished. There are a
variety of issues that we could debate about the character of amnesties
that might be used and the tradeoff between truth and justice that has
long been discussed in Chile, for example. That could come up very
quickly in Nicaragua.
The broader question, probably the one in which Washington is most
interested, is what it would mean for the Sandinista revolutionary
armed forces of Nicaragua to be controlled democratically. In other
words, what does democratic control of that army translate into? Cer-
tainly, the constitution is a basic document, providing one guide to this
question. People are looking it over carefully in order to frame this
issue.
There are at least two other qualities or factors that we need to con-
sider when asking what it would mean for the armed forces to be dem-
ocratically controlled as the government passes from the Sandinistas to
the UNO opposition. One fundamental factor in maintaining political
order in the country, one very much related to reconciliation, is the
possibility of an insurgency breaking out at the local level. The poten-
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tial for this has existed for some time. Many of us fear this possibility.
Therefore, a legitimate role exists for the military in maintaining politi-
cal order. What will enable the military to do that is a crucial question.
I refer to the nature of the political control over that military.
A second factor involves the question of political space. A remark-
able fact that has gone rather unnoticed is that, if the Sandinistas ac-
cept a position as a democratic political party, the Sandinista National
Liberation Front (FSLN) will become the first and only large party of
the left in Central America. The Sandinista party achieved its preemi-
nence militarily; the difficulty is whether they can maintain it demo-
cratically, considering not only Nicaragua itself but the region as a
whole. This is a central issue. If it can make this evolution, it will be a
tremendous sign of hope, not only for Nicaragua, but potentially for
other countries in that region. Above all, it provides hope for El Salva-
dor. The FSLN is a strong, disciplined political party, and every place
where the military has been brought under civilian control in Latin
America, it has occurred in the context of a strong party system. UNO
is not a strong party, but it may become one. With even one strong
party in Nicaragua, it is conceivable that the military can be brought
under control. The Sandinistas, although only a minority in the Febru-
ary elections, still represent a very significant and important portion of
the political spectrum.
They have no counterpart in El Salvador. With electoral turn outs of
more than ninety percent in Nicaragua and fifty percent in El Salva-
dor, El Salvador has not simply a truncated political spectrum, but
rather excludes a very significant part of the politically active popula-
tion, namely, popular organizations and groups at the grass roots level.
In addition, of course, the civilian government in El Salvador has
only the most tenuous control over the military institution. The security
forces continue to be guilty of gross violations of human rights, only a
minuscule number of which result in punishment. The real danger in El
Salvador is that it remains a "democradura," a highly restricted and
limited civilian regime without genuine democratization. It does have
one important advantage compared to Nicaragua. It has in ARENA a
strong political party on the right, a party that can compete electorally.
If ARENA, like the FSLN, accepted a full political spectrum and
competes in that fashion, there would be greater potential for removing
the military from politics.
Let me conclude with a final comparison of Nicaragua and El Salva-
dor today. In Nicaragua, international organizations have made an
enormous contribution to pluralistic electoral competition. If it is possi-
ble to transfer control of the government peacefully in that country, it
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will happen because of the active role of the international organizations
during the campaign and election, and the period following the elec-
tion. If the United States supports that kind of presence in El Salvador
(and there are promising signs) such a transition might also be possible
in that tragic country in the future.
REMARKS OF PROFESSOR HOWARD J. XVIARDA'
In focusing on the question of civil/military relations in the Western
Hemisphere and human rights, my sense has always been that one
ought to know the institution with which we deal before we rush in to
reform it. I worry that in various kinds of meetings in which we all
participate that, with the best of intentions, we rush into various con-
troversial and very difficult and complex issues without necessarily
knowing what we are doing. With all due respect, lawyers can fall into
this trap just as much as the United States government, which, inciden-
tally, does it very often.
I will begin by providing a sense of realism about the military in
Latin America, how it is organized, and what we can do. First, the
military simply cannot be wished away as doubtless some of the panel-
ists would like to do. It has to be dealt with on the basis of realism, not
on the basis of romance. I heard a comment this morning by one of the
speakers suggesting the demilitarization of Latin America. I think that
simply will not work, especially if it is attempted by the United States.
Second, we cannot understand the Latin American military through
United States' models for interpreting civil/military relations. Instead,
we are dealing with a quite different historical, sociological, political,
and strategic context in the region. It is doubtful that United States
models of civil/military relations are really appropriate for our under-
standing of Latin American military activity and their interrelations
with civilian institutions.
Third, if we are going to deal with the Latin American military, we
need to understand it realistically and, most importantly, on its own
terms and frequently in its own language, which is also quite different
from the language that we in the United States use to discuss themes
like civil/military relations. Let me just suggest very briefly what some
of those terms and realities might be. First, as already indicated by a
number of speakers, in many of the countries it is virtually impossible
to subordinate the military to civilian authority. We may have to come
1. Professor, University of Massachusetts, Amherst; Research Associate, Center for
International Affairs, Harvard University.
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to grips with that, although we may lament it. In a number of the
Central American countries and the smaller and less institutionalized
South American countries, there is a dual power structure-civilian
and military, co-existing uneasily, side-by-side-with the relative bal-
ance of power between them being renegotiated on virtually a daily
basis.
Second, we have to understand the military in Latin America as vir-
tually a fourth branch of government, one included in basic laws and in
the constitutions of a number of countries and recognized as such by
both the political and civilian elite. Thus, the military is not separate
from the state, but is, in fact, one of its main pillars. In a sense, the
military's position in society is analogous to that of the church. One
cannot think of the separation of church and state in the historically
Catholic societies of Latin America in the same way that one thinks of
the separation of church and state in the United States. Civil/military
relations in Latin America are often governed by the same special
considerations.
Third, it is appropriate to recognize, while we may again lament it,
that we are dealing with a violence-employing institution operating fre-
quently within a culture of violence. The two frequently feed upon each
other. The society is very often violent and the military itself, almost by
definition, is a violent institution. It is very difficult for North Ameri-
cans to come to grips with and understand this reality.
Fourth, historically the Latin American militaries in many countries
have played a "moderative" role. The Spanish and Portuguese crowns
used to play this role; now it is the armed forces who often moderate
the action of political forces in the context of crises and breakdown,
where seemingly only the military has sufficient legitimacy or sufficient
strength to step in and set the political order straight again.
Fifth, we need to understand the motivations of military officers. The
military institution is very fearful even today that it will be destroyed
by guerrilla and leftist groups. In my earlier research experience dating
back to the early 1960s in a number of Latin American countries, we
systematically interviewed military officers about their conception of
communism. We received some very interesting responses, and not at
all the responses that one might expect. They had nothing to do with
ideology nor competitive economic or political programs. Rather, the
Latin American military officers' conception of communism is precisely
what had happened in Cuba a few years earlier. Members of the old
Battista officer corps were tried in the baseball stadium, lined up
against a wall and shot. That is the Latin American military's concep-
tion of what happens when they negotiate with guerrillas, and it helps
1024 [VOL. 5:965
TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY
explain why situations like El Salvador are so bloody, so wrenching,
and so difficult. If that is their conception of what leftist forces do to
the military officer corps, it is certain there is not an awful lot of room
for negotiation on the part of the military over those kinds of issues.
We also have to deal with the fact, one which Louis Goodman wrote
about in his recent book, The Military and Democracy: The Future of
Civil-Military Relations in Latin America,2 that the role of the mili-
tary is expanding. The military is not only engaged in counter-insur-
gency activities and with a national security doctrine that leads it into
more forceful kinds of roles, but in the last twenty-five years the mili-
tary has taken a very active role in the administration of the economy
and the administration of public enterprises in virtually all of the Latin
American countries.
If one studies the training programs at the Latin American military
academies, what one discovers is that they no longer study Napoleonic
tactics, but rather modern management, public administration, interna-
tional trade, international law, and national development. They are
learning precisely all the skills required to run their countries and, in
fact, the military are sometimes convinced-at least up until they also
were poisoned by their experience in office during the 1970's-that
they could run their countries better than the civilians. In examining
the curricula and the quality of some of the officer corps and their
members, they may indeed be better equipped than the civilians to run
the countries.
Finally, let me suggest that if one is going to work in the area of
human rights and the military, it is necessary to understand the con-
cept of the fuero militar. Few people have an understanding of what
the fuero militar really means. This term defines the place of the mili-
tary within a set of societies that have historically been thought of as
organic, or corporate in organization. If one does not understand the
fuero militar, the military's place and rights in society, which is quite
different from American-style human rights, it will be very difficult for
outsiders to deal with the issue of civil/military relations.
The fact is that in country after country of the Americas, thefuero
militar is presently being redefined and renegotiated. The outcome will
vary from country to country, but we need to be aware of the issues
involved. Unless we understand both the history and the current as-
pects of these notions of fuero militar and the organic laws that govern
the military's relations to the state, we are not going to get very far,
2. THE MILITARY AND DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
IN LATIN AMERICA (L. Goodman, J. Mendelson, and J. Rial eds. 1990).
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either in our analyses or in our efforts to bring better human rights to
the region.
Allow me briefly to try to provide answers to some of these quanda-
ries and conundrums that have been raised. First, it should be noted
that this will be a long-term process whereby civil/military relations
are renegotiated and redefined within the region. It will not be settled
by a simple election or by civilian elites imposing a new model of mili-
tary behavior on what are, after all, proud and quite independent of-
ficer corps.
Second, we need greater education through such sources as the book
edited by Louis Goodman, et al., and a recently published book by Al
Stepan about Latin America's military institutions.3 Greater education
and professionalism is also needed within the officer corps and on the
part of civilian elites in Latin America, who often not only know noth-
ing about their own militaries, but also dislike them due to the social
and racial gaps between civilian elites and the military elites. They sel-
dom mix well at embassy events and other places where they meet.
Third, we need to understand the changes that are going on within
the Latin American militaries, on their own terms, including the notion
of military role expansion. It is going to be very difficult, since the mili-
tary has in fact expanded its role from what it was in the forties and
the fifties into areas of politics, administration, and economics, for the
military to simply go back to the barracks and spend their time clean-
ing their rifle barrels again and again. That is not likely to happen, and
we have to recognize this fact.
Fourth, civilians will have to be required to better understand the
military and not intervene in its internal professional affairs-that is,
the military hierarchy, the chain of command, the promotion structure,
etc.-if they want the military to stay out of civilian and political af-
fairs. This is a two-way process.
Fifth, as uncomfortable as it may leave us, it is very important for
us, as well as for the civilian elites in Latin America, to think about
finding something for the military to do. For example, the military's
involvement in drug enforcement activities is much preferable to the
military's being involved in overthrowing civilian governments, al-
though it carries certain risks. But those are the types of trade-offs one
has to be willing to make.
As another example, I offer the case of Spain. The United States and
the Spanish government very cleverly were able to envelop the Spanish
military in NATO committees, meetings, and travel to Brussels or
3. A. STEPAN, RETHINKING MILITARY POLITICS (1988).
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Paris, matters with which the military had not previously been in-
volved. The military did not have time to think about the kind of politi-
cal activities in which it historically had been engaged. NATO activi-
ties kept the military off the civilian government's back during the
Spanish transition to democracy. This is a very clever strategy and one
that obviously will find its counterparts somewhere in Latin America.
Spain is a much more appropriate model to use to understand the re-
definition of civil and military roles than is the United States model
that simply cannot be exported to Latin America.
Another thought which might be uncomfortable for us to accept, is
that we may need to provide increased perks, benefits, budgets, golf
courses, and clubs to the military. All of the political science literature
indicates that military budgets tend to go up under civilian govern-
ments rather than decrease. The reason for that is quite obvious. Civil-
ian governments are most threatened by military activities, and, there-
fore, a smart and shrewd civilian president will take steps to make sure
that the military poses no threat by paying it off with privileges, perks,
and benefits. So we may face the prospect that the Latin American
military budgets, in order to maintain civilian democratic government,
may have to increase.
We should also bear in mind that the military remains very suspi-
cious of and often hostile to civilian politicians, not only because they
are civilians-probably the least important motivating factor-but
rather because they tend to be whiter, more upper class, and from bet-
ter families. This racial, cultural, and social distinction between the of-
ficer corps and the civilian elites in many of the countries is a very
important one, and it leaves the military very suspicious of the actions,
including the political preferences, of the civilian elites.
In many respects the military has good reason to be suspicious of
civilian governments. For example, in Peru, where the outgoing Presi-
dent absolutely ruined the national economy of that unfortunate coun-
try, the military is very uncertain about what its attitude should be
toward the civilian president on issues of the economy as well as a host
of other issues.
Meanwhile, one ought to recognize that for a better human rights
policy with regard to some of the less institutionalized and less profes-
sional Latin American militaries, it will be necessary to keep the pres-
sure on and focus the spotlight on the abuses of the military. This in-
volves, for example, going to El Salvador as George Bush did when he
was Vice President, and laying down the law to the Salvadoran officer
corps by threatening to cut off their water-United States' aid. This is
the one message that these officer corps understand. They do not un-
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derstand much about human rights considerations expressed here in the
United States, but they do understand having their water cut off. That
may be the kind of tough, hard message that the United States will
have to convey from time to time. It may be necessary to paint these
countries as pariahs and isolate them internationally as was done in
Paraguay, Chile, and some other countries. Their wheels may eventu-
ally turn once this pressure is mobilized.
Finally, although I have spoken in general continent-wide terms, let
me suggest that one ought to recognize that there are obviously differ-
ences in each country. Nor has it been adequately acknowledged that
the military itself is internally divided, not so much on ideological
terms in the way most Americans focus on, but rather along profes-
sional and institutional lines. There is currently a major debate within
the officer corps themselves as to whether the army ought to be subor-
dinated to civilian authority as under a United States/West European
model, or whether it ought to be a separate institution retaining special
rights and duties under emergency circumstances, or whether a model
somewhere in between should be adopted. It would seem that those
very divisions and the internal debate occurring provide some room for
human rights proponents to operate, to exercise leverage, and to secure
some better human rights considerations. However, that can only be
done if we actually know the institution with which we are dealing.
TRANSLATED REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE PEDRO NIKKEN1
When discussing security issues in civil/military relations in the re-
gion, one has to consider four aspects of changed conditions. First,
Latin America is free as never before. Second, there are democratic
governments throughout the region, but the region is worse off than
ever before. The worst economic crisis ever currently exists. Third, the
military is not an answer to problems and the region is exhausted with
unsuccessful military solutions to problems. Fourth, Latin America's
reality is in the context of a different world. Anti-communism is not an
important ideology for the world. Glasnost and the new relations be-
tween the superpowers have changed the world view and all of this
causes a redefinition of civil/military relations, both with respect to do-
mestic situations, and also with respect to collective security relations
that we have for the region.
The need to rethink collective security arrangements could not be
1. Judge, Caracas, Venezuela and former President of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights.
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more clearly articulated than in the recent collapse of these agreements
with the invasion and intervention of the United States in Panama. All
of the bases of previously existing collective security arrangements were
violated. I suggest that when thinking about civil/military relations and
new collective security agreements, we should consider them within the
context of understanding why we are worried about security.
I suggest that there are five new common enemies. The first enemy is
the violence which results from the very difficult social reality con-
fronting country after country in Latin America, not only armed vio-
lence, but also the violence of unemployment, and social violence. The
second enemy is the impact of external debt and the amount of deci-
sion-making that is made for Latin American countries by forces
outside of those countries. The impact of drug trafficking and the way
it has transformed societies is a third enemy. The continuing problem
of terrorism and domestic subversion is a fourth enemy. A fifth enemy
is the paradox in which the debt situation undermines democracy. The
narcotics trafficking is, in a way, financed by developed countries, espe-
cially the United States. Another paradox results from increasing pros-
pects for democracy in other parts of the world that places less empha-
sis and less concern on Latin America and its democracies.
I suggest two ideas for considering future collective security arrange-
ments and future domestic civil/military relations. First, it is incorrect
to think that there are common threats, enemies, or problems for the
United States and Latin America. Second, Latin America is more iso-
lated now than it ever has been before. I am very concerned about both
of these facts. I am pessimistic and I certainly argue for concern about
this contemporary situation.
REMARKS OF PROFESSOR GENARO ARRIAGADA1
About ten days ago I was invited by the International Human Rights
Law Group to be an international observer in Nicaragua. I was a mem-
ber of President Carter's group. The day after the election, I made a
comment that the road to democracy was so, so long.
I suppose the Sandinista army will look to two models of civil/mili-
tary relations. One model resembles that of General Wojciech Jarusel-
ski in Poland, and the other resembles the model of President Augusto
Pinochet in Chile. Like the Jaruzelski model, they would want to be
part of a coalition. Here, the army that has been defeated in the electo-
1. Professor, John F. Kennedy School, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
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ral process may ask to remain in charge of the Ministry of Interior and
the Ministry of Defense. If they follow the model of Pinochet, the army
defeated in the polls may ask for a completely isolated army, indepen-
dent of civilian control. This army would have a commander-in-chief
who has the full confidence of the forces that have been defeated.
I think that there are many people, both inside and outside of our
countries, that are always concerned about the problems posed by mili-
tary men. They advise us not to be romantic; rather to be realistic. In
this way, a strange combination of principles is selected, but not ac-
cording to principles that work in any one democratic regime.
Many solutions are possible in Latin America. One of the main
problems in Latin America is that for more than a century, we have
been looking at these problems with an excess of realism. In that way,
some on the left suddenly discovered that the military men on the left
can create a fantastic revolution. Peru provides an example of this. As
with the Ecuadorian army, some on the right believed that the military
leader was very capable and could work better than a civilian leader.
The United States sends this message at times as well. For example, in
1969 the Rockefeller report2 suggested that the church cannot be
trusted. It described the church as being leftist. Moreover, politicians
could not be trusted because they were irresponsible. However, because
the army was more moderate, it could work better in a modernist age.
There have been ten years of dirty wars. Some people are delighted
with the performance of Pinochet in Chile since the economy there has
performed well. However, it is nonsense to say that an economic mira-
cle has occurred because, when looking at the sixteen years under Pi-
nochet, there has been more or less average growth during this period.
The difficulty with this view is that we have to think of civil/military
relations in terms of what will work in another country. It will be a
terrible mistake to go against these principles in order to make accom-
modations. What we want to achieve must be clear. Of course, it will
take a long time to obtain those principles, but the mistake is acting
without principles. Additionally, a military state within a democratic
state never works. At present, there are a lot of armies in Latin
America that in the name of the "fuero militar" want to be a military
state within a democratic state. If one knows what is impossible to
achieve, then one knows the first step.
What are the principles of good civilian military relations? The first
principle is respect for the monopoly of the arms in the hands of the
army. We need to make a very strong appeal against the politics of the
2. UNITED STATES, ROCKEFELLER REPORT ON CENTRAL AMERICA (1989).
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left in Latin America. They have been dreaming for the last twenty
years about a different definition of the monopoly of arms by the army,
one that has been extremely useful to the rightist military dictatorship.
There is no way that the politicians and societies in Latin America can
achieve democracy if we have very strong leftist groups supporting the
idea that they have the right to organize guerrillas, or dispute the mili-
tary's monopoly of arms.
The second principle involves putting the army under civilian control.
It will take time, but it is necessary for the civilian president to appoint
the commander-in-chief of the military. This is a good time to move
because the militaries in South America are exhausted. Their perform-
ance in the management of power has been awful. Their record in
human rights abuses has been awful. We are facing a new reality. I
remember that the military men in Peru came to power because some-
body lost the second page of the contract with the International Petro-
leum Company. Presently, Peru has two or three thousand percent in-
flation, and the military men are not assuming power because they are
exhausted. The countries are exhausted with military intervention. In
1964, Joao Goulart had ninety percent inflation. The military, forecast-
ing complete destruction, used this as a justification to take control.
While this is a good time to apply new principles, I agree with Pro-
fessor Wiarda that this is a two way road and that the civilians must
have respect for the military. Politicians who try to make strong reform
inside the army will not be successful if the military believes those re-
forms will mean the destruction of professionalism or the military ca-
reer. If we want to create democracy in our countries, we have to adopt
the right solution to problems. It will take a long time, but we have to
be very careful because there are some principles that we have to re-
spect. That means that the left has to change and of course the politi-
cians must be extremely prudent in dealing with these changes.
There are some events which provide hope. One is the dramatic crisis
of military ideology. I published a book on the military ideology in
South America ten years ago.3 At present, the military ideology, espe-
cially counter-subversive and anti-communist ideology, has been the
ground upon which they legitimized human rights abuses. We have a
breakdown in the military ideology and there is room to create a better
approach to dealing with the civilians and the military by matching
military ideology with democratic bias.
We also face a trend toward disarmament in the near future. In the
3. G. ARRIAGADA, IDEOLOGY AND POLITICs IN THE SOUTH AMERICAN MILITARY:
ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE, AND URUGUAY (1979).
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last fifteen years, the military expenditures in Latin America have been
growing very fast, especially in Central America. I hope that the elec-
toral defeat of the Sandinistas, resembling the fall of the wall in Berlin
that ended the Cold War, will end counter-subversion wars in Latin
America. Presently, there is a tendency to reduce the military expendi-
tures in Europe, in the United States, in the Soviet Union, and it will
be difficult not to do so in Latin America as well.
I agree with Professor Wiarda that in Latin America the military
budget grows faster under a civilian government because Latin
America does not face an arms race. Rather, it is a race of salaries, of
pensions, and all those expenditures that are linked to the idea of war,
but mainly to social security and the military establishment. I hope
that we see in Central America and South America in the near future
a reduction of the military budget.
It is a long road. But we must place at the top of the agenda the
problem of how to adjust our weak democracies to the democratic prin-
ciples that work in Western Europe and in the United States in spite of
differences in the militaries. I think that this is possible.
REMARKS OF PROFESSOR Louis GOODMAN'
Professor Arriagada, not being a United States citizen, is too polite
to add an additional point relating to what has to be done in the future:
The Unites States and its military diplomacy has a role and has had a
role to play in all of this. I find intriguing the set of principles on which
Professor Arriagada focused. It is critical to give this future that he
describes a chance to evolve. The United States must be clear about
and value these principles.
With some exceptions, I am optimistic about recent changes in
United States policy, but it is very important that the United States
stand behind the principles that Professor Arriagada has discussed. Is
Professor Arriagada's vision too optimistic? We have heard some opti-
mistic and pessimistic scenarios. As Professor Wiarda pointed out, it is
very important to know your armies and know that armies are not
monolithic. Many important changes that have arisen in Latin America
have occurred in the context of huge splits within the armed forces.
There are substantial members of every armed force in Latin
America that are concerned, not with role expansion, but rather with
professionalization, identifying the national security needs of the coun-
1. Dean, School of International Service, The American University, Washington,
D.C.
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try, and adjusting those needs to modern times. There are variations
from country to country, about how much the world is changing. One
constant however, exists among Latin American countries and the mili-
tary in country after country: they are very concerned that they do not
become isolated. This concern about isolation is very much on the
minds of Latin American nationalists, both civilian and military.
There are opportunities to have the military, in my view, play roles
that are consistent with strengthening democracy and the protection of
human rights, but only if civilians and the military take very seriously
the kinds of principles that Professor Arriagada articulated and take
very seriously the national security role of the military. It is necessary
to develop structures that allow civilians and the military to engage in
a dialogue, and that give civilians the knowledge to effectively exercise
their roles vis-a-vis the military. Such a framework is severely lacking
in virtually all of the countries of this region.
PANEL IV
ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE TRANSITION TO
DEMOCRACY
REMARKS OF JACK TOBIN1
I had originally planned to speak about the challenge to the Salva-
doran amnesty law which was filed recently by El Rescate, a refugee
rights organization in Los Angeles. I helped write that petition. In light
of some recent developments in the United States, however, I thought I
would be a little provocative, and broaden our discussion on the ques-
tion of accountability and the transition to democracy by looking at
some events within the United States which should give us pause when
thinking about transitions.
We will be discussing the notion of "transition," an unusually dy-
namic term in the otherwise static lexicon of human rights. Human
rights scholars and advocates tend to steer very clear of notions of
human rights which erode the fixity of rights. The approaches taken by
Bob Goldman, myself, and others who are involved in international
cases dealing with the question of accountability for past human rights
violations are in this mold, founded essentially on the principle that
there are certain human rights which are fixed and which are always
and everywhere inviolable. Thus to do anything other than demand
that violations of such rights be investigated and prosecuted is really to
1. Administrative Director of the Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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make a mockery of the very idea of non-derogability and the obliga-
tions of states under international human rights law.
"Transition" implies process, fluidity, even instability, and with it
comes the now well-known pragmatic debate on the extent to which
post-dictatorial states can safely put the principle of non-derogability
into practice with respect to past violations. In one sense this is healthy,
a clear confrontation between the realities of political power and the
imperatives of protecting the most basic human rights not only as a
defensive matter of the present, but as a prophylactic against future
violations. This is an important confrontation, posing challenges to a
normative and institutional structure of human rights which remains
weak.
Recent discussions of accountability, however important and interest-
ing, have been limited. They have focused almost exclusively on a par-
ticular sort of transition-military to civilian-in a particular part of
the world-the Third World, or the economically less developed parts
of Western Europe. Discussions of accountability after transitions from
Stalinist regimes have also recently begun.
Aside from the range of questions relating to the process and the
possibility of investigating, prosecuting, and punishing past violations of
human rights, the human rights community is faced with a new phe-
nomenon: The widespread existence of human rights violations under
nominally democratic civilian governments. Peru, Colombia, El Salva-
dor, and Guatemala are clear examples in this respect. We can possibly
add Brazil.
Such transitions raise serious questions about the nature of the de-
mocracy to which the countries in question ostensibly have transited.
These situations raise problems for the NGO community and for the
Inter-American system, both long used to responding to cases of rela-
tively clear-cut violations of human rights under military regimes.
This said, I would like to turn our attention to another transition, one
occurring in the opposite direction, in another part of the world. I have
in mind the transition to higher levels of repression in developed coun-
tries. For all of its achievements, in my view one of the greatest chal-
lenges which the human rights movement now faces is that of bringing
to bear the lessons learned by human rights advocates in the context of
Third World conditions to those in developed countries. In some devel-
oped countries economic crisis has led to an increase not only in viola-
tions of economic and social rights-to housing, to education, to work,
to an adequate standard of living-but also to a disturbing rise in viola-
tions of civil and political rights. As in other societies, heightened social
contradictions in our own have engendered heightened repression.
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The arduous recent history of human rights defense has been tre-
mendously costly in human terms. Often trial and error and under the
press of events, this history is inhabited by the spirits of friends and
colleagues who have been killed, and more anonymously, peopled with
peasants, unionists, lawyers, teachers, and religious workers who have
been destroyed or injured by state repression.
Fortunately, we have learned a lot. We now know a bit about the
modalities of repression, its stages, and that numbers of deaths or dis-
appearances are by no means everything. We know about low-intensity
conflict and psychological operations. We have also seen the creative
and courageous responses of individuals and groups to a sophisticated
range of repressive techniques. This experience has been preserved pri-
marily through the work of international and local human rights
NGOs.
The United States' human rights organizations now need to look
closely at conditions closer to home and to devise responses to abuses
which are ever more obvious even to white, middle-class eyes. Recent
years have seen the decimation of American labor unions. Deaths of
striking workers have gone unsolved. We are witnesses to an increasing
militarization of policing, the proliferation of special anti-crime tactical
units, and the rise of a national security rhetoric no longer directed to
the Soviet threat abroad, but to our own streets and cities. Black
youths in Boston are now systematically and openly harassed by the
police through an anti-drug "stop-and-search" policy, in which stan-
dards such as reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts and prob-
able cause are losing whatever meaning they had in the past. There are
frequent accounts of public strip searches of young black men, and a
recent investigation by The Boston Globe revealed strip searches of fif-
teen people without arrest.2
In the Stuart case,3 witnesses, most of them black and vulnerable to
arrest or harassment by the police, were intimidated into saying the
"right thing," changing their testimony in the face of threats by police
investigators. This is perhaps the extreme case. For the middle class, it
seemed the horrifying exception to the rule, the result of astute manip-
ulation of racist attitudes by a clever murderer. In contrast to this view,
2. Canellos, Youths Decry Search Tactics, Boston Globe, Jan. 14, 1990, at 1.
3. A Boston case in which there is strong evidence that Charles Stuart murdered
his pregnant wife on October 23, 1989, then fabricated an account of the murder which
referred to a black attacker. A subsequent police investigation focused on William Ben-
nett, a black man with a previous criminal record. Several witnesses have said they
were coerced and intimidated into implicating Bennett. Stuart committed suicide one
day after his brother went to the authorities to implicate him in the killing.
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people in the black community have told us the Stuart case is paradig-
matic of police conduct, not anomalous.
Right here in Washington, D.C., we have seen an attempt to impose
an 11 P.M. to 6 A.M. curfew on young people under eighteen.4 Fortu-
nately, this effort was scotched by United States District Judge Charles
Richey." In 1985, we saw the execution in Philadelphia of "Operation
Cold Turkey," which consisted of police sweeps of known gang areas.
This also was ruled illegal.' Los Angeles has instituted periodic Friday
sweeps of so-called gang neighborhoods, in which dozens of young peo-
ple are detained for the weekend and released on Monday without be-
ing charged with crimes. A local lawyer-referral service there received
about 2,000 complaints of police misconduct last year. This was double
the number received in 1988, which was itself double the 1987 total.
Shock detention-in which young drug offenders are subjected to
paramilitary-type regimes of incarceration has spread to several states.
Problems such as these are not going to go away. The Children's
Defense Fund informs us that one out of five American children are
now living in poverty, and that this figure will reach one in four by the
year 2000. Recent years have seen a rapid rise in the number of child
labor violations. Cuts in social spending continue. The inability of soci-
ety to address the root causes of the problems of crime and drug use
necessarily entails the use of repression and the demonization or
scapegoating of those who are denied basic human rights.
Paralleling these repressive responses at the grass roots level has
been a shift toward broader executive emergency powers. Jules Lobel
discusses these matters in a recent piece in the Yale Law Journal.7
During his last months in office, President Reagan issued an Executive
Order outlining his wide-ranging emergency powers: to use military
personnel in civilian law enforcement, to regulate aliens, to impose
wage and salary controls, to control civilian transportation, to acquire
and lease property, and to take control of civilian nuclear plants.8
Spend some time watching prime time TV. What do you see? Show
after show romanticizing and glorifying the police, no longer the plod-
4. Police Ready to Start Enforcing D.C. Curfew; ACLU Challenging New Law in
Court, Wash. Post, Apr. 24, 1989, at D5.
5. Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1121 (D.D.C. 1989).
6. See Cliett v. Philadelphia, No. 85-1846, slip. op. (E.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 1985) (not-
ing that the court had ordered the police to respect the constitutional rights of all
individuals in carrying out "Operation Cold Turkey").
7. Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385
(1989).
8. Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, Exec. Order No.
12,656, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,491 (1988).
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ding but honest and careful Columbo using his logic and street smarts
to decipher criminal behavior. It is now the loose cannons who get the
kudos. Constitutional norms are for wimps.
The human rights community needs to respond to this disquieting
transition. While I do not argue that we face the same situation as our
colleagues in Latin America, the models of human rights defense which
have been developed in Latin America and other parts of the world can
be used effectively in our own country. What then is needed?
What is needed are human rights monitoring offices, trusted by the
community, which will systematically collect, investigate, and docu-
ment complaints of abuses, then publish their findings. Someone who is
systematically harassed by the police will, in most cases, not file a com-
plaint with the police department out of fear of reprisal, lack of confi-
dence in the system, or simple pride. Young black men have told me
they were not about to go back to the very place which abused them to
lodge a complaint.
Such offices would perform the familiar function of fact-finding. All
of the experience of the recent past is here relevant: The need for a
consistent methodology, a defensible normative framework, and the im-
portance of accuracy and impartiality. Such offices would combat the
social fragmentation which accompanies repression, the tendency to
isolation and individual fear, which has been amply documented in
Chile, Argentina, El Salvador, and elsewhere. Human rights offices can
serve as centers around which organized community action can be
taken to confront common community problems. The work of groups
like ILSA, the Latin American Institute of Alternative Legal Services,
can be useful here in devising roles for lawyers which link them closely
to community organizations.
Aside from their fact-finding work, human rights offices can serve as
crucial points of orientation for the community through human rights
education. The experience of the Latin Americans is relevant here as
well. Initial efforts are just beginning in Boston in the form of "street
law" workshops for youths on their constitutional rights. A more sys-
tematic effort is needed, including publications, links with public and
private education, training of paralegals, and work with parents.
A final important task is to continue and expand the important work
done by a number of American and other lawyers in the use of interna-
tional human rights bodies. In recent years, local human rights organi-
zations have discovered the importance of international fora as fields of
contestation which can support the work of local groups. We need to do
a lot of work in this last area.
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REMARKS OF JAIME MALAMUD-GOTI 1
I suppose that almost everybody is acquainted with what went on in
connection with the trials in Argentina.2 Until today, no one has ex-
amined-at least not carefully-what underlay these trials. These trials
meant a lot. That is why they caused so much conflict in Argentina.
First, underlying the trials was this permanent battle over oblivion
and memory. Oblivion, because torture perpetrated in Argentina was in
dark, underground dungeons with summary, secret executions, with no
names disclosed. On the other hand, there is the problem of memory, or
the idea of a known history, and a legalized version of Argentine
history.
Second, there was a conflict between privilege and equality. The mil-
itary, and most of the civilians who marched with the military, had
always enjoyed an enormous amount of either social or caste privilege
in Argentina. This battle was against privilege. It was for the ideas that
the law would apply to everybody in society, including the military, and
that no one would be governed by special rules any longer.
Third, there was an ongoing struggle between the idea of private and
public morality. Once I had to speak to a general on behalf of Presi-
dent Raoul Alfonsin. I explained to this general that, in fact, trials
were not only to restore some sense of justice to the civilians, or in
some way to compensate for the outrages the military had committed.
They were also the best way to make distinctions among members of
the military themselves for the gravity of the deeds they had perpe-
trated. So I said to this general, "Would you like to be taken for or
confused with Admiral X?" Admiral X had stolen money and was en-
gaged in almost every sort of black business going on.
He said, "Of course not."
"And would you like to be confused with General Y?" I asked. Gen-
eral Y probably had killed more people than Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
and was involved in illegal banking activity and so forth.
He said, "Of course not."
I said, "What about General Z, the former chief of police of Buenos
Aires?"
He said, "Well, General Z is a different case."
1. Guggenheim Fellow and former senior advisor to President Raoul Alfonsin of
Argentina; former Solicitor to the Supreme Court of Argentina (1987-88).
2. Referring to trials in civilian courts beginning in April 1985 of nine former mili-
tary commanders and junta members charged with criminal responsibility for human
rights violations committed during the so-called "dirty war against subversion" in the
mid 1970s.
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"Why is it a different case?"
"Well," he replied, "General Z is a different case because his com-
rade, General A, had his arm blown off by a terrorist bomb. Therefore,
his case is entirely different from the other examples you gave."
That illustrates how privilege and caste allow you to apply a private
morality to yourself, even though these are never reasons for action
within the realm of public morality. Whatever we understand about
public morality, detachment from our own interests is one of the first
tools for defining public morality.
Within this struggle, there was the idea of setting up a landmark.
There was a discontinuity between the previous regime and the demo-
cratic regime. If we had not resorted to the mechanism of trying the
military, this discontinuity probably would have been in some way or
another erased.
Of course there are other grounds for struggle between equality, on
the one hand, and individual rights on the other. I think that in some
way, this paradox always exists for political systems that have individ-
ual rights as a main core. If you try to ensure individual rights in the
future, there is also some way by which you might jeopardize these
individual rights by cornering the military. But there is also the idea of
equality. A political system which recognizes individual rights must
also proclaim that every citizen is subject to the same rules and must
abide by the same authority.
Now, in the middle of this battle, there was also the idea that when
you emphasize the idea of individual rights, you tend to forget the tri-
als. You say, "Well, let us go on; let us move on and try not to embrace
the past because the past might close in on us and deteriorate our con-
solidation of democracy." Then the idea of a victim all of a sudden
surfaces, and one begins to doubt whether a system of individual rights
can actually call itself a system of individual rights when it has not
granted the victims any particular role or any particular weight within
this new arrangement. If the victim is totally forgotten, the democracy
in some way lacks legitimacy.
Within these many discussions, condensed onto one single battlefield,
I suppose that there was also the idea of utilizing criminal punishment
in a retributive sense and/or in a utilitarian manner. If we think the
military that committed the most heinous crimes must be punished,
and we try to find some sort of justification for punishment, we might
find ourselves at odds as to the answer we will give to this. Of course,
the answer will depend largely on the extent to which they ought to be
individually tried for their own actions and also to be tried for the na-
ture of the deed. According to Argentine and most Latin American
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legislation, almost every single military officer would have to have been
tried for either having failed to avert harm or reporting a harm. Omis-
sion has an important role in criminal law and in military criminal law
in particular. So, room for political decision was ample enough.
There were four or five reasons to try the military, which were
hardly susceptible to disagreement. The first is that trials, in fact, un-
veil the pretext and therefore shrink the room for political speculation.
It is one thing to know that a certain number of people have been
killed, executed, or tortured, and another to show that Juan Gomez had
been tortured on July 3rd, that there were witnesses to this deed, and
the perpetrators, at least the indirect perpetrators, were General C or
Colonel D. Room for political speculation shrinks considerably.
The second reason for trying the military was to state in some insti-
tutional, symbolic way that there was discontinuity between the previ-
ous military regime and the current regime. There are many ways to
stress this discontinuity. One example is to freeze the promotions of
implicated members of the armed forces. I think, however, that the
idea of criminal punishment or condemnation is symbolically the
strongest way to disapprove of both certain conduct and the way the
state was being managed. Of course, if you go deeper and try corporals
for having failed to report crimes or lieutenants for having failed to
avert harm, you probably would be questioning not only a previous re-
gime but also the structure of the state. Between these two extremes,
there are a great number of political decisions which must be made.
Third, I think that it is very important to promote general confidence
in institutions, especially in a country like Argentina that has endured
at least twenty coups since 1930. In Argentina, there is widespread
lack of confidence. One way to encourage confidence would be to set up
a new government and have it try to sneak its way in without imping-
ing upon military interests. The other method is to say that these insti-
tutions are strong enough to be applicable to all members of society
regardless of their condition.
The fourth point derives from the previous principle. I think that by
derogating the idea of erasing special fora, we would provide democ-
racy with one of its main ingredients-equality. This would provide
new grounds for legitimacy.
Finally, I think that trying the military was also a means of adapting
the military institution to the new society. If you single out those of-
ficers who have committed the worst acts, then you can say, in some
way or another, the rest of you are welcome to the new society and now
we can start talking about how you are going to work from now on. Of
course, this is consistent with a certain logic, but not with the logic of
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the general to whom I referred earlier. He would say, "Well, you are
convicting somebody who was deprived himself because he was ab-
ducted for two weeks. The terrorists that abducted him did not supply
him with whiskey."
Now the problem is that the general grounds for justifying punish-
ment do not necessarily apply to the military in the way we apply them
to common criminals. If we talk about 'deterrents, I am not sure that
those who got immediate approval from their comrades and superior
officers would be dissuaded from acting because of an eventual and po-
tential punishment. Immediate approval, immediate encouragement, is
the way to dilute or to compensate for whatever dissuasive effect your
punishment could have in the ordinary sense. I also think that the idea
of reformation is always attached to that of punishment, and would
never, from a liberal point of view, constitute a justification for punish-
ment. We tend to agree that punishment is given to those who volunta-
rily break rules. We might think that punishment is legitimate, but
that manipulating someone in order to force him or her to adapt to
society is not legitimate. The idea of reformation is not consistent with
our idea of rights in general.
REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE DIDIER OPERTTIP
I would like to express my deep pleasure and satisfaction for the
opportunity to participate on this panel. I am particularly pleased to be
at The American University today, for as many of you know, the uni-
versity is my natural habitat. In this state of mind, I will give today my
personal views in this academic forum.
Every transition to democracy is unique to each particular country.
The Uruguayan experience, whose transition to democracy ended on
April 16, 1989, was an exceptional one. The Uruguayan transition put
an end to confrontation prevailing in the Uruguayan society, and did
this within the legal system.
I should begin by stating that the transition to democracy in my
country has been finalized. It began in 1980 through a plebiscite in
which the military consulted the public about the constitutional ground
upon which the new system should be built. That process continued in
1982 as political parties and the military cooperated to hold internal
elections. We elected senators, representatives, mayors, the president,
and the vice-president. The first important legislative act of the new
1. Ambassador of Uruguay to the Organization of American States.
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government was the approval of the national law known as the "law of
national pacification." This law included amnesty for all those who had
committed crimes of sedition against the state, specifically the terrorist
organizations.
During the first two years of the new government of President Julio
Sanguinetti, there was no special legislation on that issue. There was no
resolution of the preceding military government's abuse of human
rights. Because the amnesty law was geared specifically toward am-
nesty for terrorists and not toward the military or the police, it was
necessary to complete the amnesty process. This was accomplished
through the Law of Nullity of 1986 (Ley de Caducidad). This law ter-
minated the state's power to prosecute military and police personnel for
crimes committed during the period of military rule.
Soon after the law was approved, however, some sectors of the public
asked for a constitutional referendum to remove this law. From 1987 to
1988, proponents gathered enough signatures to hold a constitutional
referendum. It is necessary to clarify that this collection of signatures
was a political mobilization led by the opposition, more specifically, by
the leftist sectors. On April 16, 1989, we held the referendum. The
final vote to keep the Law of Nullity was 53 %, with 47 % voting
against it. In this manner, Uruguay resolved the problems of the past.
It took the same approach in 1851, when it ended the civil war, and in
the 1930s when it put down a confrontation of the Uruguayan popula-
tion. As for human rights, the Supreme Court upheld the Law of Nul-
lity as constitutional before it was submitted for the popular
referendum.
We have a tradition of resolving our problems through democratic
elections, and we will continue to do so. Under the Uruguayan Consti-
tution, national elections are held on the last Sunday of the fifth year of
the government's tenure. In this past election, the opposition party
came to power with a large percentage of votes. In this forum, the
White (Blanco o Nacional) Party triumphed over the Red (Colorado)
Party. At the same time, in Montevideo, the leftist Marxists obtained
the mayoral candidacy for the capital city. This change of political par-
ties clearly demonstrates the climate of recomposition of the political
power in my country.
I would like to end by stating that Uruguay approved two laws of
amnesty. With these two laws, Uruguay attempted to reconcile the
conflict between the military and the civil societies. Nonetheless, the
families of the victims, or the victims themselves, began actions against
the state claiming compensation from the state.
That the amnesty laws and laws of nullity did not exonerate the state
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of its responsibilities is a clear demonstration of justice. From an inter-
national point of view, it is necessary to harmonize each state's sover-
eign power to enact legislation and the state's international responsibili-
ties. Uruguay found that point of harmonization through the process of
democratization. If steps toward democratization did not accompany
amnesty laws or laws of nullity, those steps would simply be elegant
ways to exonerate perpetrators from their responsibilities.
In my country, this has not been the case. Ultimately, it has been the
people themselves who have said that they do not want to keep looking
to the past. We wish to reaffirm the democratic system. While the price
is very high, it is absolutely necessary.
I began by saying that the transition to democracy had ended. I do
not say this with vanity. I simply say it thinking that when a country
resolves its problems through consultation with its own people, when a
law is declared and when a country elects its own governmental officials
in a free way, it is not possible to keep saying that a government is still
in transition.
Finally, it is necessary to have amnesty available in a majority of
Latin American societies at the end of a civil war. This has almost
always occurred. The problem is to determine when amnesty is created
by its own beneficiaries, rather than instituted by society. In Uruguay,
a freely elected parliament approved the amnesty laws and the laws of
nullity. The Law of Nullity, which was originally criticized at the inter-
national level, was ratified by a popular referendum that was organized
freely, and freely executed.
We have never denied that human rights violations were committed
during the military regime. To do so would be to deny reality. Through
democratic government, however, we have guaranteed the pacification
of our country; we have done so through the law, within the constitu-
tion, and within the system. It is necessary for the international legal
community to look for a way to reconcile these different internal and
international values, which are intimately associated with, and which
demand, a profound comprehension of the price that each country has
to pay in order to reach peace.
Finally, in analyzing human rights violations, it is necessary to re-
member that in our countries the social pressure of poverty is perhaps
the strongest enemy of the institution of democracy. In order to pre-
serve democracy we must find a way to eliminate the extreme poverty
and the underdevelopment which is surrounding us and in which the
political extremes of both the right and left are born.
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REMARKS OF NIGEL RODLEY'
After that very eloquent statement by Ambassador Opertti, I fear
the rather juridical approach that I shall be taking may seem a bit
boring-but perhaps it needs to be said anyway. Before doing so, I
would like to indicate that I find myself in a state of transition. I shall
soon belong to an institution analogous to this new Center for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law, at the University of Essex in the
United Kingdom. As I do for the moment still work for Amnesty Inter-
national, I shall in my remarks say something about Amnesty Interna-
tional's approach to this issue, but I shall stress the legal aspects about
which it might be appropriate for me to be speaking in my new
capacity.
In the introduction to the reports of the Aspen Institute Discussion
on State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon,2 the following is written: "The
Conference considered whether international law requires states to pun-
ish violators of human rights. It was agreed that there was no general
obligation under customary international law to punish such viola-
tors." I do not have any fundamental disagreement with that as a gen-
eral proposition. I do not think that international law requires that
those who imprison people whom the courts have convicted for, say,
acts of freedom of expression, should necessarily be criminally punished
when the nation later realizes that the imprisonment was, indeed, a
violation of human rights. In the same section, however, the report
said: "Several participants suggested that while there may be room for
governmental discretion in dealing with the perpetrators of lesser
crimes, gross abuses such as genocide, torture, disappearance and ex-
trajudicial or summary executions must always be criminally prose-
cuted and punished."4 This is the point from which I will depart. That
is a statement couched in the language of de lege ferenda, the law as
several participants in this conference would like to see it. I also think
it is a fair statement of lex lata, or of law that either already exists or
so nearly exists as to be indistinguishable.
First, I will discuss Amnesty International's perspective. In August
1987, the organization wrote a letter to President Julio Sanguinetti of
Uruguay5 which read:
1. Reader in Law, University of Essex, England; author of The Treatment of Pris-
oners Under International Law (Claendon Press, Oxford, 1987); and former Head of
Legal and Intergovernmental Organizations Office, Amnesty International, London.
2. THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON (1989).
3. id. at 4.
4. id. at 6.
5. Mr. Rodley at this point in his statement explained that his remarks were gen-
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Amnesty International does not take a position in general either for or against
measures of clemency such as amnesties, pardons or reductions of sentences in
favor of persons accused of human rights violations under previous governments.
Our organization recognizes that in certain historical circumstances, particularly
after periods of civil strife or political polarization, governments may consider
measures of magnanimity toward those responsible for past human rights viola-
tions to be both legitimate and prudent as a means of promoting a climate of
reconciliation and political stability which may favor the future promotion of
respect for human rights .... Whatever policies are adopted to limit criminal
prosecution and punishment, governments must do whatever lies in their power
to ensure that full and impartial investigations are carried out into abuses com-
mitted under the authority of previous governments in such a way that the full
truth about such violations may be known.
The language in that statement in 1987 seemed to suggest that if the
truth in each individual case would be established, then Amnesty Inter-
national might not take issue with the question of amnesties for those
who perpetrated the offenses. By April 1989, however, that position
had evolved. Amnesty International stated with respect to the Uru-
guayan referendum, that it believes:
[t]he results of the referendum cannot be interpreted as freeing the Government
of Uruguay of its international obligations, including the need to take steps to
make the truth about past criminal human rights violations such as torture, "dis-
appearances" and extra-judicial executions publicly known, to bring those re-
sponsible for such violations to justice and to ensure that measures are taken to
ensure that such abuses are not under any circumstances tolerated in the future.
In September 1989, referring to the developments in Argentina (e.g.
due obedience and full stop laws) Amnesty International expressed
concern that "any law which grants immunity from prosecution to peo-
ple charged with criminal responsibility for grave violations of human
rights runs the risk of being seen as encouraging or facilitating future
abuses."
I should clarify that Amnesty International does not call for the
prosecution of any particular individual. This is a position from which
it has never strayed. It is concerned about the international legal
principle.
It should also be noted that "prosecution" does not necessarily refer
to punishment. Amnesty International has never argued that any par-
ticular sentence is appropriate for any particular individual. The ques-
tion of prosecution and the extent of punishment are two separate is-
sues. The organization at the moment opposes pre-conviction amnesties,
but not necessarily post-conviction amnesties. That is the Amnesty In-
eral and not directed at any one specific state.
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ternational position so far. It is a position that has been evolving and
remains under discussion: It is not, as an organization, unaware of the
problems.
I would like to suggest what may be some of the legal basis for this
evolution. With regard to criminal human rights violations such as tor-
ture, extra-legal executions, and "disappearances," there is a strong
case to be made that international law requires basically three steps to
be taken: One, that the facts be investigated to bring the truth to light;
two, that there be compensation for victims or their surviving families
if the -victims have been killed; and three, that the perpetrators be
brought to justice.'
These principles are found in international legal documents. As far
back as 1975, Article 10 of the Declaration Against Torture, adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly, provided for alleged tortur-
ers to be prosecuted. In 1984, the United Nations Convention Against
Torture8 provided not only that evidence of torture be submitted to the
prosecuting authorities of the state in question, but also to those of any
state in. which the individual alleged to have committed the torture may
happen to be. This is the principle of universality or quasi-universality
of jurisdiction, which provides that torture is in a special category of
crime; it is a crime that can be tried anywhere.
The Committee Against Torture, established under the Convention
Against Torture," had to rule inadmissible three cases from Argentina
due to timing: The Convention had not yet come into force at the time
of the abuses in question, but the Committee stated, in a rather surpris-
ing paragraph, after declaring the complaints inadmissible:
The Committee notes with concern that it was the democratically elected post-
military authority that enacted the Punto Final and Due Obedience Acts, the
latter after the State had ratified the Convention against Torture and only 18
days before the Convention entered into force. The Committee deems this to be
incompatible with the spirit and purpose of the Convention. The Committee
notes that as a result, many persons who committed acts of torture remain un-
punished .... 10
6. N. RODLEY, The Legal Consequences of Torture, "Disappearance" and Extra-
Legal Execution, in NEw DIRECTIONs IN HUMAN RIGHTS (Lutz, Hannum, and Burke
eds. 1989).
7. G.A. Res. 3654 (XXX), Dec. 9, 1975.
8. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, 40 U.N. ESCOR Annex (Agenda Item 10(a)), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4
(1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984).
9. Id.
10. O.R., M.M. and M.S. v. Argentina, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/3/D/1, 2 and 3/1988
(1989), para. 9.
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The language seems to indicate that if the cases had been tried after
the Convention had entered into force, the Committee would have
found a violation. Indeed, it would have been unable to do otherwise,
but, of course, this particular Committee was not applying general in-
ternational law. Its function was to apply the Convention, and the Con-
vention did not apply to these particular cases.
Many Inter-American Commission on Human Rights decisions on
torture call for exactly the steps to be taken as I have men-
tioned-investigation, compensation, bringing to justice of those re-
sponsible. So, too, does the Human Rights Committee established
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.", It
does so in its general views on the nature of the specific Covenant arti-
cles and in a whole series of individual cases. Investigation, compensa-
tion, bringing to justice-those are the consequences that flow from the
finding of torture.
That torture itself is a violation of customary international law is
beyond serious dispute, so it is not too tendentious a suggestion that
there is an international responsibility to bring alleged torturers to jus-
tice. I shall more briefly suggest that the same is true for extra-legal
executions and disappearances.
With extra-legal executions, as with torture, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights cases that find violations conclude that
the elements of investigation, compensation, and a bringing to justice
follow. As recently as last year the Economic and Social Council
adopted a text called the "Principles on the Effective Prevention and
Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions."12
This text was subsequently endorsed by the United Nations General
Assembly in December of 1989.13 Paragraph 18 of these Principles
states:
Governments shall ensure that persons identified by the investigation as having
participated in extra-legal, arbitrary or summary executions in any territory
under their jurisdiction are brought to justice. Governments shall either bring
such persons to justice or cooperate to extradite any such persons to other coun-
tries wishing to exercise jurisdiction. This principle shall apply irrespective of
who and where the perpetrators or the victims are, their nationalities or where
the offense was committed.1 4
11. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 383 (1967) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
12. E.S.C. Res. 1989/65, May 24, 1989.
13. G.A. Res. 44/165, Dec. 15, 1989.
14. E.S.C. Res., supra note 12, at para. 18.
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Again, this is fairly straightforward, calling for the universality of ju-
risdiction for extra-judicial executioners as for torturers. Furthermore,
Paragraph 19 reads:
An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a
justification for extra-legal, arbitrary or summary executions. Superiors, officers
or other public officials may be held responsible for acts committed by officials
under their hierarchical authority if they had reasonable opportunity to prevent
such acts. In no circumstances, including a state of war, siege or other public
emergency, shall blanket immunity from prosecution be granted to any person
allegedly involved in extra-legal, arbitrary, or summary executions.15
This comes down very precisely to the issue under discussion, an issue
which was not, unfortunately, before the drafters of the Convention on
Torture.
According to one theory, disappearances are a form of torture and
everything I have said about torture would apply to disappearances. In
practice, the findings of the Human Rights Committee and of the In-
ter-American Commission on Human Rights have called for the same
things in respect to disappearances as they have in respect to torture
and extra-legal executions. In addition, the United Nations Subcom-
mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities is
currently drafting text that envisages very clearly that the commission
of disappearances should be treated as a crime (and one of universal
jurisdiction); that there be compensation and investigation; that people
responsible be brought to justice; and that there be no defense of supe-
rior orders. None of these concepts have been at all contentious in the
drafting process.
It seems to me that one does not have to be a very adventurous inter-
national lawyer to suggest that international law does require the
bringing of these human rights crimes to justice, while not requiring
the perpetrators of human rights violations that do not amount to
crimes to be tried. At the very least, the law-making trend is clear. It is
a basic tenet of international law that states cannot unilaterally relieve
themselves of international legal obligations. There may, nevertheless,
be room for discussion as to the rigor of application of the rule requir-
ing prosecutions in cases of amnesties that genuinely reflect a national
will towards reconciliation and which do not prevent the establishment
of the truth.
15. Id. para. 19.
[VOL. 5:9651048
TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY
REMARKS OF DIANA ORENTLICHER
I am fortunate to have as a foundation for my remarks Nigel
Rodley's lucid exposition of important recent developments in interna-
tional law.
The developments he described represent a notable departure from
the more conventional approach of international human rights law with
which we are all familiar. While it has long been recognized that inter-
national law requires governments to respect and ensure particular
rights, that same law has traditionally allowed governments broad dis-
cretion to determine precisely how their human rights obligations will
be fulfilled. As Mr. Rodley has just pointed out to us, the measures
used to secure human rights are no longer subject to the broad discre-
tion of governments when it comes to a narrow category of atrocious
human rights crimes comprising torture, disappearances, and extra-le-
gal executions. When violations of this sort occur, international law
now makes clear, governments must make good-faith efforts to bring
the wrongdoers to justice. Though for the most part recently developed,
these duties are now firmly established in international law.
The clearest basis of a duty to prosecute human rights violators is
found in several human rights conventions that prohibit particular acts
and require States Parties to investigate violations and prosecute or
punish those who are responsible. These include the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 2 which requires States Parties to make torture a criminal
offense and to either extradite an alleged torturer or institute criminal
proceedings against him; and the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 3 which similarly requires States
Parties to punish acts of genocide committed in a territory subject to
their jurisdiction.
In contrast, the more comprehensive human rights conventions, in-
cluding the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' and
the American Convention on Human Rights,0 are notably silent about
1. Orville H. Schell, Jr. Fellow and Visiting Lecturer, Yale Law School, New Ha-
ven, Connecticut.
2. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at
197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985), 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985).
3. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter International Convention].
5. American Convention on Human Rights, entered into force June 1978,
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a duty to punish violations of their substantive guarantees, and the
travaux preparatoires of both conventions contain little, if any, indica-
tion that such a duty was contemplated by the drafters. Nevertheless,
authoritative interpretations of these conventions, as well as of the Eu-
ropean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms,6 have made clear that criminal punishment plays a
necessary role in States Parties' duty to ensure the full enjoyment of a
narrow group of rights. For example, the Human Rights Committee
established to monitor States Parties' compliance with the International
Covenant has repeatedly concluded that States Parties found to be re-
sponsible for disappearances or extra-legal executions are under a duty
to investigate the crimes and to bring to justice those who are responsi-
ble.1 Interpreting the duties imposed by the International Covenant, the
Committee has likewise asserted that complaints of torture "must be
investigated effectively by competent authorities" and that "[t]hose
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.1 Doc. 65, Rev. 1,
Corr. 1, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 101 (1970) [hereinafter American Convention].
6. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, Europ. T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter European
Convention].
7. See e.g., Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5 (4) of the Op-
tional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights concerning
Communication No. 84/1981, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 124, para. 11, U.N.
Doc. A/38/40 Annex IX (1983) (expressing the view that a government responsible
for victim's death-in-detention is "under an obligation to take effective steps ... to
establish the facts of [the victim's] death [and] to bring to justice any persons found to
be responsible.. . ."); Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5 (4) of the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights concern-
ing Communication Nos. 146/1983, 148-154/1983, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at
187, para. 13(2) Annex X (1985) (concluding that respondent government should take
effective steps to clarify fate of victims who had disappeared and to bring to justice
those found responsible); Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5 (4) of
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights con-
cerning Communication No. R. 7/30 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 130, para. 15,
U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982) (holding that respondent government should take effective
steps to clarify fate of a disappearance victim, prosecute those responsible, and com-
pensate family members); Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5 (4)
of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
concerning Communication No. 107/1981, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 216,
para. 16, U.N. Doc. A/38/40, Annex XXII (1983) (concluding that the respondent
government should investigate fate of disappearance victim, bring to justice those re-
sponsible and pay compensation).
Petitioners filed complaints in these cases pursuant to the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, art. 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M.
383 (1967) entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, (authorizing the Human Rights Commit-
tee to consider communications from individuals who are subject to the jurisdiction of
states that have ratified the Optional Protocol and who claim to have suffered a viola-
tion of any of the rights set forth in the International Covenant).
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found guilty must be held responsible."' Similarly, in the 1988 Velas-
quez Rodriguez Case,9 which involved a 1981 disappearance in Hondu-
ras, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights interpreted the Amer-
ican Convention to impose on States Parties the "legal duty to ... use
the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of [human
rights] violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those re-
sponsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the vic-
tim adequate compensation." 10
The European Court of Human Rights, which has generally ac-
corded Contracting States substantial discretion to determine the
means they will employ to give effect to their duties under the Euro-
pean Convention, has made clear that punishment plays a necessary
role in this process. In a 1985 case, X and Y v. The Netherlands," the
Court found the Dutch government responsible for a violation of article
8 of the European Convention, which ensures respect for private life,
because Dutch law precluded the petitioner-a mentally defective wo-
man who had been raped-from filing a criminal complaint; the rapist
had escaped punishment. While acknowledging that, in general, Con-
tracting States enjoy a "margin of appreciation"' 2 in determining the
means they will use to secure the enjoyment of rights protected by arti-
cle 8, the Court found, nonetheless, that only the criminal law was an
adequate means of protecting what it regarded as a crucial area of pri-
vate life.' 3 In their analyses of the European Convention's exhaustion-
of-domestic-remedies requirement, the European Court and Commis-
sion of Human Rights have observed that a failure to punish repeated
8. Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, Human Rights Committee, General
Comments under article 40, para. 4 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
Add.1/963 (1982).
9. Case , INTER-AM. C. H. R. ._, Velasquez Rodriquez Case, Judgment of
July 29, 1988, Ser. C, No. 4 [hereinafter Velasquez Rodriquez Case].
10. Id. at para. 174. See also id. at para. 166 (asserting that States Parties "must
prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the Conven-
tion.. . ."); id. at para. 176 (asserting that a "State is obligated to investigate every
situation involving a violation of the [human] rights protected by the Convention").
Although the Court implied that punishment is required for every violation of the
Convention, it seems likely that such a duty exists only with respect to serious viola-
tions of the right to physical integrity. In the Velasquez Rodriquez case itself the Court
found the government of Honduras responsible for the disappearance of Manfredo Ve-
lasquez and heard testimony that the victim had been tortured and killed.
11. X and Y v. The Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985).
12. Id. at 12, para. 24.
13. See id. at 13, para. 27 (reasoning that "[t]his is a case where fundamental
values and essential aspects of private life are at stake. Effective deterrence is indispen-
sable in this area and it can be achieved only by criminal-law provisions; indeed, it is
by such provisions that the matter is normally regulated").
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instances of torture constitutes "official tolerance," 14 which is incom-
patible with Contracting States' duties under the Convention 5 to se-
cure freedom from torture.
Thus, each of these three conventions has been interpreted by au-
thoritative bodies to require that States Parties investigate and punish
serious violations of physical integrity. If the texts of these conventions
are silent about such an obligation, how have such interpretations come
about?
Part of the answer lies in the nature of the obligations imposed by
the three conventions. Each one requires States Parties not only to re-
spect enumerated rights but also to "ensure" or to "secure" the enjoy-
ment of those rights to persons subject to the states' jurisdiction. 6 The
bodies responsible for monitoring compliance with these conventions
have interpreted this language to require States Parties to undertake
affirmative obligations to ensure enjoyment of the rights set forth in the
conventions, and have found that effectively "ensuring" or "securing"
rights relating to physical integrity requires that States Parties investi-
gate violations and bring to justice those who are responsible.
Although few of these interpretations articulate a rationale for the
result they reach (this is especially true of the decisions of the Human
Rights Committee), they appear to rest upon reasoning that goes some-
thing like this: Because the rights involving physical integrity are of
paramount importance in the international human rights regime, it is
appropriate to insist that governments who have undertaken a binding
commitment to ensure protection of those rights employ the most effec-
tive means available to secure their enjoyment, and criminal prosecu-
tion is the most effective means. The analysis of the European Court in
X and Y v. The Netherlands conveys similar reasoning in more forceful
terms: Only application of the criminal law is deemed an adequate de-
terrent to violations of crucially important rights that merit special pro-
tection by the State. 17
This approach is closely related to a legal argument advanced by a
number of international law experts: Under both customary and con-
ventional human rights law, a narrow class of fundamental rights, in-
cluding the ones we have been discussing, are non-derogable. If govern-
ments are required to uphold these pre-eminent rights in all
14. The "Greek" Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTs. 196 para. 29.
15. Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 65 para. 159 (ser. A)
(1978).
16. International Covenant, supra note 4, at art. 2, para. 1; American Convention,
supra note 5, at art. 1, para. 1; European Convention, supra note 6, at art. 1.
17. X and Y v. The Netherlands, supra note 11, at para. 27.
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circumstances, including situations of public emergency, they should
not be permitted to suspend operation of the legal machinery necessary
to ensure the substantive rights.1 8
Punishment also plays a necessary part in governments' fulfillment of
their obligations under customary international law, which is generally
thought to prohibit torture, extra-legal executions, and disappearances.
Support for this view is found in the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, which asserts that a state violates customary
international law "if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encour-
ages or condones" ' torture, murder, or disappearances, and suggests
that "[a] government may be presumed to have encouraged or con-
doned [these] acts.., if such acts, especially by its officials, have been
repeated or notorious and no steps have been taken to prevent them or
to punish the perpetrators."20 Under this formulation, a government's
wholesale failure to punish repeated or notorious human rights crimes
would generate state responsibility for a violation of the substantive
rights because the government's failure fairly can be regarded as com-
plicity in or encouragement of the crimes.
Similar reasoning can be found in a large and growing number of
reports prepared by Special Rapporteurs, Special Representatives, and
Working Groups appointed by the Commission on Human Rights of
the United Nations to investigate human rights conditions in particular
countries or particular types of human rights violations, such as torture
and disappearances. These reports, which frequently cite the Interna-
tional Covenant and other human rights instruments-as well as cus-
tomary international law-as the basis of the rights examined, have
repeatedly condemned governments' failure to punish acts of torture,
disappearances and extra-legal executions, and have suggested that the
resulting impunity encourages further violations." Although these re-
18. See American Convention, supra note 5, at art. 27, para. 2 (providing explicitly
that certain substantive rights are non-derogable, and that "the judicial guarantees es-
sential for the protection of such rights" are likewise non-derogable).
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATErS,
§ 702 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
20. Id. § 702 comment b.
21. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/38/385 (Agenda Item 12) at para. 341 (1983) (con-
cluding in a report of the Special Rapporteur on Chile that impunity enjoyed by Chil-
ean security organs "is the cause, and an undoubted encouragement in the commission,
of multiple violations of fundamental rights"); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/21 (Agenda
Item 12) at para. 60 (1987) (observing in a report of the Special Representative on El
Salvador that failure of Salvadoran courts to render convictions that bear reasonable
relationship to the number of violations of right to life creates a "climate of impu-
nity"); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/18 (Agenda Item 10(c)) at para. 312 (1989) (assert-
ing in a report by the Working Group on Disappearances that impunity in the face of
repeated instances of disappearances "creates conditions conducive to the persistence of
such practices").
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ports are not authoritative interpretations of international law, resolu-
tions of the U.N. General Assembly have endorsed many of the reports'
conclusions regarding punishment of persons responsible for torture,
disappearances and extra-legal executions. The sheer repetition of these
conclusions in numerous U.N. reports and resolutions is itself impres-
sive, suggesting an inexorable link between the assurance of fundamen-
tal rights and punishment of violators.
I would like, now, briefly to address the question that Nigel Rodley
raised toward the end of his remarks: If international law generally
requires governments to investigate acts of torture, extra-legal execu-
tions, and disappearances and to bring to justice those who are respon-
sible, does that obligation apply with full effect in the peculiar circum-
stances prevailing in countries that have just emerged from a prolonged
period of sweeping state violence?
In addressing this question, it is important to begin by making clear
what is not at issue. First, the fact that a democratically-elected gov-
ernment succeeds a repressive regime has no bearing on the state's in-
ternational obligations. It is well established that a change in govern-
ment does not relieve a state of its duties under international law. 2
Accordingly, if an outgoing government failed to discharge its duty to
punish egregious human rights violations, its successor is generally
bound to fulfill that obligation.
Second, that prosecution of human rights violators may be politically
inexpedient is no excuse for a state's failure to discharge its obligations
under international law. Let me be more direct: If a state is required
by international law to secure fundamental rights by punishing viola-
tions when they occur, it cannot evade its duty by enacting an amnesty
designed to placate restive military forces or to promote national recon-
ciliation. However desirable the objectives, the government must find
other means to promote them.
I find more difficult the question whether international law can ac-
commodate the constraints on judicial resources faced by governments
that succeed a massively abusive regime. In a country like Argentina,
where some 9,000 people are estimated to have disappeared during the
military juntas' "dirty war against subversion," any thought of prose-
cuting all who participated in the atrocious crimes would be untenable.
Even a well-functioning judiciary would be incapable of discharging
22. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, International Law 266 (2d
ed. 1987). See Velasquez Rodriquez Case, supra note 9, at para. 184 (stating that
obligations under international law continue despite changes in government).
1054 [VOL. 5:965
TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY
such a burden; much less could a judiciary in a country where the rule
of law had totally collapsed in recent years be expected to do so.
In this regard, little difficulty is posed by states' duties under custom-
ary international law. Applying the Restatement rule, customary law
would be violated by an amnesty that established a wholesale impunity
for gross and systematic violations of the right to physical integrity,23
but would not appear to require prosecution of every person who com-
mitted such a violation. Selective prosecutions, focusing perhaps on the
leaders who were most responsible for designing and implementing a
system of human rights atrocities or on especially notorious cases,
would seem to be all that is necessary to satisfy governments' custom-
ary-law obligation not to condone or encourage such violations.
I believe that a similar interpretation of States Parties' obligations
under the three human rights conventions that I discussed previously is
also appropriate. The route to this result is more complicated, however,
since some of the authoritative interpretations of those conventions im-
ply that States Parties must investigate and prosecute virtually every 24
instance of torture, extra-legal execution and disappearance. 25 A rigid
application of the general rule of international law that a state's inter-
national obligations persist despite a change in government might sug-
gest that successor governments must attempt to prosecute every in-
stance of such violations that has not yet been punished.
I believe that the comprehensive human rights conventions do not
compel such a result. Instead, those conventions should properly be in-
terpreted to forbid complete impunity for grave violations of physical
integrity, but to permit transitional governments to satisfy their punish-
ment-related obligations by undertaking a limited program of prosecu-
tions. This conclusion is based upon a functional analysis of the general
rule requiring States Parties to investigate and prosecute certain
violations.
As suggested earlier, the primary rationale for requiring States Par-
ties to prosecute certain human rights violations is deterrence. Consis-
23. RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, at § 702 comment b.
24. See Velasquez Rodriquez Case, supra note 9, at para. 177 (indicating that le-
gitimate factors such as insufficiency of evidence may justify a failure to prosecute,
provided the State has undertaken a good-faith investigation).
25. See Velasquez Rodriquez Case, supra note 9, at para. 176 (asserting that a
State Party to the American Convention must investigate and punish "every" violation
of the rights protected by the Convention); X and Y v. The Netherlands, supra note 11
(finding the Dutch government responsible for violating the European Convention be-
cause a gap in Dutch law prevented the petitioner from initiating a criminal complaint
against her rapist, even though Dutch law generally provided for such a procedure and,
more generally, for prosecution of rape).
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tent with this rationale, one would expect that, when considering par-
ticular cases alleging, for example, that a government committed an
extra-legal execution, bodies such as the Human Rights Committee
would generally find that the State Party responsible for the violation is
under an obligation to initiate criminal proceedings. If the Committee
regards criminal sanctions to be the most effective (or the only truly
effective) means of securing the right to life, investigation leading to
punishment would be the most appropriate response of a State Party to
any particular violation of that right. Moreover, the deterrence
"model" implicit in the various decisions of bodies responsible for mon-
itoring States Parties' compliance with comprehensive human rights
treaties would operate most effectively if States Parties consistently re-
sponded to particular violations, such as disappearances, by initiating
serious investigations that led to appropriately severe punishment.
This rationale would not, however, compel prosecution by a successor
government of every violation committed by a previous regime on a
wide scale. In a post-transition context, while the deterrence model
sketched above would seem to require the new government to investi-
gate and seek to punish each violation committed thenceforth, it would
simply be too late for that model effectively to prevent the past
violations.
Still, a failure to punish any of the past violations would undermine
the deterrence objectives underlying the general duty to punish. If the
new government established a wholesale impunity for past violations of
fundamental rights committed on a vast scale, its action would, as the
Restatement reasoned, have the effect of tolerating or condoning the
past violations and thereby encouraging similar ones. Such an effect
would be incompatible with states' convention-based duty to undertake
affirmative measures to prevent such violations. But even a limited pro-
gram of exemplary punishment could serve a deterrent function and
thus accomplish the chief objective underlying the general duty to pun-
ish egregious human rights violations, provided the government did not
vitiate the deterrent effect of punishment by cynically targeting for
prosecution a small group of scapegoats.
In the short time that remains, I would like briefly to touch on one
other source of international law that is often cited as a basis of a duty
of new democracies to punish past violations-customary norms relat-
ing to crimes against humanity. The concept of crimes against human-
ity has a compelling symbolic power, and strikes many lawyers as par-
ticularly pertinent in a context where a period of massive and flagrant
human rights violations has just come to an end.
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While their intuition is well-founded, the concept of crimes against
humanity is difficult to apply, in part because its substantive meaning is
shrouded in ambiguity. For example, it is not clear whether the term
still refers, as it did in the Nuremberg Charter,2" only to violations that
have a nexus to war. Moreover, a number of post-Nuremberg legal de-
velopments27 have sought to expand the crime to cover practices, in-
cluding apartheid, that were not explicitly included in the Nuremberg
Charter's definition of crimes against humanity. Some of these develop-
ments have generated more controversy than consensus, and it is diffi-
cult to identify genuine agreement that the term "crimes against hu-
manity" refers to any conduct beyond Nazi-type criminality.28
Definitional issues aside, it is not immediately obvious that Nurem-
berg law establishes an obligation to punish certain human rights
crimes. The most controversial legal issue surrounding the prosecution
of crimes against humanity at Nuremberg was whether the Allied na-
tions had the power to assert jurisdiction criminally to punish acts com-
mitted by the German government against its own citizens. Such an
assertion of jurisdiction had no precedent in international law, and in
fact flew in the face of a central tenet of the international legal or-
der-respect for national sovereignty. It requires some work to derive
from the assertion by foreign powers of a right to punish certain of-
fenses a duty of governments to punish similar crimes committed by
their predecessors.
If the technical legal implications of the Nuremberg precedent are
not particularly tidy, the normative implications are somewhat more
clear. Simply stated, that precedent, as subsequently ratified by the in-
ternational community, stands for the principle that crimes against hu-
26. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, signed Oct. 6, 1945, art. 6,
para. c, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472, reprinted in IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUERENBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS XIV (hereinafter Nuremberg
Charter].
27. E.g. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime
of "Apartheid", entered into force July 18, 1986, art. I, para. 1, G.A. Res. 3068
(XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, U.N. Doe. A/9030 (1974), reprinted
in 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974).
28. One reason for this ambiguity is that the most significant post-War develop-
ments in human rights law have moved away from use of the term "crimes against
humanity." crimes against humanity prosecuted at Nuremberg that were also viola-
tions of the laws of war were subsequently codified and clarified in the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949. Geneva Conventions of 1949, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950, 6
U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. The most important crime against
humanity committed by Germans against their own citizens-genocide-was codified(and redefined) in the Genocide Convention. Genocide Convention, supra note 3. While
numerous conventions adopted since Nuremberg have expanded the catalogue of rights
that governments must assure to their own citizens, these conventions generally have
not purported to develop the concept of crimes against humanity.
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manity should not go unpunished. The Nuremberg tribunals regarded
that principle to be so important that its vindication justified an excep-
tion to traditional notions of sovereignty. 9
Post-Nuremberg developments, such as the adoption of conventions
providing that crimes against humanity shall not be subject to statutes
of limitations ° and international cooperation in the extradition of war
criminals,3" have underscored the international community's determina-
tion to ensure that no person guilty of crimes against humanity escapes
punishment.
Pre-eminent values underlying the international legal order are best
served if a government whose predecessors committed crimes against
humanity assumes responsibility for their punishment. Prosecution
under these circumstances reconciles international law's determination,
on the one hand, to ensure that such crimes do not escape punishment,
and its concern, on the other hand, to respect national sovereignty.
Whatever remains unclear about the scope of transitional governments'
duties in this regard, there can be little doubt that a wholesale impu-
nity for Crimes Against Humanity would do violence to the norms that
underlie the international human rights legal regime.
REMARKS OF JUAN MENDEZ'
Diane Orentlicher raised the issue that is foremost in my mind when
we discuss human rights questions, and that is the issue of impunity.
29. One of the United States military tribunals at Nuremberg reasoned that inter-
national jurisdiction was conferred because, without it, crimes against humanity would
not be punished:
Crimes against humanity are acts committed in the course of wholesale and sys-
tematic violation of life and liberty. It is to be observed that insofar as interna-
tional jurisdiction is concerned, the concept of crimes against humanity does not
apply to offenses for which the criminal code of any well-ordered state makes
adequate provision. They can only come within the purview of this basic code of
humanity because the state involved, owing to indifference, impotency or com-
plicity, has been unable or has refused to halt the crimes and punish the
criminals.
IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS CASE 9 UNITED STATES V. OHLENDORF 498 (1946-
1949).
30. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutes of Limitation to War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, (entered into force
Nov. 11, 1970), European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limita-
tion to Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, opened for signature Mar. 26,
1974, 13 I.L.M. 540 (1974).
31. See G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), U.N. Doc. A/9326, A/L.711/Rev. 1 (1973)
(setting forth the principles of international cooperation in the detection, arrest, extra-
dition and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity).
1. Executive Director, Americas Watch, Washington, D.C.
1058 [VOL. 5:965
TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY
This is what we are discussing here: Whether or not we, as a human
rights community-and it is a worldwide human rights community that
includes governments and government officials as well--can live with
impunity.
We have dealt with questions of self-amnesty laws in the past and
have always been very much in agreement that those are unacceptable,
for both policy and moral reasons, and simply illegal. Obviously, the
issue of impunity is highlighted in situations of transition to democracy.
The burden placed on an innocent government is something that we
cannot just dismiss, but the issue is still the same: Are we going to live
with impunity?
Today's newspapers bring the issue very much up to date because
Nicaragua is about to issue another amnesty law. In effect, Nicaragua
has been issuing very generous amnesty laws for the opposition and
some partial amnesty decrees for their own wrongdoers within the se-
curity forces. In Americas Watch we have consistently opposed these
amnesties and we are preparing to do it again.
It is important to point out that we object to amnesties and pardons
for the opposition insurgent groups as well as for officers of the state, at
least when we are dealing with very serious breaches of international
humanitarian law, in cases of combatants, and with gross abuses of
human rights in the case of government agents.
There is really no need for symmetry. There is no obligation to ab-
solve one's own agents simply because we have given amnesty to the
opposition. Of course, we have no objection to amnesties for purposes of
national reconciliation for the crime of sedition, and certainly we would
not propose that people who fought a clean war or people who actually
killed in a combat setting should be punished as well.
There is a very clear difference between the act of taking up arms
against the state and the commission of very serious crimes in the con-
text of war. For that reason we oppose amnesties even for people who
have taken up arms against the state if they committed serious
breaches of human rights laws.
In this context, in Human Rights Watch, like Amnesty Interna-
tional, we have dealt with the issue, debated it and issued our own
guidelines and decisions. I have brought issues of a special edition of
our news bulletin, called "Human Rights Watch,"2 that spells out this
policy. I think it is also very important to review past experiences. For
that reason we have published a report called "Truth and Partial Jus-
2. HUMAN RIGHTS NVATCH, No. 4, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PAST HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSEs (1989).
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tice in Argentina," 3 that tried to deal with the events occurring be-
tween 1982 and 1987. We have also had occasion to comment on the
plebiscite and the process towards the plebiscite in Uruguay.4
The question of amnesty is coming up in many different contexts,
especially in Latin America, but perhaps also in other countries. We
are now faced with people of good will beginning to question whether it
is a good idea in the first place to begin the process of healing and
challenging impunity. We are beginning to see people of good will stat-
ing that perhaps these are the things that have to be set aside for the
sake of future peace. I believe very strongly that we in the human
rights community have to be waging a new battle, an ideological, philo-
sophical battle to vindicate the effort that has been made, at least in
Argentina, to bring people to justice, to begin the process of restoration
of justice, and to avoid impunity.
It is very auspicious that this Center begins its work on this very
issue. Obviously the question that comes to mind is the extent to which
we require governments to search for justice; limitations on prosecu-
tions and punishment will be inevitable. At the very least, we should
require that there be no scapegoating. For example, if a new and final
pardon is issued in Argentina, it may well happen that the only general
made to pay any price for human rights violations may be General
Carlos Guillermo Suarez Mason, because the other generals do not like
him anymore. They despise him. I am not going to defend Suarez Ma-
son's innocence here, but certainly I do not think it would be a good
result to dump the whole responsibility for the dirty war on him alone.
I also think that any limitations should be undertaken without twist-
ing legal concepts or without forcing the letter of the law, because that
creates distrust in the general population about legal institutions. For
example, one of the justices of the Supreme Court of Argentina, in
order to pass on the constitutionality of the due obedience law, had to
call it an amnesty because as a due obedience law he could not find it
acceptable on constitutional grounds.
If the government and the legislature of Argentina decided not to use
the word amnesty, there has to be some reason for it. In the Argentine
due obedience law, the legislature usurps certain functions that are
more properly left to the judiciary, such as determining if the evidence
shows there has been due obedience, or whether there was an opportu-
nity to disobey a wrongful order.
3. AMERICAS WATCH, TRUTH AND PARTIAL JUSTICE IN ARGENTINA (1987).
4. AMERICAS WATCH, CHALLENGING IMPUNITY: "THE LEY DE CADUCIDAD" AND
THE REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN IN URUGUAY (1989).
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I want to make one more point regarding the reason for punishment.
I am not going to go into the international law questions because both
Nigel Rodley and Diane Orentlicher have been very eloquent on those
subjects. One of the reasons we insist on punishment is to uphold the
norm. We use punishment because we hold certain norms of our civi-
lized society in such high regard that we want to make sure that they
are observed, even in punishment. That is because we think that the
prohibition against torture, the prohibition against disappearances, and
the prohibition against extra-judicial execution should have a high
standing in the society that we are trying to build. We make certain
that they are respected by making sure that violations of those norms
do not go unpunished.
Finally, the only valid reason that I have heard in all these debates
over the years for not prosecuting and not punishing, is a "real-politik"
kind of reason: The fact that the state is powerless to punish. That is a
valid reason in some circumstances, but it is also a very debatable rea-
son. I think, in fact, the nature of democracy is that we should have a
very public debate, but more importantly, if institutions are powerless,
then we have to empower them. If we decide, proclaim, and dictate
that they are powerless, we are only weakening them a little further.
REMARKS OF LAWRENCE WESCHLER1
Because I must proceed quickly, the analogy I will make is even
more of a caricature than I otherwise would present. If I take Bob
Goldman, Diane Orentlicher, and Juan Mendez into the next room,
beat them silly so that the audience can hear their moans and groans,
fire a few shots, return, put the gun on a table and then say, "Let us
vote on whether to forget about what just happened," the status of that
vote is not clear to me. Even if we forget about the gun, it is not en-
tirely clear to me that the people in this room have the right to vote on
whether or not we can ignore the reality of what took place. Ironically,
this is a situation where a vote that might otherwise seem to be the
very nature of democracy and the very essence of democracy, is being
used to overthrow another part of democracy: the rule of law. These
situations create this type of dilemma.
The events in Uruguay were not quite as bad as the scenario I just
described, but there is an underlying sense in which that is what hap-
pened. A very fundamental aspect of torture is that during torture, the
1. Staff writer, The New Yorker, and author, The Passion of Poland and A Mira-
cle, A Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers (both Pantheon).
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torturer claims to the torture victim that nobody will ever know what is
going on in the room, nobody will ever care: "Scream all you want. It
does not matter. Nobody can hear. Nobody would dare to hear."
In the same way that a disappearance goes on indefinitely- when a
baby is taken away from its parents, the baby goes on living and grow-
ing and the abduction is an ongoing crime without any statute of limi-
tations, so torture, whose very premise is that no one will ever know, is
likewise continuous. The torture victim who lives in a society that votes
not to know continues to be tortured. In effect, the society that votes
not to know, or through its inaction chooses not to know, is perpetuat-
ing the torture. A democracy cannot have torture. So there is another
argument for why we must confront these issues fairly.
Those of you who were here heard me yesterday laud the principles
of tremendous -forgiveness, tolerance, not hating the policemen, all
those principles that people like Michnik and Lipski were discussing in
Poland. However, where these two notions come together is a wonder-
ful observation of Hannah Arendt who, in The Human Condition,' also
suggested that forgiveness was called for. She pointed out that men are
unable to forgive what they cannot punish. If there is not even the
capacity to punish, then the kind of forgiveness given is not free for-
giveness and does not move the society in any direction.
At the very least, what is called for is truth-telling within a legal
framework, within the rule of law. At the end of a prosecution there is
much latitude for grace, for forgiveness and so forth, but without a
certain number of bare minimum factors being recognized, the rule of
law has not been established.
I would like to close quickly with a quote from Zbigniew Herbert,
the Polish poet, who has a wonderful poem on the need for precision."
He talks about the end of the Second World War where there were
people saying there are millions and millions of victims and it is point-
less to try to remember them all. Everybody wants to just move on to
the future. We cannot be precise. We cannot know everybody's name.
He writes:
and yet in these matters
accuracy is essential
we must not be wrong
even by a single one
we are despite everything
2. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958).
3. Id. at 236-43.
4. Z. Herbert, Mr. Cognito on the Need for Precision, in REPORT FROM THE BE-
SIEGED CITY AND OTHER POEMS 64-68 (Ecco ed. 1985).
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the guardians of our brothers
ignorance about those who have disappeared
undermines the reality of the world.'
Ignorance about those who have disappeared undermines the reality
of the world. It seems to me that a democracy can consist of many
things: laws, elections, parliaments, debates. At the very least, the de-
mocracy has to be real. It has to imbibe; it has to exist in a real world,
and a willed ignorance undercuts that very reality which is the essence
of a democracy.
PANEL V
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUPERVISION
IN STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS
REMARKS OF PROFESSOR JORDAN PAUST'
International Legal Standards Concerning the Legitimacy of Govern-
mental Power
Nearly 200 years ago Thomas Paine expressed a common expecta-
tion that the "authority of the people [is] the only authority on which
government has a right to exist in any country."' 2 Similarly, the United
States' Declaration of Independence declared that governments are
properly constituted in order "to secure [the inalienable rights of man,
that governments derive] their just powers from the consent of the gov-
erned, [and that] it is a right of the people to alter or abolish [any form
of government which] becomes destructive of these ends." 3 Today,
these claims and expectations are still relevant to transitions to democ-
racy, still meaningful with respect to precepts of authority, the legiti-
macy of governmental power, human rights, and self-determination
under international law.
The United Nations Charter sets forth among its major purposes
"respect for the principle of... self-determination of peoples' 4 and the
promotion and encouragement of "respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all." 5 The preamble to the Charter also reaf-
firms "fundamental human rights" of individuals and, importantly,
5. Id. at 67.
1. Professor, University of Houston Law Center, Houston, Texas.
2. T. PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 8 (1794).
3. The Declaration of Independence, quoted in 3 SOURCES OF OUR LIBER-
TIES-DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY I (R. Perry ed. 1959).
4. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
5. Id. para. 3.
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"the dignity and worth of the human person ... [and] the equal rights
of men and women." 6 Importantly also, Article 56 of the Charter sets
forth the obligation of all member states "to take joint and separate
action [to achieve] universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all. .... "
Necessarily, such precepts and obligations are interrelated. It is evi-
dent, for example, that during what may well be a continuous global
transition to democracy, the right to change a governmental structure
necessarily is interrelated with the question of the legitimacy of that
structure in terms of the accepted standard of authority in international
law and with the precept of self-determination. Both of these concepts
are interrelated and interconnected with the human rights of individu-
als to participate in the governmental and political processes and to
individual worth and dignity.
As recognized in numerous international legal instruments and by
the International Court of Justice, all peoples have the right to self-
determination, and by virtue of that right, to freely determine their
political status. Similarly, the Court has recognized "that the applica-
tion of the right of self-determination requires a free and genuine ex-
pression of the will of the peoples concerned."" A state that complies
with the principle of self-determination is one possessed of a govern-
ment representing each and every person-the whole peo-
ple-belonging to its territory. Political self-determination, in fact, is a
dynamic process, the outcome of which is a genuine, full, and relatively
freely expressed will of a given people. It is, in other words, a dynamic
aggregate will of individuals and a will which reflects an equal and
aggregate participation by individuals and groups in a process of
authority.
The authoritative 1970 Declaration on Principles of International
Law seems to emphasize these points by stating that "[b]y virtue of the
principle of equal rights and self-determination ... all peoples have the
right freely to determine ... their political status ... and every State
has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of
the Charter."9 In subsequent paragraphs, the Declaration adds:
"[e]very State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate ac-
6. Id. preamble.
7. Id. art. 56, para. 9.
8. Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-33, 36.
9. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970), reprinted in, 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970).
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tion... [the] self-determination of peoples" and that "[e]very State
has the duty to promote ... universal respect for and observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the Char-
ter."10 Importantly, and in view of recent events in Panama, the Philip-
pines, Afghanistan, and the ongoing struggle in South Africa, the Dec-
laration adds that a relevant people "in their actions against, and
resistance to such forcible action" depriving them of self-determination
have the right "to seek and to receive support [from outside groups or
states] in accordance with the.., principles of the Charter.""1 In 1984,
for example, the General Assembly reaffirmed the illegality of
apartheid and recognized the right of the people of South Africa to
self-determination assistance.' 2
The need for a free or consensual determination is also evident in a
subsequent paragraph which provides even more insight. As if to illus-
trate the process of self-determination and to offer a partial definition
through the use of relevant examples, the General Assembly declared
that "[t]he establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the
free association or integration with an independent State or the emer-
gence into any other political status freely determined by a people con-
stitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that
people."' 3 Thus, what is most relevant is the relatively free determina-
tion of the political status, not the particular form of that status. Thus,
and importantly for a new Europe, self-determination may result in the
formation of a newly integrated state, a new bloc of states, or "any
other political status," and thereby implicitly a changing of state, re-
gional, and sub-state territorial boundaries.
What is also quite evident is that self-determination is the right of
peoples, not states, governments, or a particular political party. Indeed,
an illegal regime, acting contrary to the rights of its people, has no
right under international law to assure its own survival. Its claims of
necessity are illegitimate.
The consistency among the precept of self-determination, the human
right to individual participation in the political process and the only
standard of authority recognized in international law is also evident in
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. G.A. Res. 2, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1984). See Paust, The Illegality of Apartheid and the Present Government of South
Africa, speech at A.B.A. Annual Meeting, Seminar on Legal Aspects of Apartheid,
July 7, 1985, reprinted in 131 CONG. REC. S16,854 (1985) (discussing the recognition
of the illegality of apartheid).
13. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Co-operation Among States, supra note 9.
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documented expectations concerning the sharing and shaping of politi-
cal power through a process involving a relatively full, free, and equal
participation by individuals who are members of a given nation, state,
or community. Indeed, self-determination and human rights both de-
mand that the only legitimate basis of the authority of any government
is a dynamic process of self-determination and authority as noted
above.
The first two paragraphs of Article 21 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights recognize the rights of every person "to take part in"
the governmental processes of one's country and to "equal access to
public service."1 4 The more significant content of Article 21, however,
is set forth in paragraph 3, which states: "The will of the people shall
be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed
in periodic and genuine elections which ... shall be held by secret vote
or by equivalent free voting procedures.""i A legitimate government,
the Universal Declaration affirms, is one in which the will of the people
is the basis of authority. Just as Thomas Paine remarked much earlier
and the peoples of Eastern Europe are still affirming, the authority of a
government exists lawfully on no other basis, in no other form. Indeed,
the only specific formal reference to the concept of authority that one
finds in all of the major legal instruments is the reference to the au-
thority of the people of a given community.
Many interrelated norms of the Universal Declaration, when taken
together, tend to confirm a clear and unswerving criterion of authority
contained in the third paragraph of Article 21. The Universal Declara-
tion affirms, for example, that "[a]ll human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights,"' 6 that "[e]veryone is entitled to all the
rights and freedoms set forth without . . . distinction of any kind."17
These include the freedom from distinction on the basis of race, sex,
political, or other opinion." Of additional significance is the affirmation
that everyone has the right to recognition as a person and that all peo-
ple are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection.' 9
When one considers how individuals acting within a political process
14. G.A. Res. 217A, at 135, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). See Paust, On Human
Rights: The Use of Human Right Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an Effec-
tive Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543, 570 n.182, 596 notes 369-
370 (1989) (discussing the legal relevance of the Universal Declaration).
15. G.A. Res. 217A, at 135, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
16. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 1, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N.
Doc. A/810 at 7 (1948).
17. Id. art. 2.
18. Id.
19. Id. art. 7.
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are to exercise their rights-their rights to take part in governmental
processes and to obtain equal access to public service in a manner that
is consistent with the rights of each person to equality, worth, dignity,
and the equal protection and enjoyment of law-it seems clear that
participation should be on the basis of one person, one voice. Stated
differently, an equally weighted "will" of each individual conjoined in a
so-called "will of the people" or common expression is the only formula
that allows equal individual worth and participation in political
processes.
Having this in mind, one can understand why Article 21 contains
other references to what one might term related aspects of the process
of authority. These include, as mentioned previously, the right "to take
part in" and the right of "access" respectively. Thus, one has examples
of the interconnections between individual rights of equal participation
and the right to participate in the political process and an outcome of a
political process that allows a relatively full, free, and equal participa-
tion-the aggregate will of individual participants.
From the above discussion it is also evident that the people of a given
community have the right to alter, abolish, or overthrow any form of
government that becomes destructive of the process of self-determina-
tion, and the right of individual participation. Such a government, of
course, would lack authority, and as a government representing merely
some minority of the political participants, it could be overthrown by
the majority in an effort to insure authoritative government, political
self-determination, and the human rights of all members of the com-
munity equally and freely to participate. A member of the "elite" at-
tempting to stifle or to kill a relatively free political process can be
considered to be engaging in politicide, or what others have termed
crimes against self-determination or crimes against human rights. This
involves crimes of international concern that are not simplistically the
affairs of a single state or those elites who hide behind the mantle of
state power.
A related point must be stressed. In partial opposition to Ambassa-
dor Opertti's remarks, crimes against humanity, like war crimes, in-
volve obligatio erga omnes, and attempted grants of amnesty or immu-
nity, or statutes of limitation, by a particular state are not binding on
the rest of the international community or other sovereign, independent
states. Further, such a concept would play havoc with a state's obliga-
tion under Article 56 of the Charter and a universality of responsibility
and opportunities for effective implementation and effective sanctions.
Moreover, Article 8 of the Universal Declaration expressly recognizes
the right of all persons to an effective remedy for violations of their
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human rights.
Finally, Ms. Orentlicher made a point that needs to be addressed.
The concept of crimes against humanity, she stated, started with Nu-
remberg. Actually, the concept of crimes against humanity is quite old.
It has a history of more than two hundred years. Fortunately, we can
use "Lexis" or "Westlaw" in the United States to demonstrate that
concepts of duties of humanity, rights of humanity, and even the phrase
"crimes against humanity" have been utilized in this country in the
past. Indeed, the 1907 Hague Convention, a primary treaty on the laws
of war or humanitarian law, in its preamble addresses duties of human-
ity that are nevertheless strictly incumbent upon others.20
Can you hear them?
They call in your name,
Authority,
Law Creators,
Foundation of the Contemporary Soul
Of Humanity.
Can you hear them
Calling in your name?
More directly,
When you answer,
Little stays the same.
Rejoice,
You have much to gain
More directly
In your name.
Can you hear them?
"They're not listening still,
Perhaps they never will."
REMARKS OF AMY YOUNG'
It is a great honor for me to participate in the inaugural activity of
the new Center being established by The American University and the
Law School. It is also a great honor to appear on the panel with other
20. 1907 Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, preamble, T.S. No. 539; League of Nations Treaty Series vol. XCIV (1929),
No. 2138; 36 Stat. 2277 (Oct. 18, 1907) ("laws of humanity"), quoted in Ex Parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 35 (1942); Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604, 611 n.30 (9th Cir.
1951); Aboitiz & Co. v. Price, 99 F. Supp. 602, 614 (D. Utah 1951). See Paust, Con-
gress and Genocide: They're Not Going to Get Away With It, I 1 MICH. J. INT'L L. 90,
91 n.1 (1989) (providing further insight into the duties of humanity as expressed in
myriad sources).
1. International Human Rights Law Group, Washington, D.C.
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distinguished election observer groups such as CAPEL, of the Inter-
american Institute of Human Rights, which has done such distin-
guished and innovative work in Latin America, and also the Southern
Africa Project of the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
which played a major role during the elections in Namibia. I want to
discuss the role of observers, but I would like to start out with a caveat.
The issue to be considered is the scope and definition of the electoral
process. For the International Human Rights Law Group ("Law
Group"), elections include not only election day, but also the entire
electoral process.
If during the campaign or the electoral process there is no openness,
no dialogue between the different factions, no possibility of debate
within the society; if the laws are not revised or modified to allow fair
access to media, or if there is no fair registration process for voters and
for candidates; it gives a very clear indication that there may not be a
transition to democracy regardless of who wins on election day. Observ-
ers should monitor the whole process and be prepared to comment on
all these aspects of the election, not just the technical fairness of the
balloting and counting procedures.
The most important aspect of the election, therefore, is the process
leading up to the day of the elections. There must be an openness and
exchange of ideas. There must be a possibility for a redistribution of
power, a loss of power, or a sharing of power. One can observe the
formulation of coalitions in which power is shared as well as measures
that a government may take unilaterally prior to an election, such as
releasing political prisoners or revising laws regarding the media, free-
dom of assembly, or freedom of speech and press. All of these measures
are the essential primary indicators of whether there indeed will be a
transition to democracy. To the extent that observers can play a role in
this pre-election process, they have the opportunity to strengthen the
transition to democracy.
Jordan Paust has just stated the premises upon which observers re-
ally should be acting under international law: Articles 21 of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights2 and Article 25 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,3 both of which state very
clearly that citizens have a right to periodic, genuine elections and a
secret ballot which will guarantee that the will of the people is
2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N.
Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 383 (1967)(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
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respected. Because all nations have adopted the Universal Declaration,
every country in the world is bound by the international norm to hold
genuine, periodic elections.
Many observer groups monitor elections because they are invited by
the government or by one of the parties. Some even wrangle an invita-
tion-that is fine, too. Whether they want observers present or not,
governments accept observer groups because of political pressure and
the obvious conclusions that can be drawn about denying access to the
process.
The Law Group's policy is to observe an election regardless of
whether the organization is invited by any of the participants. The pre-
mise upon which we decide to observe an election is the extent to which
we feel we can effectively protect the right to political participation.
The Law Group, as a human rights organization, monitors the right to
genuine, periodic elections in the same way that we would initiate a
fact-finding mission to monitor the right to be free from torture, to
have freedom of the press, or to be free from summary arrest and
execution.
What is the role of observers? Observers can certainly bear witness
to the event and report their findings to the international community.
They can give moral support and confidence to people who want to run
for office. They certainly encourage people to freely vote their con-
sciences because they know that observers will make certain, at least on
election day, that nothing happens to them if they vote for the opposi-
tion. Observers generally deter fraud, although I do not think that ob-
servers can always detect fraud, except for the most blatant examples
like that witnessed in the Philippines, Panama, and Haiti. For example,
chain or relay voting (in which people switch pre-marked ballots for
their own ballot) is almost impossible for observers to detect or deter.
Observers, however, should play more of a role in the pre-election
day activities, and not just come to witness the election. Again, the
internationally-recognized right to political participation provides the
legal basis for observers to enter a country, monitor its electoral pro-
cess, and make recommendations about election laws, access granted to
the media, or campaigning rules.
The standards and international norms by which the Law Group
judges elections is set forth in the Guidelines for International Election
Observing." The book sets forth four minimum standards for a free and
fair election derived from international norms. The first guideline re-
quires respect for the integrity of the individual. There cannot be free
4. L. GARBER, GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVING (1984).
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and fair voting, there cannot be secrecy of the ballot, there cannot be a
genuine process, if people are being arbitrarily detained, arrested,
threatened, intimidated, or are receiving death threats over the tele-
phone. In a climate of fear and government repression, the electorate
certainly cannot feel like they can freely cast their votes, even if they
are assured that the vote is secret, because they think that the govern-
ment is too powerful. If the government has the power to arrest, tor-
ture, and even kill with impunity, then certainly it will know how the
vote was cast and will retaliate against supporters of the opposition.
Respect for the integrity of the individual throughout the entire electo-
ral process, therefore, is essential.
The second minimal requirement is the right of all citizens to partici-
pate actively in the campaign and electoral process. This means that
people who may want to run for office, to assist in running parties or
leafletting, and those who want to participate in rallies or assemblies
may do so.
The third guideline is freedom of association, assembly, and expres-
sion for a period adequate to allow political organizing, and campaign-
ing to inform citizens about the candidates and the issues. This is a
minimum standard and general guideline. It does not say there must be
thirty minutes for each candidate to appear on television or that air
time has to be free. Those are regulations that should flow from that
principle.
The final guideline is administration of the voting and counting
processes in a fair and honest manner.
These four criteria are based on international norms and derive from
the basic principles found in Article 25 and Article 21 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.' They are not tied to any ideology, nor
do they promote any particular political system. They are the basic
norms by which the fairness of any election can be judged.
It is also very important for observers to follow through on the pro-
cess and not just monitor the event. If a group monitors the process
leading up to the election and is present for election day, they have an
obligation to monitor the transition to power afterwards. This has been
lacking in many countries. It may not happen in Nicaragua because
everyone is so focused on the process. Fortunately, a lot of people are
still focused on the elections in Chile. Prior to those elections, the inter-
national human rights community was remiss in its monitoring duty in
countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala.
The international community, in addition to observing the electoral
5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 2.
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processes, should look for indications that democratic institutions are
being established, respected, and allowed to flourish. For example, civil-
ian control over the military, an independent judiciary, freedom of the
press, and the ability of non-governmental organizations to conduct
their activities free from intimidation or any sort of repression are all
indications that democracy is taking root.
The role of inter-governmental monitors is also important to under-
stand. In Nicaragua, there were 3000 election observers. Someone
stated that there was one observer for every 500 Nicaraguans voting,
which is probably quite accurate. Surprisingly, we did not keep bump-
ing into each other, which was somewhat of a miracle. The interna-
tional observer teams from the United Nations and the Organization of
American States (OAS) played a tremendous role prior to the election
in mediating and negotiating difficulties, in teaching groups in little
towns in rural areas, as well as the cities, and in holding meetings with
citizens' groups and the parties. UNO and the Sandinistas would ask
the OAS to mediate to resolve a dispute, for example, over the destruc-
tion of campaign literature. I saw a dramatic demonstration of the les-
sons learned in Nicaragua from the mediating presence of the inter-
governmental observers. Nicaraguans have now learned how to negoti-
ate and to reconcile their differences in a very peaceful manner.
One of the Law Group's observer teams was in a very small town in
Estali, which is the region to the north of Managua, bordering on Hon-
duras. On the day of the election there was a problem. A young woman
reported that after she voted, a group of women approached her and
said, "You voted for UNO," and took a knife and slashed her hand.
Some of the leaders of the two parties asked us if we would assist them
in resolving this dispute. While we could not get involved, we certainly
were interested to see what they would do.
The leaders brought the young woman to the Sandinista headquar-
ters and confirmed that her hand had been badly slashed. Each side
questioned the parties and determined that the women had been ene-
mies before the incident. Thus, rather than being a politically moti-
vated act, it really had been a personal vendetta. The parties decided to
let the incident go unreported. They learned from that, and other inci-
dents, that there is a way of resolving these disputes with means other
than violence.
Finally, the Law Group, as an institution with seven years of experi-
ence monitoring elections, is concerned that international observers are
not applying international norms to the process of observing. The Law
Group has tried to promote the concept of applying reasonable, mini-
mal standards to the whole process of election observing. We hope that
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the kind of efforts demonstrated in Nicaragua, especially by groups
such as CAPEL, the Center for Democracy, the United Nations and
the OAS, will be more representative of the kind of things that observ-
ers will do in the future.
I want to raise a few other problems. First, nobody is focusing on
countries such as Cuba, North Korea, and many others where there are
no elections taking place at all. Indeed, if there is a right to political
participation and to genuine and periodic elections, why are these coun-
tries not criticized for failing to hold them? Elections have not been
held in many countries, and the international community is not speak-
ing out about the abridgement of that very important right. Why are
we not bringing those cases to the inter-governmental organizations?
Why do we not state that failing to hold genuine, periodic elections
constitutes a gross and consistent pattern of violations, and take the
complaint to the United Nations or to the Inter-American
Commission?
I am also concerned about a backlash of too many observers coming
in to monitor an election. One week after Nicaragua, the Law Group
was denied a request to monitor elections in another country, in an-
other part of the world. I have a very strong feeling that it had a lot to
do with what happened in Nicaragua. Governments must see that there
will be almost an irrebuttable presumption of fraud unless they admit
election observers.
TRANSLATED REMARKS OF ALEJANDRO GONZALEZ'
I would like to thank you for this invitation to join you in celebrating
the newly established Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law. I think it is a great initiative and is excellent news for people
working in the field of human rights. The creation of this Center will
support the work of many people in the human rights field. After our
long period of dictatorship in Chile, we appreciate the international
support and solidarity in Chilean human rights work. Certainly, the
same international solidarity should be focused today on other coun-
tries with similar problems and human rights violations. International
solidarity in human rights is sometimes a crucial factor for sustaining
the hope of human rights activists within our countries. I am not a
human rights academic. My experience basically comes from my legal
practice in human rights defense in Chile.
1. Chief of the Legal Department, Vicar a de la Solidaridad, Santiago, Chile.
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Almost from the beginning of the dictatorship we could see that in-
ternational human rights activism was extremely important for us at
the internal, domestic level. Immediately after the coup d'etat in Chile
in 1973, important representatives of the international community in
the human rights sector came to Chile and advised us to utilize the
international conventions and instruments for protecting human rights
internally. One month after the coup in Chile, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights visited and pointed out to the govern-
ment the concern of the Commission for human rights violations in
Chile. Three days after the coup, Amnesty International and the Inter-
national Commission of Jurists submitted a complaint to the Inter-
American Commission on Civil Rights about the gross human rights
violations that were taking place in Chile. The Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights tried to persuade the Chilean government to
respect human rights. Later, in October of 1973, the Commission vis-
ited Chile. After the coup, the United Nations hired a commissioner to
visit Chile in an on-site mission to determine the condition of the politi-
cal prisoners.
All these contacts with international organizations, non-governmen-
tal organizations, as well as inter-governmental organizations, made it
possible for the Chilean human rights community to establish contacts
with the international community to help provide protection for human
rights internally. The Chilean case is an excellent case for research in
human rights because of the great combination of legal defense work
and international attention to the protection of human rights.
John Densa wrote an article recently published by the magazine, In-
teramerican Institute on Human Rights, pointing out that the Chilean
case (and possibly the South African case) has been one of the most
remarkable cases in the world of international solidarity. It revealed
the progress that can be made with both international and internal ef-
forts of human rights NGOs to protect human rights.
I would like to make a couple of very important points with relation
to the international defense of human rights. First, there are differences
between individual petitions for violations of human rights and denun-
ciation of gross violations of human rights. Second, the work of interna-
tional political organs in human rights and the work of a technical or-
gan in the human rights area vary greatly. In the beginning, we
introduced the practice of submitting complaints to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Commission of
the United Nations, while at the same time we tried to use local reme-
dies. During the first five or six years after the coup, we submitted
about 1,700 complaints and petitions to international institutions. After
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a few years, in 1978 or 1979, we found that global denunciation de-
rived from individual petitions pending before international organiza-
tions such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was
helpful. We made. decisions based on the impact global human rights
reports could make in the international community. We found these
reports very helpful and now favor the presentation of global studies of
the human rights situation in Chile over other methods. Nevertheless,
in these global reports of human rights in Chile we include the study of
individual petitions, as well as studies of the human rights situation in
relation to different rights, like the right to life, or the right to live in
one's own land. We enjoyed much greater success using these reports
rather than individual petitions. We worked with the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, which we consider the technical organ
because it includes members who work in their personal capacity as
experts in human rights issues.
In theory, we know that we always should prefer working with tech-
nical organs. Nevertheless, the real impact and effectiveness of these
organs depends upon the support of political organs. The Inter-Ameri-
can Commission on Human Rights has done a great job in the Chilean
case, and published excellent reports, particularly the last one in 1985,2
one of the best done on human rights in Chile. Nevertheless, the work
of the Commission has received a very restrictive response from the
General Assembly of the Organization for American States (OAS).
The excellent report in 1985 did not get endorsed or approved by the
OAS General Assembly. In Chile, we consider the General Assembly's
human rights activity in South America to be a failure. In contrast, the
technical organs of the United Nations have our strong support. We
observe a great contrast between the work of the technical organs of
the United Nations and the political organs of the United Nations. In
theory, one of the priorities of United Nations is human rights supervi-
sion. Unfortunately, this support has not been found in the Inter-Amer-
ican system, with the single exception of the work of the Inter-Ameri-
can Commission on Human Rights.
REMARKS OF GAY McDOUGALL1
In 1981, Ralph Zackland, the senior officer in the Office of Legal
2. The Situation of Human Rights in Chile [Resolution Concerning the Report on
the Situation of Human Rights in Chile], 1985 IN'rER-Att Y.B. ON Hu,.?& R'rs. 550.
1. The Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Southern Africa Project,
Washington, D.C.
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Counsel at the United Nations, wrote: "Namibia stands as a monu-
ment to the shortcomings and ineffectiveness of international law and
international organizations when applied to a problem, a situation in
which a superior force is confronted by the exclusively moral weight of
the international community."2 His is not an optimistic view of the role
of the United Nations in solving the Namibian dispute. Upon close ex-
amination of last year's events in Namibia, however, his statement
about the relative power between the United Nations and South Africa
will stand. The problem of securing self-determination for the people of
Namibia has engaged the major organs of the United Nations and the
United Nation's predecessor, the League of Nations, throughout their
histories. It has also been an international dispute that has eluded reso-
lution for many decades in spite of the unique global consensus on the
moral and legal issues involved.
The transition that finally occurred, or is in the process of occurring
in Namibia, started on April 1, 1989 and Independence Day will be
March 21st. In its conceptualization and implementation, that transi-
tion departed significantly from the parameters of international law
within which the question of de-colonization of Namibia towards inde-
pendence should have been resolved.
At this point, the international community appears to be largely sat-
isfied with the outcome of the process in Namibia. Perhaps more im-
portantly, the political parties in Namibia have made a decision to ac-
cept the results as a basis for going forward. They have little option to
do otherwise. Nevertheless, it is very important to accurately assess the
conduct in this process.
I want to focus on conceptualization and implementation. In 1978
there was a dramatic turn of events in the process of United Nations'
efforts to gain independence for Namibia. Five members of the Secur-
ity Council, who were all Western members at that time and under the
leadership of the United States, proposed a modification in the plan
previously adopted for free and fair elections in Namibia. The previous
plan, adopted in 1976, was Resolution 385.3 The Security Council
eventually adopted the Western Plan as Resolution 435.4 It was the
blueprint used for the transition processes that began in April. In my
view, that resolution and its mandated terms, provisions, and arrange-
ments really turned international law on its head-at least with respect
to Namibia.
2. R. ZACKLIN, THE PROBLEM OF NAMIBIA IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 330 (1981).
3. 31 U.N. SCOR (1884th mtg.) at 8 (1976).
4. 33 U.N. SCOR (2087th mtg.) at 13 (1978).
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Under the previous resolution, the first step in the process was for
South Africa, the illegal occupier in Namibia, to withdraw from the
territory. Next, the United Nations, the de jure administering author-
ity, was to enter the country, take control of the governmental
processes, and run the election.
Under Resolution 435, in contrast to Resolution 385, South Africa,
the illegal occupier, was given a de jure legitimacy in Namibia. It
would remain in the territory with some of its troops, run the govern-
ment, and run the elections. Under the Resolution South Africa would
draft the election laws, register the voters, print the ballots, staff the
polls, and count the votes. Its police force was to maintain law and
order. In fact, its police force was the primary threat to law and order.
The United Nations' role under Resolution 435 was then reduced to
merely a monitoring role, euphemistically referred to as supervision
and control. This arrangement appeared to fly in the face of the dic-
tates of advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice and sub-
sequent Security Council resolutions which had mandated that the in-
ternational community take no action that would imply legitimacy to
South Africa's role in Namibia. There was a fundamental problem in
how this process was conceptualized or how the blueprint would work.
Second, I want to discuss implementation. Of course, during the im-
plementation phase, South Africa used the authority granted to it
under Resolution 435 to its full advantage. The whole transition pro-
cess was plagued with persistent problems. South Africa engaged in a
consistent pattern of delays, half-measures and ruses that could only be
interpreted as intent to manipulate the process.
Consider the following examples of manipulation by South Africa in
light of Amy Young's four guidelines defining a free and fair election
mentioned previously. In violation of Resolution 435, South Africa re-
fused to disband its dreaded counter insurgency unit, Koevoet. This was
the group responsible for all of the worst atrocities during the war in
Namibia. Its commander testified in court proceedings that he trained
his personnel to be killers and they had one role: to search out and
destroy SWAPO (South West Africa's People's Organization) mem-
bers as well as SWAPO supporters and suspected supporters. They re-
mained in the field for the whole electoral process engaging in serious
acts of intimidation, including murders and beatings. All of this oc-
curred throughout the voting, forcing the Namibian people to vote in
an atmosphere of complete fear and intimidation.
Second, in violation of the plan, South Africa refused to repeal the
law which had established apartheid structures in the country. Under
Resolution 435, the South Africans were to repeal all of the repressive
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and discriminatory legislation in Namibia. They did this very late in
the process, but left one key law out: the law that had established
apartheid. Thus, throughout the process of transition to a democracy,
apartheid was still very much in effect legally, and in many respects, de
facto. South Africa promulgated election laws which enfranchised cer-
tain white South African civil servants and members of the army who
had been assigned to Namibia as part of the occupation forces in
Namibia as well as their family members if they had been residents for
only four years.
I do not think anybody had an objection to the notion that there
were whites from South Africa or elsewhere who, after having made a
commitment to the country, should be allowed to participate as citizens
of the new nation. But this was no ordinary election. It was an election
under a mandate that had been postponed for many decades, an elec-
tion which was to determine the future course of Namibia through de-
colonization. It was highly inappropriate, and perhaps a violation of
international law, for those people to have been given a franchise to
vote. They flew in charter flights from South Africa to vote at polls set
up in the airport especially for the convenience of South Africans who
crossed the border to vote. Additionally, any black Namibians who de-
cided to vote at the airport polls during those days were shunted into a
separate line so they would not interfere with white South Africans
who might miss their charter flights back.
Throughout the election campaign, the South African-controlled me-
dia monopoly of radio and television showed unrepentant bias in their
reporting and in allowing access of political parties to the airwaves. In
this country where sixty to seventy percent of the population is illiter-
ate, the radio certainly is a major form of communication. There were
needless and damaging delays in promulgation of the election laws,
leaving political parties in a situation where they did not even know the
rules of the game until a few weeks before the election. This is a coun-
try that had never really voted. With parties like SWAPO, the libera-
tion movement never really operated in the context of an election.
Knowing the rules of the game and being able to accurately educate
voters, was vital to winning.
South Africa attempted to promulgate election laws that would per-
mit wholesale fraud and totally violated any concept of secrecy of the
ballot. It was here where we as observers and monitors were able to
have the greatest impact because we held firm on the issue of secrecy.
The United Nations' operation in Namibia simply was not willing to do
that. South Africa even created a special covert unit to engage in dirty
tricks to discredit SWAPO in Namibia. This was revealed in the last
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month of the election campaign as people who were employed in South
Africa in this covert unit defected. Just one week before the elections,
South Africa threatened to derail the process because of claims, that
were later found to be totally bogus, that the United Nations was coop-
erating with SWAPO in allowing SWAPO military forces to infiltrate
the country.
In this context, the United Nations' role was not looked upon favora-
bly by the population. It is true that the Namibian people had some
very unrealistic expectations about what the United Nations was au-
thorized to do and in fact could do in Namibia. They had lived through
decades of very brutal war that ravaged the country and South Africa
had been in charge. The Namibians actually expected the United Na-
tions to come in and save them, or at least take control of the situation,
but that is very far from what the United Nations actually did. There
was a lot of frustration and bitterness among the population as a result.
I think Martti Ahtisaari, the U.N. Special Representative in
Namibia, should have interpreted UNTAG's (the U.N. Transition As-
sistance Group) admittedly limited role in the most expansive way pos-
sible. UNTAG should have been as aggressive as possible. All through
the process we had a lot of concerns about the relationship between
UNTAG and the South African Administrator General-the South
African governor in Namibia. In most cases UNTAG was in a second-
ary or subordinate relationship to the Administrator General in every
way; protocol as well as substance. UNTAG consistently yielded to the
Administrator General even when it was absolutely obvious that the
Administrator General was wrong in a particular situation.
In general, the United Nations inaccurately analyzed its leverage
with respect to South Africa's role in Namibia. The United Nations
had far greater power to compel compliance than it realized or demon-
strated. After all, South Africa for many reasons had to hold these
elections. This was not altruism; they had to and they knew it. They
knew they had to have the United Nations' endorsement of the process.
They gave the United Nations a lot of leverage, whether it existed
within the terms of Resolution 435 or not, and the United Nations sim-
ply did not use that leverage well. It was reluctant to play a role that
involved pro-active supervision and control. It was reluctant to adopt a
firm and assertive stance towards South Africa and did not hold its
overall posture.
While Resolution 435 can certainly be blamed, a lot happened after
the resolution which allowed the United Nations to take this sub-
servient or secdndary position. For example, the status agreement was
negotiated so that the United Nations civilian contingent, members of
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the UNTAG team, had to get visas from South Africa, an illegal occu-
pant, in order to enter the country in which it had de jure authority to
administer the elections. This was not just on the books. The arrival of
a number of U.N. officers was also delayed and certain staff members
were refused visas altogether. It seems to me that is a situation in
which the United Nations should have exercised its muscles. UNTAG
seemed to be negotiating with South Africa rather than exercising its
supervision and control throughout the process. In addition, UNTAG
was woefully understaffed and had few resources to fulfill the mission
that it confronted.
There are a lot of examples that I could detail, but I will conclude by
saying that, as one of the people who monitored this process very
closely over the past year, I have serious problems in concluding that it
was free and fair by any criteria. The international community had
quite a large stake in a successful de-colonization process in Namibia
in order to make it a model for a transition to democracy in South
Africa, but it was also a test of the United Nations' role in the post-
cold war era. After all, the United Nations is now moving into election
monitoring. It is a growth industry currently in Nicaragua, Cambodia,
and possibly Afghanistan. It is very important that the United Nations
emerge from this process with an assessment that it handled the situa-
tion well. It is in all our interests to take a critical look at the process in
Namibia and learn some very important lessons from it.
REMARKS OF PROFESSOR HURST HANNUM1
Let me begin by saying that I am a bit uncomfortable with the topic
that I have set for myself, which in a sense is designed to rain on the
rather pleasant celebration of transitions to democracy that has oc-
curred during the last couple of days. On the other hand, I do believe
that a little reality is generally helpful, and perhaps as we consider the
events of the last few years, and how positive they have been in many
ways, it might be good to bear in mind the problems that are likely to
arise during the next few years.
Let me say that international law per se has a very minor role to
play in the transition to democracy, with one very important exception:
The human rights norms that have been developed over the last forty
years certainly have legitimized foreign and especially international in-
terest in this transition to democracy, wherever it occurs. These inter-
1. Professor, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford,
Massachusetts.
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national human rights norms have become legal obligations for most
countries in the world.
However, I think that the major contribution has been provided not
so much by international law, but by the international supervi-
sion-political as well as legal-of human rights norms that have en-
couraged democracy and that will be essential if the recent gains are to
be maintained in coming years.
One example of what could be termed an over-emphasis on interna-
tional law was provided by the panel this morning, which dealt with the
question of accountability or punishment of human right violators.
Nigel Rodley, who is not only a good friend, but who has probably
contributed more to the progressive development of international
human rights law in the last fifteen years than any other international
lawyer, stated that his conclusion that punishment of human rights vio-
lators was required under international law was not an adventurous
one. I think it is not only adventurous, but it in fact cannot be sus-
tained at the present time. One convention, the Torture Convention,2
several United Nations' resolutions, declarations, or principles and oc-
casional comments by expert bodies (to whom no one pays much atten-
tion) are simply insufficient evidence for the assertion that customary
international lav now requires the punishment of human rights viola-
tors. I am quite attracted to Diane Orentlicher's suggestion that
"wholesale impunity," as she put it, may be an illegal abdication of
international responsibility, but I think we are far from having
achieved customary international law that any foreign ministry in any
country in the world would consider itself bound by.
On the merits of the issue, I agree that punishment should be the
norm and not the exception, but I think that an overly ambitious reli-
ance on international law is dangerous for a couple of reasons. First, it
gives governments concerned a very easy target, because any govern-
ment would be able to dispel the notion that the punishment of viola-
tors is required under customary international law.
Second, emphasizing international law may divert attention from the
much more difficult political and moral issues involved by attempting to
force them into a legal framework that is really not appropriate. One
needs to distinguish between the progressive development of interna-
tional law and a statement of international law as it is. Exaggerating
the latter category is not particularly helpful.
2. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, 40 U.N. ESCOR Annex (Agenda Item 10(a)), U.N. Dec. E/CNA
(1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984).
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My remarks refer to the dangers of democracy. I would just like to
mention three or four issues that may have been alluded to by other
speakers but that deserve serious attention as we consider not only how
transitions to democracies occur, but what is needed once they have
occurred.
The first danger is the obvious one of dealing with the raised expec-
tations that are created by those who focus almost exclusively on free
elections or "democracy" in general terms as likely to resolve the many
complex problems that face most people in most countries. It is cer-
tainly true that democracy and elections are in many cases a necessary
condition for the achievement of social equity, economic development,
and other important goals. They are not, however, very effective at
achieving these goals quickly. From Poland to Nicaragua to the Philip-
pines, we have seen a backlash by those who have been led by politi-
cians both inside and outside the country to expect great things very
quickly from democracy. Democracy's social and economic benefits
have not yet been received and will not be evident soon, and that is
something that human rights advocates need to be very careful about
promising.
The second danger is brought about by the fact that democracy is,
after all, for everyone. Frankly, I do not think that either UNO or the
Sandinistas were particularly attractive candidates in the recent elec-
tion in Nicaragua, but that is all we had. In the first democratic elec-
tions in South Korea a couple of years ago, the "bad guys"-in many
people's view-that is, the government, won. It was to the credit of
organizations such as the International Human Rights Law Group that
they nevertheless declared the results to be fair, despite the fact that
such organizations had frequently supported the opposition's claims of
human rights violations in the past. Similarly, I do not think that one
can ignore the results of the referendum in Uruguay on the amnesty
law. That also is democracy, and we cannot assume that people we like,
those who have been fighting hardest for democracy, will automatically
benefit from its fruits.
This leads me to underscore a point made by Amy Young, that is,
that the only legitimate outside interest we have as human rights law-
yers, or as human rights activists, is in the process of democracy, not
in the result. If we want to be politically active and favor one result or
the other, we can be, but we should not claim that we are doing it
under the rubric of human rights or international law.
This leads to another danger which arises from the theory that the
ends justify the means and suggests that intervening in favor of democ-
racy is always legitimate. The United States invasion of Panama is the
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most obvious example of this kind of thinking. A somewhat less obvi-
ous, perhaps even more pernicious, example was the United States fi-
nancial support to the opposition during the Nicaraguan elections.
Even though this was legal under Nicaraguan law, one can imagine the
outcry in this country if the Japanese were to give an equivalent
amount of 200 or 300 million dollars to the Republican Party for its
use in the next United States election.
The real danger of democracy is that it does not necessarily lead to
the protection of human rights. Democracy, as amply pointed out by
Jordan Paust, implies majority rule. Professor Paust went so far as to
say that it implies one person, one vote, which is the essence of self-
determination, the essence of government by the people. But one-per-
son, one-vote is not even the essence on which the United States' gov-
ernment is based, as evidenced by the unequal representation of states
in the Senate. This inequality may not be very important today, but it
represents the kind of fundamental constitutional compromise that may
be required in many countries where one-person, one-vote not only fails
to resolve existing problems, but may create new ones.
For example, a majority of the people in Azerbaijan would like to
kill a lot of Armenians; a majority of Romanians would like to repress
ethnic Hungarians. These issues of minorities, of marginal groups, of
regional groups, exist everywhere in the world, and they cannot be re-
solved merely by appealing to numerical democracy.
I think that it is appropriate for us to rejoice in events not only of the
past year in Eastern Europe but also events of the last few years in
many parts of the world. We really do seem to be heading in the right
direction. Democracy, however, does not necessarily lead to the protec-
tion of human rights, and the mere protection of human rights does not
necessarily lead to social justice and economic development. Certainly,
mere law, whether it is domestic or international, cannot ensure the
achievement of either one of these goals. It is important for both law-
yers and non-lawyers to bear that in mind in the years ahead.
CLOSING REMARKS
PROFESSOR HERMAN SCHWARTZ'
I have been asked to make a few closing remarks. They are not going
to be even a half- or quarter-hearted attempt at a summary because a
conference like this, which covers so much so thoroughly and so percep-
1. Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, The American University, Wash-
ington, D.C.
1990] 1083
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
tively, does not lend itself to any kind of summary. The closing remarks
are really an attempt to take into account the mixture of blessings and
fears that the last year, and indeed the last years, have presented.
We are approaching the third millennium and it does look as if, in a
kind of definitely anti-Marxist Marxian twist on Hegel, there is some-
thing of a march of freedom through history. There has been a move-
ment which seems to have come not from an elite, as in 1848 and at
other times, but as a groundswell from people in general. It was true in
the Philippines some years ago. It has certainly been true in Europe
and in Latin America. It seems to be true even in places like South
Africa, which we have not talked about very much, where clearly we
have seen some of the most remarkable changes. Who knows where or
how far that situation is proceeding? But still, it is very different from
what it was.
Turkey is another example that I had hoped somebody would dis-
cuss, but it does not fit into any pattern or category. Turkey had mar-
tial law until a few years ago, and is now caught between East and
West. Istanbul itself is half in Asia and half in Europe and is trying to
reconcile an Islamic population and tradition with Western secular tra-
ditions, hopes, and aspirations.
All of this has been going on for a couple of years and, of course, it
has been enormously significant. What it represents, however, primarily
is a revolt against one tyranny, or form of tyranny, and an opening of
the possibility for some freedom. We must not forget that these are all
terribly fragile and delicate situations.
I do not know very much about Latin America, but it does not take
much to know that there have been repeated cycles in the histories of
those countries. In fact, just a few weeks ago there was a story about
the dreadful inflation in Argentina and there is talk about a strong man
or the military coming back to produce some order. It is the economic
issue that has both driven and threatens these changes. The great dan-
gers that we face come from the enormous expectations that democracy
will bring economic security and prosperity. The people of these nations
have seen on Western television that everybody lives in a lovely fifteen-
room house with many neat and clean things, plenty to eat, three
VCRs, and much more. If that is not achieved, if the rather desperate
situations of the poverty in Latin America, the bankrupt economies and
the backward industries of Eastern Europe, or the failure to keep up
with the information revolution continues, then there will be deep, bit-
ter disappointment, not only with the way the economy is being han-
dled, but probably with democracy itself. We may see, especially in
countries which do not have a strong tradition of democracy, a move
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away, probably not back to communism, but towards some other kind
of authoritarianism. Countries in Latin America with high illiteracy
rates; countries in East Europe like Romania, which, as Alex Kozinski
said yesterday, have almost no tradition of democracy; and countries
like Hungary which have a tradition of impatience with democracy, are
vulnerable.
Among the things that human rights groups can and should do is to
keep up the pressure on human rights issues. I am a novice in this
work. Many of those present have done much more work in this field
than -I have, but the one thing that struck me right from the beginning
is the power of international public opinion and international pressure.
I was discussing with Nigel Rodley some work that I did on Polish
prisons. The Polish guards were particularly terrified about having
their identities revealed over the Voice of America. There was a great
deal of brutality when I was there. Part of the reason for that was that
the torturers believe that nobody will ever know and nobody will ever
be able to pin the blame on them.
There are many stories of how international pressure has worked.
Czechoslovakia is one very well known example. In some ways, the
Czechoslovak revolution started last January 1989. In other ways it
started even earlier, in Bratislava in March 1988, but one of the great
blunders of the not-very-bright Czech regime, in office before the
revolution, was arresting and prosecuting Vaclav Havel, in January
1989, on a clearly trumped-up charge. It was a real joke. In fact, the
regime held him for two days while trying to figure out with what it
would charge him. Milan Jakes, the prime minister at the time, was
quoted in a secret meeting (of which a tape was made and smuggled
out) that they had made a very bad mistake. Nevertheless, they prose-
cuted, convicted, and sentenced him to nine months in a second level
prison, which meant that he would not have been released until Octo-
ber. All hell broke loose. The Austrians threatened to cancel all rela-
tions. A meeting of the Helsinki group was scheduled for June. There
was an appeal of Havel's conviction.
On appeal, and for no good reason, they reduced his sentence to
eight months in a first level prison. As a result he became eligible for
parole and release on May 15, a month before the meeting of the Hel-
sinki group, defusing the tension. Those who followed these events are
convinced that the reason for his release was that the Czechoslovaks
did not want to stand up in Paris at the meeting and justify this incred-
ibly stupid, outrageous violation of Havel's human rights.
There are other examples, that we all know, where external pressure
and public opinion have been crucial. It strikes me that among the
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things that we should be doing is focusing heavily on those factors and
trying to breath some life or put some teeth into some of the interna-
tional institutions, even if only in terms of exposure, making it possible
for them to visit and reveal what is taking place. We know that the
threat of a United Nations investigation of Cuba produced significant
improvements in the Cuban prison situation in 1987-88. That is the
kind of thing on which we should concentrate.
Dick Lillich suggested yesterday that there were too many human
rights organizations tripping over each other, and that they ought to
cooperate a little more, and not fight over turf. I disagree with that.
First, it is counsel of hopelessness. It is not going to happen. Every
organization needs money and every organization will fight for its turf
and for its share of publicity. Second, why not have many human rights
organizations? The more, the merrier. The more people talk, the more
people get involved, the more people are exposed, the more people try
to bring those who violate human rights and their governments to book,
the better it is. So what if there are turf fights? We have that in the
United States in the American civil liberties/civil rights community. It
is nothing more than annoying and is actually very useful.
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